‘My soul, consider what you should do’:[1] Psychological Conflicts and Moral Goodness in the Greek Novels

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Introduction

Psychological conflicts are a *topos* of the Greek novels. Time and again characters are shown to feel contrary feelings and to think contrary thoughts at once. Such conflicts, however, do not have all the same ethical purport. Consider these three examples, the first two from Chariton’s novel, the third from Achilles Tatius’:

– Callirhoe discovers that she is pregnant by her beloved Chaereas and knows that the only way to keep the child is to marry Dionysius, who loves her. Will she save the child or remain loyal to Chaereas?
– Dionysius is drowning in his love for Callirhoe but tries to keep his head above water to preserve his self-respect: in vain.
– Melite, in love with Clitophon and deceived in her hopes to marry him when Leucippe is found to be alive, is attacked by shame, jealousy, anger, and love: love wins, and she pleads with Clitophon for a one-time consummation of her passion.

While all these predicaments involve intense emotions, only Callirhoe and Dionysius are troubled by moral concerns. Callirhoe cannot find contentment, if she thinks she has done what is morally wrong. Dionysius resists his passion because he is ashamed of himself; he has no doubt that the good decision (βουλευομένῳ καλῶς) consists in opposing his desire (2. 4. 4-5).

[1] Chariton 6. 1. 9. Translations of the novels are generally taken, but sometimes adapted, from Reardon 1989.

Conversely, Melite disregards any ethical issue and is dragged to action by the emotion that dominates. She does not think of herself as a better or worse person depending on the course she chooses.

To be sure, the conflicts experienced by characters who oppose their erotic yearnings, like Dionysius, are not of the same kind as Callirhoe's dilemma. Callirhoe is faced with alternatives, either of which is morally demanding: stay chaste or have a family. Dionysius, in contrast, thinks he knows what is the right action but *cannot* act because his passion prevails; he is unable to follow the better course. But even so, his conflict has an ethical purport, because it is dictated by his aspiration to meet certain moral standards.

This paper will focus on these two kinds of conflicts. Instances of purely emotional conflicts will also be included, but only when they can throw light on a novel's treatment of conflicts involving moral considerations.[2] It will be suggested that novels make use of such conflicts, or not, in particular ways, and that the differences can be connected with differences in narrative styles and goals as well as with each novel's 'thought-world', that is, the set of values, moral, philosophical and theological, which underlies the characters' behavior and structures the plot.

Callirhoe: agônes *and the helplessness of human reason*

Of all the novelists Chariton is the keenest to develop psychological quandaries.[3] This penchant fits with his dramatic narrative style, which delights in the representation of tensions and divisions:[4] this novel is set in an 'agonis-

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[2] I will not to use the term 'moral conflict' in line with criticisms of such use as in Nussbaum 1986, 28-30. Though I still hold that inner conflicts driven by the desire to be a good person are different from purely emotional conflicts, at least in the world of the novel. The focus of this paper does not allow me to broach the larger question of the emotions in ancient or modern theories. For a thought-provoking treatment of those theories, see Konstan 2006, chapter 1. Extensive discussions of emotional conflicts in the novels are found in Fusillo 1990; Kytzler 2002; and Repath 2007. Repath, however, also includes Dionysius' and Calasiris' fights against their erotic desire (the latter in Heliodorus), which entail moral concerns.

[3] See Kaimio 1996, 55-56; Ruiz-Montero 1994, 1023 and the references in note 2.

[4] Chariton seems to have regarded the voicing of psychological tensions as perhaps the main component of drama. Here is a telling illustration: 'What dramatist ever staged such an astonishing story? It was like being at a play packed with passionate scenes, with emotions tumbling over each other—weeping and rejoicing, astonishment and pity, disbelief and prayers' (5. 8. 2-3). What in this theater one sees, rather, predominantly hears,

tic' world (expressions such as 'the crowd was divided' or 'opinions differed' are almost formulaic), of which conflicts driven by moral concerns are one aspect, as when Dionysius' soul is the theater of 'an ἀγῶνα between reason and passion' (2. 4. 4) or Artaxerxes, likewise ashamed of his love, engages in an ἀγών against himself (ἀνταγωνιζόμενος σεαυτῷ, 6. 3. 8).

Chariton's fondness for such conflicts is made clear from their distribution: they belong in the first place to Callirhoe, the protagonist, in the second to Dionysius, Chaereas' most important rival, and in the third to Artaxerxes, after Dionysius the main competitor for Callirhoe's favors. Chariton's is the only novel in which rivals in love wrestle with their passion instead of indulging it without scruples. Because of their qualms they rise to a higher moral stature than an Arsace (in Heliodorus), a Thersander (in Achilles Tatius), or a Manto (in Xenophon), and inspire sympathy when they inevitably succumb.

In particular, Dionysius' repeated aspiration to self-control casts him as Chaereas' antagonist in the fullest sense: a worthy rival rather than a villain, and a defender of the aristocratic ideal of self-mastery in contrast to the impulsive Chaereas. Dionysius tries again to win over his desire when he is given the unexpected news that Callirhoe wants marriage: though eager for immediate consummation, he 'forced himself to hold his head above the towering waves of his passion' to arrange for a public wedding (3. 2. 6-7)—and succeeds.[5] Dionysius aspires to fight his emotions once again after the shocking appearance of Chaereas at the trial: 'he tried to endure what was happening to him in a spirit of nobility, drawing on his natural stability of character and his disciplined good breeding' (5. 9. 8)—but fails, because 'the unbelievable disaster…might have driven even the bravest man (τὸν ἀνδρειότατον) out of his mind'.

Like Dionysius, Artaxerxes opposes his love for Callirhoe, like him in the name of ethical principles, namely *aidôs* (shame) and the force of the laws, and like him in vain. Artaxerxes' conflict is in many ways a repetition of Dionysius' first and major one. Both Dionysius and Artaxerxes begin by facing their passion alone, then confide in a servant, and in both cases a servant who has already guessed the truth; both lovers' 'good deliberation' to oppose their passion is attacked by Eros, and both resolve not to use violence

are a great variety of emotions. Chariton does not seem to have been impressed as much by the spectacular aspect of drama. See, in contrast, the use of θέατρον in Heliodorus (1. 1. 6) to describe a spectacle.

[5] On this passage, see Repath 2007, 67-68.

on Callirhoe, but ask the servant[6] to persuade her. The numerous parallels in the development of the two conflicts, however, highlight the different temperament and disposition of their protagonists.[7]

Dionysius strives to control himself because of his *paideia*, which urges him to reign in his instincts.[8] *Paideia* requires Dionysius to oppose (what he perceives as) an illicit passion, and later to find the courage (*andreia*) to endure his misfortune at Chaereas' reappearance.[9] Artaxerxes, on the other hand, is a good king but one who is tempted to behave like a tyrant, and whose inner turmoil concerns his power as much as his passion.

Dionysius' *paideia* urges him not only to fight his passion but also, paradoxically, to recognize the power of Eros. For, as evidence for Callirhoe's divine nature, he invokes the stories about gods constrained to associate with mortals (2. 4. 8). In contrast, Artaxerxes formerly considered himself superior to the power of love as described in those stories: 'I had heard what Love is like before now, in stories and poems; I had heard that he is master (κρατεῖ) of all the gods, even of Zeus, but all the same I did not believe that anybody could be more powerful than me at my own court. But the god is upon me' (6. 3. 2).

Artaxerxes configures his opposition to love in terms of, 'who is the more powerful?' To be sure, his attempt at asserting his power against Eros' reads like the noble struggle of a model ruler such as Xenophon's Cyrus, whose self-mastery entitles him to kingship. When the eunuch suggests to Artaxerxes the traditional remedy to love, consummation, he shudders at the prospect: I will not seduce another man's wife! 'Don't ascribe such lack of self-control (ἀκρασίαν) to me'! (6. 3. 8). Artaxerxes uses the philosophically loaded term ἀκρασία to describe the condition of a man who cannot master himself —and he claims not to be such a man. Of course the eunuch goes along, nurturing Artaxerxes' illusion that he is superior to all other men: just as the myths about the power of love apply to them, not to the King, the King will not apply the traditional remedy to love but a 'more powerful',

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[6] In Dionysius' case it is the servant's wife.

[7] The parallels reach down to diction and phrasing: both conflicts, as we have seen, are *agônes*. We shall also compare 2. 4. 6 ('It isn't fresh grief come over you at the death of your lady, is it?' 'It is a lady, yes,' said Dionysius, 'but not the one who is dead') and 6. 3. 1-2 ('I am worried in case some plot'— 'A plot, yes,' cried the king, 'a massive plot, but not laid by a man').

[8] Dionysius' *paideia* is mentioned each time he fights his emotions: 2. 4. 1; 3. 2. 6; 5. 9. 8; 8. 5. 10. See Repath 2007, 68; Morgan 2007, 27.

[9] On the connection between *paideia* and *andreia*, see Jones 2007, 123.

κρείττονα, one, a contest with oneself. For he alone 'can master (κρατεῖν) even a god'.

By celebrating the King's power over men and gods, however, the eunuch invites him to slide from philosophical self-restraint to the temptation of tyrannical license. Unable to apply the 'more powerful' remedy, Artaxerxes readily welcomes the eunuch's legal quibbling, 'the woman you love has no husband, therefore don't be afraid of breaking the law about adultery': 'The King approved this argument, because it tended to his pleasure' (6. 4. 8). From now on, he refrains only from violence and is held back only by fear of being seen ('If I wanted to slake my desire openly and by force, I have guards available'). The eunuch's increasing threats to Callirhoe betray the pressure he is put under by the King's unrestrained desire. To prevent Callirhoe from either killing herself or being forced to have sex with the King, Chariton abruptly introduces a new development, the outbreak of the war engineered by Tyche (6. 8. 1).

We shall contrast Artaxerxes' aggressive behavior with Dionysius' heroic resignation. Like Artaxerxes, Dionysius urges his loyal servant to bring Callirhoe around, but when this fails, he resolves for death by starvation, ἀποκαρτερεῖν ἐγνώκει (3. 1. 1). This decision casts him as the deserving competitor of the novel's hero, like him sick with love and ready to die for it. The intervention of Fortune, another parallel in the staging of Dionysius' and Artaxerxes' conflicts, rewards, so to speak, Dionysius, whereas it punishes Artaxerxes: by initiating the war Fortune frustrates Artaxerxes' hopes, for it banishes 'all thought and all discussion of love'; by revealing Callirhoe's pregnancy (2. 8. 3), Fortune sets off the chain of deliberations that lead her to marry Dionysius at the outcome of the novel's most elaborate psychological conflict.

The deployment of Callirhoe's dilemma at this juncture aims to defend her morals. In her predicament the only truly honorable option would be suicide, which indeed occurs to her in the course of her reflections (2. 11. 3 and 4, and perhaps 1). But of course Callirhoe cannot die. A second *Scheintod* would not solve the problem because Callirhoe would wake up still with child.[10] What can she do then to keep both her life and her morals, especially in a world in which to abort and to remarry both bear a stigma?[11]

[10] The possibility of miscarriage, with its crude realism, would clash with the spirit and the style of this novel.

[11] Reardon 2003 (1996), 330 points out that Chariton's novel fits with the contemporary official emphasis on 'chastity, fidelity, stable marriage and family values'. In Callirhoe's case, these aspirations enter into conflict with one another.

In the first act of the dilemma Callirhoe shows respect for her society's norms by deciding to keep the child. As she reconsiders her first inclination to dispose of it, she draws the readers' sympathy and approval by contrasting herself with Medea and by upholding family values: the child (assuredly a male) will sail to Syracuse, find his father and grandfather, and restore his parents to each other. In addition she pre-empts, so to speak, accusations of infidelity by coming to her decision before knowing that the only way to keep the child is to marry Dionysius, and by capitalizing on the words Chaereas tells her in a dream ('I entrust our son to you, my wife'): 'So on her husband's advice, as she thought, she decided to rear her child' (2. 9. 6). Based on Chaereas' words Callirhoe builds solidarity between husband, wife and child as she is about to remarry.

The second act of the dilemma gives Callirhoe's decision an even stronger moral imprimatur. The very frame of her quandary spells out that her choice will be in any case acceptable, having 'a wife's loyalty on one side, a mother's love on the other' (2. 10. 8). In the first act Callirhoe imagined the child would help reunite the family in his adult age; now, in a climax, she sees him in his public role as the worthy heir of his grandfather Hermocrates. Callirhoe consistently puts her more intimate wishes aside in favor of communal expectations.[12] As far as she is concerned, she would die the wife of Chaereas alone, fidelity for her being 'dearer than parents or country or child' (2. 11. 1). But she has set off to decide not for herself but 'what is best for us all' (*ibid.*). By privileging the demands of society over her personal inclinations she both dispels any suspicion that she might be attracted to Dionysius and puts forward her selflessness and commitment to higher values than her immediate emotional gratification. The repeated emphasis on her unwillingness to do what she is about to do (2. 11. 1, 4 and 5) points to a tension between her as a private person, as it were, and in her social roles —which she chooses to honor— as wife of Chaereas, mother of his child, and daughter of Hermocrates. The second act, which began with her casting a negative vote for the child and for marriage, ends with Chaereas, her 'adviser' (σύμβουλον 2. 9. 6), urging her to choose both: it is Chaereas who takes her to the altar (2. 11. 4).

Callirhoe's decision, however, no matter how much dictated by a synergic devotion to Chaereas, Syracuse and the child, splits her allegiances. She becomes double in her marital bond, and soon also in her sentiments. Though she loves Chaereas, even at the time of his unexpected 'resurrection' at the trial in Babylon, she feels 'respect' for Dionysius (5. 8. 6: αἰδουμένη),

[12] See Perkins 1995, 69.

which does not escape Chaereas’ notice (5. 10. 7: ᾐδεῖτο). Callirhoe’s farewell letter to Dionysius shows her strongly attached to him, for it ends with the possessive ‘yours’: ‘Fare you well, good Dionysius, and remember your Callirhoe (Καλλιρόης μνημόνευε τῆς σῆς)’ (8. 4. 6). The possessive in itself is emphatic in Greek; and the word-order adds more emphasis by separating name and adjective and placing the latter at the end. We shall compare, in Xenophon’s novel, and in a love-declaration, Ἀνθίας τῆς ἐμῆς (2. 1. 4), though with no separation between name and adjective. The closest in style to Callirhoe’s phrase is this question of Chaereas to Mithridates, ‘Where did you see my Callirhoe (...ποῦ γὰρ σὺ Καλλιρόην εἶδες τὴν ἐμήν;)?’ (4. 3. 8). Callirhoe’s last words to Dionysius echo, as it were, Chaereas’ expression of love for her. I see only two possible interpretations of her signature: either she is exaggerating to the point of deluding Dionysius into believing that she loves him, or she is indeed, somewhere in her heart, ‘his Callirhoe’.

Callirhoe’s affection for her second husband prevents her original conflict from reaching a definitive solution. For, to alleviate his sorrow, she decides to leave her child with him and keeps him in the illusion that it is his, yet she also plans for the child to come to Syracuse some time in the future to be reunited with its real family. Her decision opens up a sequel and creates instability: what will her son do when, an adult man, he finds out the truth? What will Dionysius do?

The lack of a definitive solution to Callirhoe’s conflict might be reflected in the novel’s relatively open ending. *Callirhoe* draws the curtain, not on the reunited couple, but on a picture of separation: Chaereas in the theater, Callirhoe in the temple; he in public, she in private; he telling their story, she asking Aphrodite that she not be parted from Chaereas again. Will the goddess grant her prayer? Though she is now reconciled with the couple, she gives no answer. The novel ends in suspension, not with ‘and they lived happily ever after’.[13] And the suspension not only concerns ‘Fortune’s fickle ways’ or Aphrodite’s plans (what if Chaereas has another attack of jealousy? [cf. 8. 1. 15]), but perhaps can be extended to Callirhoe’s future wishes. Unlike the other heroines of novels, Callirhoe experiences little hardship in her journeys abroad: she lives in luxury, lavished with attention.[14] In contrast, at the end she is back in a provincial city and in the only public space tradition-

[13] Reardon 2003 (1996), 312 calls Callirhoe’s wish at the end ‘no doubt prophetic’, but there is no evidence for this except the conventions of the genre. Fusillo 1997 notices the question mark at the end of *Callirhoe*.

[14] Perkins 1995, 55-58 correctly points out that novelistic heroes and heroines are regularly restored to their upper-class lifestyle even during their misadventures. But many of them endure physical pain and repeated humiliations, whereas Callirhoe hardly does.

ally allowed to women, the temple, and the same temple where we first meet her at the beginning of the novel, on her social debut. She is pushed back to square one, so to speak—in a perfectly circular, regressive, movement. Will she contently resume a domestic life with no suitors or glamour?[15]

In spite of its importance for the novel's economy, however, Callirhoe's dilemma does not highlight her freedom to make decisions. In Chariton inner struggles do not bring out the agents' autonomy but their powerlessness in the face of the gods or fortune, which ultimately decide for them and even against them. Dionysius' and Artaxerxes' attempts to dominate their passion are nullified by the intervention of an offended Eros, who cannot bear his adversary's 'philosophical' resistance (2. 4. 5-6). In both cases the god counters the lover's 'good decision' (2. 4. 5; 6. 4. 5), his hubristic aspiration to self-restraint, *sôphrosynê* (2. 4. 5), by setting his soul on fire (2. 4. 5; 6. 4. 5).

But one could object: is not Callirhoe a freer agent when she weighs her two options and makes her choice? According to Aristotle, the decision following a dilemma, though forced on us by constraining circumstances, is closer to a voluntary than an involuntary action. Take the case of a tyrant's subject, compelled to choose whether to do something shameful or see his family killed, or of a merchant caught in a storm, who resolves to throw his cargo overboard to save his crew and himself (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1110a4-17). Though in both predicaments the agent is under pressure, the decision comes from him ('the origin is in the agent'), and thus spells out his moral autonomy.[16] Does not Callirhoe's choice likewise originate in her?

Let us first deal briefly with a feature of the narrative which might suggest, but wrongly, that Callirhoe is no free agent: Chaereas' decisive role in determining her course of action. One might interpret his intervention as minimizing the responsibility of the agent. But this line of argument is no more valid if applied to characters of novels than it is for Homeric heroes. Divine intervention in the latter's decision-making process does not exempt the agent from moral responsibility, nor is such intervention coercive: the hero can always choose not to follow the advice, and feels personally liable for his decisions even if they have been 'caused' by divine agency.[17] In the same way, Callirhoe decides to listen to Chaereas' recommendation, but she is free not to do so.

Nonetheless, when Callirhoe sets out to ponder the fate of her unborn child, we readers are better informed than she about her upcoming decision,

[15] See Schmeling 2007, 28.

[16] For an excellent discussion of dilemmas in Aristotle, see Gottlieb, 2009, chapter 6.

[17] See the lucid assessment of this issue by Gaskin 1990, 6.

and more inclined to see her as the dupe of Fortune than a free agent. For Callirhoe’s dilemma is initiated by Tyche, who intends to attack her chastity by revealing her pregnancy. Tyche, in addition, enters the stage as the always-victorious competitor against human endeavors. Right before giving the details of Tyche’s action, Chariton comments: ‘…Fortune, against whom alone human calculation has no power. For Fortune relishes victory, and anything may be expected of her’ (2. 8. 3). Chariton’s emphasis on Tyche’s role and power *just before* the occurrence of the dilemma is significant, for he could have created the setting for Callirhoe’s discovery of her pregnancy naturally, by simply saying, as he eventually does, that Callirhoe took a bath in the presence of her confidante, and the latter, versed in women’s things, noticed her swelling belly. The stress on the intervention of Tyche and on the ineffectiveness of *human reasoning* (λογισμὸς ἀνθρώπου) before her, forcefully brings out Callirhoe’s lack of autonomy at this crucial juncture.

Given this frame, the readers can anticipate that Callirhoe will surrender her chastity because Tyche has so decided: when the dilemma takes shape, they already know what the outcome will be. Callirhoe is guided in her decision in order for her subsequent actions to accord with the schemes of Fortune, who writes a new script, *drama*, when she so wishes, ruling lives from above the stage.

The employment of *drama* to signify a turn of events decided by Tyche fits within this novel’s stress on the impotence of human intelligence in the face of those events. Things are ‘dramas’ because they deceive us;[18] things are ‘dramas’ because we cannot decide on their course. When Mithridates, who wants to help Chaereas recover his wife, tells him, ‘Fortune…has involved you in a grim *drama*’ (4. 4. 2), he spells out that Chaereas is only the actor, Tyche the director. Mithridades urges his protégé to deliberate carefully instead of acting impulsively as he does, ‘according to passion rather than reason’ (πάθει μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ). Chaereas should consider the new script that Fortune is writing, now that she has married his wife to another; he should ‘prudently decide’ (βουλεύσασθαι δεῖ ... φρονιμώτερον) what to do next. Yet, the plan he carries out following Mithridates’ advice —to test Callirhoe by letter— fails because Fortune has yet another end in mind. Chaereas’ inability to act ‘according to reason rather than passion’ ultimately does not need to be corrected, for reason, in spite of Mithridates’ hopes, cannot plan.

[18] *drama* can be referred to a situation which confounds its interpreter. For instance, Artaxerxes thinks that Callirhoe is a goddess who is putting up a *drama* (6. 3. 6).

This belief in the ineffectiveness of human reason before Eros or Fortune is encoded in a scene in Book 6 in which Chariton sets the stage for Callirhoe to face a second dilemma, but does not let it unfold: 'Lady', the King's eunuch warns her, 'I will give you a chance to think about it [yielding to the King's desire]. You should not consider yourself alone, but Chaereas as well. He is in danger of dying a miserable death; the King will not tolerate being outdone in love'. Chariton comments: these words 'touched (ἥψατο) Callirhoe's mind' (6. 7. 13). We do not learn anything, however, about her qualms, because Tyche rushes in to put a quick end to all thoughts of love.

The suppression of Callirhoe's second dilemma by the abrupt intervention of Fortune brings out the powerlessness of human deliberation in the face of that unknown and unmanageable ruler. The meditation on Fortune's dominance over 'human calculation', which frames Callirhoe's first dilemma, escalates to a practical demonstration of Fortune's power to silence the voice of moral reasoning.

Never have moral doubts: 'Stoic' determination in An Ephesian Tale

Habrocomes and Anthia have fallen prisoners to a Phoenician. His daughter Manto, in love with Habrocomes, summons the couple's loyal servant, Rhode, to play the go-between lest she experience the wrath of a 'Barbarian woman'. The girl is between a rock and a hard place, ἐν ἀμηχάνῳ κακῷ (translated as 'dilemma' by Graham Anderson). She does not want to harm Anthia but is afraid for her own life and Leucon, her lover's. Unable to decide, she passes the problem on to Leucon, who resolves to talk to Habrocomes (2. 3. 3-8).

Moral doubts trouble also the Ephesian doctor who has befriended Anthia as she is about to marry Perilaus. Horrified at the prospect, she showers her new friend with gifts in return for a deadly potion. The doctor is in a quandary: he 'gave the matter a great deal of thought and was sorry for the girl's plight; he wanted to return to Ephesus; and won over by the money and the gifts, he promised to give her the poison' (3. 5. 9). The doctor's pity for the girl might suggest that he is truly thinking of providing the lethal drug in spite of the medical deontology, as codified in the Hippocratic oath. If this is the case, he is experiencing a dilemma between morally demanding claims: 'help a desperate girl?' or 'abide by the dictates of the profession?' or even, 'break my oath to her?' (He has sworn to do what she asks) 'or to the physicians' guild?' But the text's emphasis on his captivation by the

proffered gifts shows what his primary motive is, and rather suggests that he is wondering what to do to keep them. He resolves to give Anthia a sleeping potion making her believe it is a deadly one. Though as a doctor he behaves ethically, as a friend he betrays the girl’s confidence. Indeed, Anthia laments that she has been cheated as soon as she wakes up from her death-like sleep (3. 8. 1). A morally better course might have been to refuse the money and say no to her request, but this would have put Anthia in the predicament of having to marry Perilaus and break her oath of fidelity to Habrocomes. From the point of view of the novel’s economy the doctor does the right thing: he allows the heroine to stay both chaste and alive—but at the cost of deceiving her, and for material gain.

The doctor and Rhode are the only characters to experience dilemmas in Xenophon’s novel, and both characters are morally weak.[19] The protagonists, the unfailingly virtuous duo, never experience a dilemma. They always know what the right action is, and it always is: ‘whatever it takes to stay loyal to the other’.

A possible reason Xenophon makes no use of dilemmas to characterize his protagonists is that he presents them in a Stoicizing light.[20] Of course, it could hardly be argued that any ancient novel is a philosophical manifesto; but perhaps it is also an exaggeration to call philosophical elements in the genre just a coloring, with no deeper significance.[21] Though Platonism is the dominant philosophical presence in the extant novels, owing to both its popularity[22] and the narrative productiveness of certain of its features (namely its psychology, which satisfies the novels’ penchant for dramatic scenes), Stoicism is prominent as well. It is to the credit of Judith Perkins to have pointed this out, and other scholars have followed her lead.[23] The Stoic aspiration to dissociate oneself from external events, to put up with them by not giving them one’s ‘assent’, could be used effectively in scenes of torture or

[19] Perhaps also the goatherd to whom Anthia is ‘married’ faces a dilemma when he is ordered to kill her but decides to sell her instead (2. 11. 6-7). He, too, is weak in spite of his goodness, for, fearing his mistress, he tells her of her husband’s love for Anthia (2. 11. 2).

[20] The Stoics apparently tried to account for the existence of conflicts in ordinary persons, though their psychology made such an account difficult. For a reconstruction of the Chrysippean attempt to explain *akrasia*, see Joyce 1995, 315-335. The protagonists of Xenophon’s novel, however, are no ordinary persons.

[21] For a balanced position on this issue, see Morales 2004.

[22] Especially in the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD: see Repath 2007.

[23] Perkins 1995, 77-103. Most recently, see Doulamis 2007, on Xenophon.

other hardships to convey the heroes' courage, steadiness of purpose, and inner freedom.

It is true that such use does not necessarily assume a Stoic creed on the part of the author. One of the episodes which best demonstrates the novels' exploitation of Stoic motifs is in Achilles Tatius, who knows his philosophy but pokes fun at it, especially in the domain of sexuality. This novel is no endorsement of the Stoic ideal of sexual abstention, with the young couple planning to make love outside of marriage and the male protagonist actually doing so with another woman. Yet the heroine, faced with the threat of torture by a tyrannical suitor, speaks like a Stoic: 'take up the whips against me, the rack, the fire, the sword…I am unarmed, alone, a woman, but one weapon I have, my freedom, which cannot be shredded by lashes, dismembered by sharp blades, or burned away by fire. That possession I will never surrender (6. 22. 4)'.

Xenophon's novel, however, is not the playful pastiche Achilles Tatius' is. The consistency with which Xenophon resorts to Stoic motifs, joined with the absence of clear Platonic ones, might suggest that he sympathized with the teachings of the Stoa.[24] As far as psychological conflicts are concerned, it might be significant that Xenophon does not posit divisions in the soul, in a vaguely Platonizing-Aristotelian fashion.[25] This is best illustrated by the description of Habrocomes wrestling with the onset of love.

Habrocomes' opposition to his passion is more emphatically exhibited than any other character's: whereas in other cases the painful fight is shown through silence and sickness rather than a display of eloquence,[26] Habrocomes openly battles with love by denying currency to the dynamics that makes people fall in love. He will not let Anthia's beauty pass from the eyes to the soul and thus become the cause of love: 'the girl is beautiful: what then? To your eyes, Habrocomes, Anthia is beautiful, but, if you so will (ἐὰν θέλῃς), not to you (σοί)' (1. 4. 3).

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[24] Dalmeyda (in the Belles Lettres edition) notes several Stoicizing passages in Xenophon. For more in-depth analysis, see Doulamis 2007. This scholar proposes that Xenophon's 'Stoicism' is reflected in the simplicity of his style, which accords with Stoic conceptions about rhetoric. Jones 2007, 116-17 observes that the representation of Anthia's courage has Stoic overtones, namely, it reflects Musonius' teaching that women should possess *andreia* but apply it to the defense of their chastity.

[25] In several passages (1. 9. 1; 1. 11. 1; 2. 5. 5; 3. 7. 1; 5. 13. 3), Xenophon records the coexistence of many emotions in the same person, but does not use terminology which would suggest a divided soul (the 'spirited' part versus the 'rational' one, or even 'reason' versus 'passion').

[26] Clitophon also fights his love dramatically, but his conflict, as I shall argue below, is a sham one.

From a metaliterary perspective Xenophon is laying bare a stereotypical motif of the genre. Habrocomes undoes the *topos* that beauty streams from the eyes into the soul; that the eyes are the channels of love.[27] He divorces the eyes from himself and wishes to block communication between eyes and mind. It is as if Xenophon wanted his hero to fight against his narrative destiny as a novelistic lover. Habrocomes refuses to play the role he conventionally has to play, and his refusal, which might for a brief moment be thought of as successful in light of Hippolytus, his model's, unbreakable opposition to Eros, emphasizes both his moral defeat and the obligation for him to yield to the literary constraints that fetter his character-type.

In opposing his (novelistic) passion, Habrocomes uses Stoic language. Shortly before being wounded, he trusted in his will to steer clear of Eros: 'no one would love or submit to the god *against his will* (μὴ θέλων)' (1. 1. 5). Habrocomes Stoically thinks that passion is or derives from the endorsement of an impression which one is free to give or not. Accordingly, when Eros attacks him, he is ready to beat back the onslaught with the force of his will. A comparison with similar scenes in Chariton brings out the Stoicizing flavor of Habrocomes' aspirations: in Chariton such battles against love are presented as a 'fight between reason and passion',[28] with reason trying to suppress passion. This representation of inner struggles implies a divided soul. In Xenophon the battle is not between reason and passion but between a body part, Habrocomes' eyes, and his *self*:[29] Habrocomes confines the sensorial impression to the eyes, whereas his self (σοί) is the free will, which decides whether to attach value or not to what the eyes see. Contrary to Chariton, Xenophon puts emphasis on the will's opposition to passion even when Eros finally wins: 'the god pressed on him even more; he dragged him along as he resisted, and tortured him *against his will* (μὴ θέλοντα)'.[30]

Once he gives in to passion and marries, Habrocomes' Stoic aspirations concentrate on fidelity. For him and his wife fidelity is an unquestionable

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[27] On the close association between ὁρᾶν (*horan*: to see) and ἐρᾶν (*eran*: to love), see Morales 2004, 18. Morales cites the etymology of Eros proposed in Plato's *Cratylus*: '*Eros* is so called because it flows (εἰσρεῖ) from without and this flowing is not inherent in him who has it, but is introduced through the eyes' (420a5-b1).

[28] 2. 4. 4; 5. 10. 6.

[29] See Perkins 1995, 92; Doulamis 2007, 153-154.

[30] Xenophon seems to have in mind the scene of Dionysius' fight against love, as is indicated by the almost identical description of Eros' intervention: in both cases Eros increases his charge (σφοδρότερον in Chariton 2. 4. 5; σφοδρότερος in Xenophon 1. 4. 4) and condemns the lover's arrogance (Chariton 2. 4. 5; Xenophon 1. 4. 5).

principle in Stoic terms, even if the price to pay for it is death.[31] Seneca's poignant formula, 'I will not endure myself the day I find anything unendurable' (*Ep*. 96. 1), could apply to their relationship: Anthia and Habrocomes find nothing unendurable if their fidelity is at stake, and endure themselves no more if they cannot keep it. *Mutatis mutandis*, one can read our heroes' commitment to each other as a romantic version of Cato the Younger's commitment to freedom (as read by Stoic authors) at all costs. Habrocomes defends his 'principle' even if he risks harming other people as well as himself. Consider his resolution, when Manto falls in love with him, to stay loyal to Anthia though it is clear that by doing so he will put in danger the people around him. 'What are we to decide?' asks Leucon, and he pleads with Habrocomes: 'decide as you think fit, but save us all' (2. 4. 2). Leucon's exhortation builds the premise for a dilemma, which Habrocomes, however, does not experience. He responds indignantly and in Stoic language,[32] stressing his inner freedom and that he will never consent to betray Anthia—we must add: even if Anthia should die as a consequence. We recall Callirhoe's response to a similar predicament: when pressed to yield to Artaxerxes lest Chaereas be killed, we are led to guess that she sets out to ponder what to do, that she feels caught in a dilemma. She is 'touched' or 'affected' (ἥψατο) by the eunuch's threats, not just straightforwardly 'pained' (ἤχθετο) (2.5.3) as Habrocomes by Manto's proposal.

Habrocomes' and Anthia's unfamiliarity with dilemmas matches the taste for symmetry typical of Xenophon's novel. It is well known that Xenophon creates parallelisms down to the last detail so as to make the protagonists so much alike that no conflict or even contrast is possible between them just as within them. In Chariton the couple are far from similar in their ways: she has dilemmas, he does not; she is emotional yet thoughtful, he is impulsive; he is much more suicidal than she.[33] Xenophon replaces contrasts and

[31] It is true that both protagonists, yielding to pressure, agree to marriage, Habrocomes with Kyno (3. 12. 4-5), Anthia with Perilaus (2. 13. 7-8). But in Anthia's case the agreement seems to be purely nominal: she consents in order to deflate violence ('she was afraid that he would try something more desperate') and begs for a delay. Her prudence compares with Leucippe's or Charicleia's when they pretend to agree to the advances of their suitors (Charmides and Thyamis respectively) fearing lest they apply force, and also ask for a delay. Habrocomes has a moment of wavering (he thinks of the harm chastity has done him), but as soon as Kyno kills her husband, he recovers his determination and flees. Both lovers pay the highest price for their fidelity, 'death': see Perkins 1995, 68-69.

[32] See Perkins 1995, 92; Doulamis 2007, 157.

[33] See Konstan 1994, 16: 'Suicide seems to be Chaereas' instinctive reaction to any serious obstacle, whether physical or moral'.

conflicts —Chariton’s favorite mode— with full correspondences in stretches of the plot and in the characterization of the protagonists, who are identical with each other just as they are identical with themselves.[34]

Enlightening in all these respects is the scene in which Anthia and Habrocomes are both summoned to yield to their respective powerful suitors, the pirates Euxinos and Corymbos, read against that in which Callirhoe is first confronted by Artaxerxes’ eunuch with a similar demand. Callirhoe, left alone, vents her emotions, then urges herself to decide (βούλευσαι) on something noble, suicide, and finally changes her mind because, so she says, the situation is not serious enough (6. 6. 5). From highly emotional she becomes heroically minded, and from heroically minded pragmatically sober. And she is by herself. Xenophon’s protagonists are together and speak in one voice: to Corymbos, who intercedes with Anthia in favor of Euxinos, ‘she gave…the same answer’ [as Habrocomes], namely she asked for some time to decide (βουλεύσασθαι: 1. 16. 7; see 1. 16. 6). Back in their room, they begin their lamentation literally in unison (‘O father’, they said, ‘o mother, o dearest fatherland, friends and relatives’, 2. 1. 2), then they vie with each other in mourning their fate, with Anthia echoing Habrocomes’ opening exclamation (‘Oh, ill-fortuned ones!’ ‘ah, our ills!’).[35] Their duet ends with the resolve to die, which is presented as a rational decision along Stoic lines (2. 1. 6: δεδόχθω).[36]

The entire scene can be read as a confrontation with fate in a Stoic mood. Euxinos and Corymbos present their prisoners’ situation as fate-induced, and preach *amor fati* to them: ‘…you must put everything down to fortune, be content with (στέργειν) the fate that rules over you’ (1. 16. 3). But of course the pirates exploit this maxim of wisdom to dress up their abuse of power (δεσπότης, tyrant, recurs time and again in their speeches). They distort Stoicizing motifs in a way reminiscent of Seneca’s Medea, when she says, *Fortuna opes auferre, non animum potest* (‘Fortune can take away wealth, but not one’s spirit’, *Medea* 176), by *animum* meaning, however, not the strength to put up with hardship, but the courage to take revenge; or, *Fortuna semper omnis infra me stetit* (‘All ways of fortune were always below me’,

[34] As just one example, we shall recall that both lovers know whom they are going to marry; both respond in exactly the same way to the happy news; and both have exactly the same feelings on their wedding night. Conversely, Callirhoe does not know whom she is marrying, while Chaereas does. Konstan’s argument (1994) that the novels are built around the ideal of ‘sexual symmetry’ works best for *An Ephesian Story*.

[35] On the virtual identity of Habrocomes’ and Anthia’s speeches, see Konstan 1994, 25.

[36] Anthia again *resolves* to kill herself (δεδόχθω ταῦτα) on the eve of her marriage with Perilaus (3. 6. 3).

520), meaning, not that she is indifferent to fortune, but that she is was always able to gain the upper hand. Whereas Euxinos and his friend resort to Stoicizing maxims for their lascivious ends, Anthia and Habrocomes respond to their predicament as true Stoics. 'Love your fate or die,' says the Stoic. Unable to love their fate, the young couple decides to die. Their suicide would meet with a Stoic's approval also as the correct response to the abuses of autocratic power.[37] While Callirhoe does not abide by this ideal, Habrocomes and Anthia are firmly set on it and are saved only by an incident.[38]

The irrelevance of dilemmas in this novel is also related to the gods' behavior. In *Callirhoe* the gods' will remains opaque to the human players. Dreams are the only form of communication from gods to men, and they occur when the gods, not men, want so. Gods do not answer prayers.[39] Callirhoe's dilemma(s) occur(s) because she cannot foresee what is in store for her. Though she is guided in solving her first quandary, she does not know, as we do, that her decision fulfils the plan of Tyche. The separation between the divine and the human plane in *Callirhoe* allows for dilemmas.

In Xenophon the gods are closer to the human actors. Aphrodite's silence in response to Callirhoe's prayer, 'show me if Chaereas is alive!' (7. 5. 5), contrasts with Apis' unambiguous answer to Anthia consulting his oracle on her chances to be reunited with Habrocomes (5. 4. 10-11). The couple feel the presence of divine forces and even abandon themselves to them. On two occasions Habrocomes hands himself over to the Nile's god (at 4. 2), and Anthia counts on Isis. Whereas in Chariton the happy ending is brought about by a reconciled goddess who stops Fortune's wicked plan, in Xenophon it is inscribed in the divine will since the beginning, encoded as it is in the oracle. The reactions of the two couples of parents to the latter, one pessimistic because of the dreadful predictions, one optimistic 'considering the end of the prophecy' (1. 10. 8), encompass the novel's entire plot and push the readers to connect it with divine will from the start and in every detail, including the happy ending. Undermining dilemmas by Xenophon is in keeping with his novel's stronger religious teleology.

[37] See Doulamis 2007, 156.

[38] We shall also compare Callirhoe's and Anthia's behavior when they awake from their death-like sleep: the former pleads for her life (1. 9. 5); the latter begs the robbers to let her die (3. 8. 4-5).

[39] Aphrodite lets her will be known only once, and to reject Callirhoe's prayer: see 2. 2. 8. The goddess does not answer any other of her prayers (1. 1. 8; 3. 2. 12-14; 3. 8. 7-9; 7. 5. 2-5; 8. 4. 10) or the one by Chaereas (3. 6. 3).

Leucippe and Clitophon: poking fun at moral aspirations

Achilles Tatius is the master of emotional conflicts. As Ian Repath has shown, these conflicts are fashioned with the tools of Platonic psychology, except that the reasoning faculty, the *logismon*, is replaced by another passion.[40] The theater of these upheavals is especially Thersander, a character with no redeeming feature, whose unbridled soul cannot live up to Platonic ideals.[41]

Better characters, however, are also the prey to such conflicts. For instance, the generous and urbane Melite experiences four emotions, shame, anger, love, and jealousy, when she finds out that Leucippe, her rival, is alive (5. 25-26). Reconfigured as 'anger and grief' on the one hand and 'love' on the other, the two camps give a speech, with love speaking last, that is, winning the contest.[42] The victory of Eros' speech in this 'philosophical' display of eloquence (5. 27. 1)—where 'philosophy' is at the service of Eros, not in opposition to it— is straightaway implemented by Melite's offer of her body to Clitophon. Had she not yielded to love, however, she would not have followed the commands of reason but would have acted prompted by anger and grief.

Leucippe and Clitophon are also beset by emotional conflicts, Clitophon at the very onset of love: all manners of feelings seize him, 'admiration, amazement, trembling, shame, shamelessness' (1. 4. 5).[43] Shame and fear, the restraining forces, lose. The eyes he tries to avert from the girl have a will of their own (οὐκ ἤθελον), which keeps them fixed on her. Clitophon reverses the terms of Habrocomes' fight by attributing a will not to himself (Gaselee's translation 'they won the day against my will' adds to the Greek), but to his eyes. Whereas Habrocomes by his will tries to stop the visual impression from reaching his true self, Clitophon acknowledges the power of that impression in one of those maxims that rubberstamp what is happening to an individual (in this case himself) by generalizing the experience and

[40] Repath 2007, 73-77.

[41] A telling contrast between Thersander and Dionysius is their response to the assault of the "third wave," or the strongest onslaught of passion: whereas Dionysius tries to rise above it (3. 2. 7: ἐκ τρικυμίας), Thersander sets off to act on it (7. 1. 2: εἰς τὴν διάκρισιν τῆς τρικυμίας).

[42] In conventions of (fictional) forensic rhetoric, the last to speak is the winner. Achilles, however, on other occasions scrambles these 'rules': see Morales, 2004, 148.

[43] See also 2. 29. 1; 5. 19. 1.

presenting it as a recognized fact with 'scientific' authority:[44] 'beauty…through the eyes flows into the soul. The eye is the channel for love's wound'. Far from attempting to block the communication between eyes and mind, Clitophon gives force to the popular etymology of Eros as reported in Plato's *Cratylus*, as a *flow* (εἰσρεῖ) through the eyes (420a5-b1):[45] beauty is a stream running down to the soul (1. 4. 4: καταρρεῖ), which cannot be dammed up.

Countering the frequency of purely emotional conflicts in *Leucippe and Clitophon* is the absence of serious quandaries dictated by moral concerns. The less idealistic spirit of this novel is reflected in the mocking of moral tensions of the kind we find in other novels. Dilemmas do not appear at all. Fights against love, though exuberantly delivered, are half sincere at best. Clitophon stages two such fights. At 1. 11. 3, he tells his cousin that he 'lies in between two opponents', Eros, armed with fire, and his father, equipped with *aidôs* (αἰδοῖ κρατῶν). How will he decide the contest? Though he wants to vote for his father, he falters because Eros is the stronger opponent: he is attacking the judge himself.

Both context and style show in Clitophon a weakly motivated fighter—if he is fighting at all. Before this episode there is no hint that he opposes his passion (except for his brief attempt to drag his eyes away from the girl). On the contrary, he readily excuses his lack of self-restraint by invoking the gods' example. All a-blaze with love after hearing a song about Apollo pursuing Daphne, he finds arguments in that myth to justify his state: 'stories of love stir feelings of lust. In spite of all our admonitions to moderation (εἰς σωφροσύνην), models excite us to imitation, particularly a pattern set by our better' (1. 5. 6). Apollo pursuing Daphne allows Clitophon to blame his 'shame' (αἰδώς) and 'inappropriate moderation' (1. 5. 7: σὺ δὲ ὀκνεῖς καὶ αἰδῇ καὶ ἀκαίρως σωφρονεῖς;) rather than his yielding to love, and gives his own pursuit a divine imprimatur. We can contrast Clitophon with Dionysius, who does not identify with the voice of Eros blaming his 'hubristic *sôphrosynê*'.

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[44] I subscribe to Morgan's interpretation of *sententiae* in Achilles: 'Their function is to illustrate that the behaviour of the fictional characters and their world conforms to normative statements acceptable as descriptions of the real world' (1993, 202). This passage is discussed by Morales, who offers an insightful analysis of the effects of *sententiae* on the reader (2004, 108-122).

[45] The reference is to a *popular* etymology, not Platonic thought. Parallels have been suggested between this passage (and others [1. 9. 4-5; 5. 13. 4] in which also appears the 'flow' of beauty) and the theory of beauty's effluence in Plato's *Phaedrus* (e.g. 251b). See, however, the cautionary warnings of Morales 2004, 130-35, especially 132.

Moreover Clitophon's quandary occurs at the end of a detailed consultation with his cousin about how to seduce Leucippe. Is Clitophon suddenly held back by moral scruples? If he is, his doubts concern, not the appropriateness of pursuing Leucippe, but his fear lest his passion grow even stronger and yet he be unable to satisfy it with marriage because he is promised to another (1. 11. 1-2). Which is tantamount to saying: were he sure that sex could quench his fire, he would go ahead, as his opening words spell out: '…you have given me the most admirable provision for the journey (ἐφόδια), and I pray that I may arrive safely' (translation by Gaselee). Clitophon hesitates to embark on the journey of seduction because he is worried on his own behalf, not because he blushes at the prospect. David Konstan has a point calling Clitophon's qualms 'comic'.[46]

The conflict in Clitophon's mind is cast as a contest featuring two adversaries, with Clitophon playing the role of judge. Whereas Dionysius sides with reason and tries to silence the voice of love, Clitophon, in his capacity as judge, shows himself willing to give both parties a hearing. In addition he is a judge who, though he claims he would vote for his father, is already submitting to Eros, as he both admits (1. 11. 3) and shows by leaving the god the stage at the end of the contest. We can again contrast Clitophon with Dionysius, whose plea for reason forces Eros to step in to nullify the lover's 'good decision' and attempt to behave 'philosophically'.

The verb *philosophein* appears in our passage as well, another indication that Achilles Tatius might have Chariton in mind and be poking fun at Dionysius' lofty morals. For Dionysius' 'philosophizing' is the heroic resolve of a soul trying to beat back Love, whereas in our passage the verb describes Clitophon's and Clinias' discussion of erotic matters, ending with Clitophon's quandary: 'We were thus rapt in deep philosophy (ἐφιλοσοφοῦμεν) concerning the god' (1. 12. 1). Clitophon and his cousin do 'philosophy' by talking at length about Love, that is, by acknowledging his power.[47] They engage in a celebration of love reminiscent of Plato's *Symposium*, though without philosophical seriousness.[48]

Clitophon stages a similar conflict again at 2. 5. 1-2: 'left to myself…I tried to whip up my courage to face the maiden. "How long will you keep

[46] Konstan 1994, 67.

[47] Note that this 'philosophical discussion' ends with Clitophon admitting defeat at the hands of the armed god.

[48] The playful allusions to the *Symposium*, as well as to the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*, are numerous in Achilles. See Morales 2004, 57; Repath 2007, 70, n. 66. The verb *philosophein* in this novel has ironic or parodying overtones: see also 5. 23. 7; 8. 5. 7; 5. 27. 1, with Goldhill 1995, 93-100; Morales 2004, 57-60; Morgan 2007, 26.

silent, sissy boy? What use is a spineless soldier in the service of a virile god? Are you waiting for her to make the first move"? Then I answered myself: "Why cannot you control yourself (οὐ σωφρονεῖς), fool? You have another lovely maiden in your own family: desire *her*; gaze at *her*; marriage with her is in your power". I thought that I had convinced myself, but the voice of Eros replied from deep down in my heart: "Such insubordination! So, you would take up position and fight against me? How can you escape when I attack from the skies with arrows and fire? If you dodge my arrows, you won't evade my fire. And even if you douse that with your high-minded self-control (σωφροσύνῃ), I will catch up with you on my wings" '.

This scene parallels Clitophon's description of his first conflict. Here as there the quandary directly follows a consultation, this time with the servant Satyrus, about how to seduce Leucippe (the name of the advisor is reflected in the boldness of his advice: don't just look at her, but touch her, be courageous, the brave soldier of a brave god!).[49] Clitophon's conflict this time unfolds in three acts, not two, but here again love is given the last word.

The imagery clusters around the pole cowardliness/bravery. What is the courageous action? The opposite of what it is for Dionysius. Though in Chariton's episode the imagery is not markedly military, Dionysius' noble character shows itself in his attempt at *withstanding* (ἀντέχεσθαι) his desire (2. 4. 4). Conversely, Clitophon identifies seduction with bravery, and inaction ('silence') with cowardliness (ἀνανδρία). A contrast can be drawn also with Habrocomes, who calls himself 'cowardly' (ἄνανδρος) not because he cannot bring himself to act on his love but, quite the opposite, when he is yielding to it (1. 4. 1-2).[50] For Habrocomes to fight love is manly, for Clitophon, manly is to follow the guidance of 'the virile god'.

As an act of courage seduction is noble. The opposition Clitophon envisages between courage (ἀνδρεία) and moderation (σωφροσύνη), occurring as it does right after he has been blamed for his cowardliness (2. 4. 5-6), casts σωφροσύνη as a pale virtue compared to sexual ἀνδρεία. From Eros' point of view σωφροσύνη is not even a virtue but is a shameless vice, capable of making Clitophon 'insolent'(1. 5. 2: τολμηρέ). This oxymoronic association

[49] Morales (2004, 56) reads in the name Satyrus that of 'a cunning meddler'. But Satyrs were also known for their lewdness and sexual exuberance.

[50] Habrocomes aspires to both military and philosophical endurance, as in καρτερήσω … οὐ μενῶ γεννικός; μένω, to stand fast, is what a brave soldier does on the battlefield, and what Socrates, imitating a brave soldier, does on the battlefield of philosophy (in Plato's *Apology*). Anthia has a different perspective: she accuses Habrocomes of cowardice and unmanliness for having been so slow (1. 9. 4: '…ἄνανδρε καὶ δειλέ …'). Clitophon reproaches himself in the same vein.

of self-restraint with excessive daring, as opposed to ‘right daring’, εὐτολμία, which consists in following the dictates of love, repeats Eros’ contention that Dionysius’ self-control is arrogant, likewise phrased as a clashing of opposites: ‘Love…thought his moderation to be arrogance’ (2. 4. 5: Ἔρως ... ὕβριν ἐδόκει τὴν σωφροσύνην τὴν ἐκείνου). The parallel again suggests that Achilles Tatius might be poking fun at Dionysius’ aspiration to self-restraint.

In sum, Clitophon’s insouciance in dealing with his passion is mirrored in the staging of sham quandaries. In spite of the presence in Achilles Tatius’ novel of both Stoic and Platonic motifs, its protagonist falls short of both philosophies’ ideals.[51] The overall parodying mood of the novel affects also the treatment of psychological qualms: while the heartfelt conflicts are purely emotional, quandaries concerned with moral goodness, as displayed by Clitophon, are, precisely, a display, an effervescent show of rhetorical skills, rather than the expression of a sincere agony.

Daphnis’ fear of the blood: instead of a quandary

As in many other respects, as regards conflicts driven by moral concerns Longus’ novel is unique: it does not have any.[52] This absence is consistent with both the innocence of the protagonists and the conception of their erotic initiation as a spontaneous assimilation of cultural norms.[53]

When they experience the first stirrings of love, Daphnis and Chloe do not try to resist it. They try to understand what it is. Their predicament is not disgraceful in their eyes because they do not know how it is called, that is, what cultural, societal associations it bears.[54] The *topos* of the lovers fighting the onset of love is replaced by the theme of the search for love’s name and ways.

[51] Clitophon’s inability (or unwillingness?) to live up to Stoic ideals in the scene in which he has sex with Melite is emphasized by Morales 2004, 59-60.

[52] Except, perhaps, for Lamo’s when he finds Daphnis exposed: he first thinks of taking only the tokens, then, ashamed of himself, takes the foundling as well (1. 3. 1). The conflict, however, is not developed.

[53] This conception, however, allows for emotional conflicts (see 1. 13. 6; 1. 31. 1 with Kytzler 2000, 73 and 76), for such conflicts can be instinctual responses, unrelated to the knowledge of social values.

[54] Emphasis is placed on the couple’s ignorance of Eros’ *name* (1. 13. 5 and 1. 15. 1). On the implications of knowing Eros’ name, see Winkler 1990, 119.

Daphnis and Chloe discover that their passion is called love from the shepherd Philetas, who also instructs them about what to do to cure it: kiss, embrace, lie together naked. This discovery marks a turning point in two ways. On the one hand, the youngsters become eager to experiment with the remedies they have been taught. But on the other, it seems that along with the remedies they have also learnt, and without being taught, the social proprieties that govern love's dealings. For they experiment with kissing and embracing, but are reluctant to lie together naked because this act appears 'too daring' (θρασύτερον) to them (2. 9. 1: see also 2. 10. 3: '…the third remedy was delayed, because Daphnis didn't dare to speak about it, and Chloe didn't want to make the first move'). Why do they feel this way? Before knowing that their condition was called love, Chloe indulged her desire to look at Daphnis naked as he bathed; she even touched him, and asked him to bathe again, and again touched him (1. 13. 1 and 5).[55] Now that she and Daphnis know the name of the passion, nudity turns out to be embarrassing: even the word 'naked' disappears from the description of their movements.[56]

Daphnis and Chloe become more daring, but the first manifestation of that daring, far from concerning sexual experimentation, takes them to endorse the rule of fidelity: 'All this made them hotter and more audacious (θρασύτεροι). They started competing with each other about who loved the other more, and gradually reached the point of swearing oaths to their fidelity' (2. 39. 1). We cannot help smiling: whereas Daphnis and Chloe found lying together naked too audacious (θρασύτερον), they screw up the 'courage' to give their passionate imprimatur to a social value. Their oaths are presented as a natural movement of the heart, but we shall ask: why then were Daphnis and Chloe not moved to swear fidelity to each other earlier, when they did not know the name of love? Along with learning that their passion was love they have internalized, as it were, the obligation of fidelity. There is much in a name…

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[55] It is true that at 1. 13. 2, Chloe touches herself to compare her skin with Daphnis' *when he does not see*. As Morgan comments, 'shame and modesty are presented as instinctive' (2004, 161), and the same holds for other passages in Book 1 (1. 25. 1; 1. 31. 2). The inhibitions, however, grow along with the acquisition of erotic knowledge.

[56] When eventually Daphnis and Chloe lie down together (though only by accident), the text does not say that they are naked: see 2. 11. 2-3; see also 2. 38. 3. 'Naked' appeared in the couple's report of Philetas' instructions and in the account of their dream (2. 8. 5; 2. 10. 1), and will appear again when Daphnis, in the second spring, becomes 'more daring', (3. 13. 4-3. 14. 1. Note the emphasis on nudity proportionate to the growing audacity: γυμνὴν γυμνῷ).

Daphnis' behavior subsequent to the most important lesson he learns is in keeping with this novel's effort to make the protagonists' initiation into social values agree with their natural inclinations. Philetas' euphemism in detailing the remedies to love ('lie together naked') allows Daphnis and Chloe not to transgress the norm (which they do not know) requiring chastity before marriage.[57] Since they take Philetas' words literally, another lesson is needed.[58] To offer it is Lycaenion, a woman experienced in love and enticed by Daphnis' beauty. She is also genuinely concerned for Daphnis' and Chloe's welfare and has seen that they will never 'get there' without help. Taking Daphnis to the woods, she teaches her lesson to an enthusiastic pupil, who directly after learning it wants to rush off to Chloe to practice. But his teacher stops him, explaining that Chloe will bleed and scream. Daphnis, however, should not be afraid, but persuade Chloe and take her to that secluded spot, where no one will hear or see her, and where she can wash. Now Daphnis pauses: '[he] thought about what she had said and lost his previous impulse, and shrank from pestering Chloe for more than kisses and embraces. He did not want her to cry out at him as though he was an enemy or weep as if she was hurt or bleed as if she was wounded. Having just learned about the blood, he was frightened of it and thought it was only from a wound that blood came. So he decided to take only his usual pleasures with her' (3. 20. 1-2).

Daphnis' restraint is necessary to preserve the couple's pre-marital chastity, which his teacher jeopardizes by encouraging him to have sex with Chloe. For Daphnis to experience a quandary, however, would be out of place because even now he does not know that pre-marital chastity is a virtue. Thus, he makes the morally right decision spontaneously, based on a wrong representation of Lycaenion's lesson about virginity: blood can come only from wounds, and wounds are inflicted only by a foe.[59] The conflict Daphnis experiences is not between an 'instinct' and a 'value', or between 'passion' and 'reason', but between a previous impulse (3.20.1: ὁρμῆς) and an overcoming emotion, fear. Longus succeeds at preserving the integration of cultural constraints and natural inclinations by having Daphnis invest those constraints with a strong emotion, which wins over his initial enthusiasm and assures that he will play the required role: not, however, because

[57] That Philetas speaks euphemistically is noted by Morgan 2004, 10. But see Konstan 1994, 86.

[58] On the need for *technê* to bring natural desire to fulfilment, see Hunter 1983, 19-20. Longus, however, says that the couple 'perhaps would have done something real' if a disturbing accident had not occurred (2. 11. 3).

[59] On Daphnis' misunderstanding of the lesson, see Zeitlin 1990, 423.

he honors those constraints (this would be out of character), but because his fear agrees with them. Indeed, when contact with Chloe arouses him, the disturbing thought of the blood is enough to stop him (3. 24. 3).[60]

Dilemmas and the gods' design in An Ethiopian Story

Hydaspes, the king of Ethiopia, is about to sacrifice the first spoils of war in thanksgiving for his victory, as required by his country's laws, when he recognizes the designated victim for his daughter. What to do? Indulge his paternal feelings or honor the ancestral laws of his kingdom? He is in a dilemma.

Hydaspes would gladly avoid the sacrifice were it not that he is concerned with his righteousness as king. He will not display the lack of civic sentiment of a Creon, who, faced with the gods' demand that he sacrifice his son to save Thebes, refuses to do so without giving the matter even a thought (in Euripides' *Phoenician Women*). Read against this negative model, Hydaspes elicits sympathy straightaway for his considerate treatment of his subjects. Here is a summary of his speech (10. 16. 4-10): Though I have been made a father against all odds, I am ready to sacrifice my daughter in your interest. I see how sad you all are. Your emotion is human. You pity her for her untimely death, and me for my shattered expectations of continuing my line. Nonetheless it is necessary, even if perhaps (ἴσως) you do not want me to, to obey the law of our fathers. Whether the gods wanted me to recover my daughter and immediately lose her I do not know, just as I do not know whether they will welcome the sacrifice of a girl they exiled from her country at birth and then returned to it. You tell me. I will not succumb to the paternal feelings that perhaps (ἴσως) are forgivable in another, nor will I ask you to attach more importance to such feelings than to compliance with the law. I see how you sympathize with me and suffer for my woes as if they were your own. This makes me hold your welfare in even greater esteem and disregard my feelings and my wife's. Cease from weeping and commiserating me in vain. Let's proceed with the sacrifice.

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[60] After this episode Daphnis fears that he might lose control some day, and for this reason he asks Chloe not to take off her clothes. His request, though, is not at odds with his ignorance of the social obligation of chastity because it is based on instinctual responses. Contrast Theagenes' behavior in Heliodorus: since he is aware of the value of chastity, he can be made to swear to respect it, and when he risks failing, Charicleia reminds him of the oaths (5. 4. 5).

He then exhorts his daughter to behave with royal dignity, and finally calls on the gods: ‘And gods, if in the coils of passion I have uttered any word that offends against piety, forgive me, for I am the man who has to slay his child in the very instant of calling her by that name’. He carries Chariclea to the altars, but the crowd prevents the sacrifice.

Hydaspes has obtained what he wished, by a speech ‘whose rhetoric he had contrived to ensure its ineffectiveness’ (10. 17. 1). John Morgan identifies the speech as a specimen of *logos eschematismenos* (‘in figures’), aiming to accomplish the opposite of what the orator said.[61] Hydaspes achieves this goal by attributing to his audience, not himself, reluctance to sacrifice his daughter, and by doing it tactfully, saying ‘perhaps you do not want to’, just as he hopes that *he* is the father whom ‘perhaps’ his listeners will forgive for his feelings. In addition he operates a clever reversal of the widespread feature of forensic rhetoric which consists in trying to involve the audience in one’s plight by appealing openly to its pity and compassion for oneself. Hydaspes instead asks his listeners to overcome *their own* turmoil, which he claims to see, and not to let pity and compassion for him get in the way. By dwelling on his people’s feelings, he works toward increasing them. As in trial scenes in Chariton, the crowd might recall a tragic chorus setting the emotional and moral pitch.[62] But whereas in *Callirhoe* the author, with no partial involvement, stages the chorus’ movements, in our scene they are interpreted and directed by the concerned party.

Hydaspes’ audience, however, has another, and more important role to play: that of judge. Morgan notes how Hydaspes in the course of his speech comes to disregard that the sacrifice is unavoidable if the laws are to be respected, and instead devolves the decision to his people.[63] Will the gods accept the sacrifice? Will they not feel rebuffed in their plans, since they returned his daughter to him from the opposite end of the world? Hydaspes himself apparently has no answer, and asks his people to provide it (10. 16. 6). By entrusting his subjects with such a critical task, Hydaspes points up his disinterested concern and high respect for them. His image as rightful king is saved.

Hydaspes ends his speech by appealing to the gods’ forgiveness for his impious words. We are left to wonder: what are those words? The ones dic-

[61] Morgan 2006.

[62] For Chariton, consider especially the trial in Babylon, where the crowd gives voice to opposite opinions about which husband Callirhoe should choose (6. 1. 2-5). See Schmeling 1974, 106.

[63] Morgan 2006, 54.

tated by Hydaspes' emotionality, as he openly claims, or the ones with which he presses for the sacrifice? The latter, is his audience's answer: 'may the gods forgive this apparent infringement of the law; it would be a greater infringement if we opposed their will. No one must slay her whose life they have saved' (10. 17. 2). Hydaspes has received the answer he was seeking.

Hydaspes' dilemma is preceded by another conflict, which sets the stage for the dilemma in that it portrays the king as a thoughtful and self-controlled man, yet this time unable to reign in his emotions. As soon as Charicleia is recognized as the daughter of the royal couple, her mother rushes to embrace her, weeping, whereas Hydaspes, though pitying his wife, stands firm, 'his eyes as if of horn or steel' (Homer, *Odyssey* 19. 211), trying to hold back his tears: 'his soul was buffeted by waves of fatherly love and manly resolve that fought for possession of his will, which was pulled in two directions by the opposing tide races. But finally he bowed to all-conquering nature: not only was he convinced that he was a father, but he also betrayed a father's feelings' (10. 16. 2).

Hydaspes' inner fight is modeled after Odysseus' as he watches Penelope weep. Hydaspes, though, breaks down. He joins the number of novelistic characters who fight against passion nobly, but in vain. The struggle in his soul between 'manly resolve' and 'fatherly love' is indeed cast as the equivalent to many a character's battle against love, and his yielding to his 'passion' (πάθος is the word for his fatherly love) as a 'defeat' (ἡττήθη) similar to theirs.

By bringing out Hydaspes' emotionality, Heliodorus already foreshadows the solution to the upcoming dilemma. If it is 'natural' to suffer 'a father's feelings', Hydaspes will be more than forgiven for factoring them into his speech; if he gladly accepts to be 'defeated' in his attempt to hide his emotion, he will be even gladder to admit defeat when the crowd blocks the sacrifice (see, at 10. 17. 3, τὴν ἧτταν, echoing 10. 16. 2: ἡττήθη).

Hydaspes' elaborate dilemma stands out in a novel that otherwise makes little use of conflicts with a moral purport. The young lovers have the same firmness of purpose as Xenophon's protagonists, though it is not so markedly couched in Stoic language. Once they yield to love, they always know what is right to do and are able to stick to it.

In addition an important thematic thread militates against the significance of such conflicts in Heliodorus' novel, namely that it is largely built around the interpretation of divine signs and advances along with the gradual understanding of them. The main engineer of the plot, the priest Calasiris, plans his movements in accordance with his decipherment of divine messag-

es. As Jack Winkler puts it, “Kalasiris is a man above all obedient to the divine plan and devoted to ferreting out the gods’ intentions as they are disclosed to him in stages of ever greater definiteness”.[64] Bent as he is on discovering destiny’s roads, Calasiris asks cognitive, rather than moral, questions.

This is true already at the beginning of his story, when, unable to conquer his passion for Rhodopis, he exiles himself from Memphis (2. 25. 2-6). From a moral point of view the decision casts the high priest as a weak character, one who fears that, should he stay in Memphis, he might risk defilement. But Calasiris interweaves his reading of destiny’s signs into his decision: he leaves ‘surrendering to the decrees of destiny’, the woman being an ‘interpreter’ (2. 25. 3: ὑπόκρισις) of destiny’s drama, the beginning of the hardships he had foreseen. He then adds that his ‘unspeakable god-given wisdom’ had many times predicted to him his children’s fight, and that he flees to avoid witnessing a crime that he thinks fated. The conflict spurred by his erotic desire is complicated and eventually superseded by his attempts to interpret the future and behave accordingly.[65]

Calasiris’ main contribution to the plot is to bring about Charicleia’s and Theagenes’ elopement. It is in the context of this momentous decision that we might expect moral doubts to haunt him. But it is not so: ‘I perceived the hand of the gods’, he says upon discovering Charicleia’s origins, ‘and marveled at the subtlety of their governance. I was filled with a mixture of pleasure and sadness and had the peculiar experience of being moved simultaneously to joy and tears. My heart was thankful that the mystery had been explained, that the riddle of the oracle had been solved, but it was sorely troubled about the course the future might take and filled with pity for the life of man, whose instability and insecurity, whose constant changes of direction were made all too manifest in the story of Charikleia. My mind was filled with the contemplation of many things: whose child she was and whose she had passed for, how far from the land of her birth her exile had brought her, and how she was called the daughter of a man who was not her father after losing her legitimate place in the royal family of Ethiopia. For a

[64] Winkler 1982, 146.

[65] It is unclear whether Calasiris decides to flee to avoid destiny or to embrace its ways: his claim that he ‘surrendered’ to it (2. 25. 4: εἴκων) is countered by the Pythia’s pronouncement (2. 26. 5), and by his own reading shortly afterwards (3. 16. 5). See Liviabella Furiani 2006, 96. Calasiris’ knowledge of his destiny is not yet firm enough for him to follow it without hesitation (the ‘decrees of destiny’ is a vague formulation), but from the outset he seems concerned with adjusting his actions to his efforts to read divine signs.

long time I stood there, torn between pity for past sorrows and despair for future happiness, until, clearing my mind of such intoxicating thoughts, I decided to set to work to do what I had to do' (4. 9. 1-3).

Calasiris is in a state of emotional turmoil, but has no hesitation about the right course of action. He suffers a new *pathos*, of sadness and joy at once, which develops into a meditation on the fickleness of human fortunes and on Charicleia's individual predicament. He 'stood for a long time in doubt' (Ἐπὶ πολύ τε ἀμφίβολος εἱστήκειν), not, however, owing to moral scruples, but because he is assaulted by different emotions and strains of thought. When he recovers the sobriety of reason, he no longer lingers but sets out to act. Calasiris is convinced that to take Charicleia away from her putative father is morally right because destiny wants so. He had been searching for some time 'to what land the god was conducting the young couple' (4. 4. 5), and his first response to the discovery is admiration for 'the gods' governance', soon reinforced by his expression of joy at having deciphered the oracle. That Charicles will suffer from his action is not in the equation because that action is required. Earlier, when Artemis and Apollo in a vision asked Calasiris to take Charicleia and Theagenes with him and to go back to Egypt, 'for thus the ordinance of destiny demands' (3. 11. 5), he grieved for Charicles (3. 15. 3), but his knowledge of fate already prevented him from questioning the righteousness of the enterprise.

Heliodorus' reading of *sophia*, *sophos*, and *philosophos* is consistent with the absence of moral doubts from Calasiris' behavior in that it puts knowledge of the future to the fore. Whereas in Chariton and Achilles Tatius "philosophy" applies to the erotic domain, the only instance of *philosophos* in Heliodorus is referred to the wise men who congregate in Delphi, and with whom Calasiris has elevated discussions (2. 27. 2). Of the numerous occurrences of *sophia/sophos*, the great majority means 'a science that helps predict the future', 'a god-given science', 'arcane knowledge':[66] this in particular is Calasiris' *sophia*.[67]

Like Calasiris, Charicleia experiences no moral scruples when she decides to follow him and elope. Her behavior conforms to this novel's emphasis on the necessity to endorse destiny, for she is not even troubled by the idea that her departure will pain Charicles. She has no thought for his welfare in spite of the affection they share and all he has done for her: 'You say

[66] To give an exhaustive list would be tedious (readers are referred to the novels' lexicon by Conca *et al*., 1983). Instances of the meanings here advocated are 2. 24. 6; 2. 25. 5; 2. 33. 6; 3. 16. 2; 3. 13. 2. More instances assume such meanings, e.g. 2. 31. 1; 3. 12. 2.

[67] 2. 24. 6; 2. 25. 5; 3. 16. 4.

that this is the gods' will, and I believe you. So what am I to do, Father?' (4. 13. 3). Charicleia takes advantage, as it were, of this novel's narratological philosophy to promote her emotional interests, for of course the decree of fate is welcome to her because it agrees with her love and justifies its pursuit. When Calasiris dies, she laments that she has betrayed Charicles (7. 14. 6), and later, in front of him, admits that ascribing her actions to the will of the gods is no good excuse for what she did (10. 38. 1).[68]

The irrelevance of quandaries for the advancement of a plot governed by a better and better knowledge of destiny is illustrated by the anticlimactic function of the dilemma that besets Cnemon mid-way through the narrative (6. 7. 3-7). When Nausicles announces to his guests his intention to sail to Greece and asks them what their own plans are, Calasiris, speaking also for Charicleia, explains that, although regretful to leave his host, 'we cannot evade our duty to do everything possible to recover those whom we love most in the world'. As to Cnemon, at first he is checked by a fit of sobbing and tears, then bewails the ways of fortune. Ken Dowden has remarked on Cnemon's moral inadequacy at this juncture: instead of assuming responsibility for the decision he is strongly inclined to make (to go back to Greece), he 'expounds a philosophy of *tychê*…of a world without purpose, sense, or security'.[69]

Consistently with his refusal to take responsibility, Cnemon packs his peroration with a string of question marks: 'Which way should I turn? What ought I to do? Am I to abandon Charikleia before she has been reunited with Theagenes? What a cruel and sinful thing to do, O Earth! Should I go with her then and join her quest? If we were assured of finding him, efforts spent in the expectation of success would be efforts well spent. But on the other hand if the future is uncertain and merely holds yet more misfortune, then it is also uncertain what end there will ever be to my wanderings. Why do I not crave forgiveness from you and from the gods of friendship and, at long last, begin to think about returning to my homeland and my family?'

Cnemon produces a caricature of the so-called 'desperation speeches' of tragedy ('where shall I turn?' is a topical phrase in such speeches).[70] For of course our hero is not desperate but embarrassed. His far-from-tragic unease about the decision he is making emerges from his inability to live with it

[68] Perhaps Charicleia even develops a sense of guilt over her elopement: see Konstan 1994, 94. In fact, as soon as she leaves she blushes at her action (4. 18. 2), and later considers herself a criminal (10. 38. 1, with Liviabella Furiani 2006, 84).

[69] Dowden 2007, 148.

[70] See for instance Euripides, *Medea*, 502, with Fowler 1987.

without first asking for 'permission', so to speak, to make it. He pleads for forgiveness with Calasiris, and immediately afterwards with Charicleia, to whom he finally spells out his decision: he will accompany her only a short way, and if Theagenes is not found, he will return, hopefully with her understanding ('even then I could still be excused').

This dilemma is anticlimactic because it does not advance the action of its protagonist in the narrative. Cnemon's quandary creates a divide between those, Charicleia and Calasiris, who keep their place in the story, and Cnemon himself, who disappears: his decision to return to Greece puts an end to his role as character. Cnemon's dilemma momentarily halts the plot, which is resumed with renewed verve once his wavering is cut short. Thinking of him as no longer a fitting traveling companion, Charicleia excuses him for not continuing the journey with her, and adds: 'Whatever befalls, Calasiris and I shall fight on until we reach the end of our wanderings, confident that even if no human being should join our quest, we have the gods as our traveling companions'. Charicleia's resolve to travel to 'the end', which borders on a mystic call, signals the author's own resolve to give his narrative an energetic push forward and look ahead, to the end, now that the story has reached the half-way point. The narrative is 'recharged', as it were, ready to go again and travel to higher regions, once it gets rid of Cnemon's cowardly expressions of undecided-ness.

How do we read Hydaspes' dilemma against this background? If this novel's vision puts forward the knowledge of destiny as the motor for rightful action, whereas dilemmas are irrelevant to it, why does the story culminate in a true and meaningful dilemma?

There are, I think, two reasons for this. First, Hydaspes' dilemma does not clash with the novel's vision because he asks a theological question: what do the gods want? Hydaspes does not have the knowledge of destiny that would free him from dilemmas, and is bent (or so he claims) on acquiring it. He interprets the gods' action, the sudden restitution of his daughter to him, according to his wish, as perhaps suggesting that they reject the sacrifice, but wants to hear confirmation of his reading from his people. His question highlights the recognition of the gods' power at the conclusion of a plot that has aimed to decipher their design.

Second, Hydaspes is playing a tragic role. His dilemma builds up suspense towards the end of the narrative in the same way some decisive scenes of tragedy do: the audience knows or imagines the outcome, but not the de-

tails of its materialization.[71] As far as Hydaspes' predicament, the closest parallel is Agamemnon in *Iphigenia in Aulis*. But Hydaspes, contrary to Agamemnon, is seeking conciliation. Whereas Agamemnon can only save one party, either Iphigenia or the Greek army, either himself as father or as ambitious leader, Hydaspes works towards reaching an agreement with all those involved and towards harmonizing his roles as father and as rightful leader. In that it seeks conciliation, his dilemma is not unlike Cnemon's: Cnemon wants his friend to give him leave to do as he wishes; Hydaspes hopes that his audience's emotion and the gods' plans match his desire for his daughter's salvation. Both dilemmas in Heliodorus' novel are about building consensus: they are performed in public, not in private like Callirhoe's, or in front of a partial audience like Agamemnon's at the beginning of Euripides' play.

Hydaspes' aspiration to build consensus becomes apparent in his final question to the priest Sisimithres. Upon discovering the nature of Charicleia's relation with Theagenes, who is about to be sacrificed, the populace takes to singing and dancing. Hydaspes consults the priest: 'What are we to do (Τί χρὴ δρᾶν), all-wise one? To refuse the gods their due sacrifice would be irreverent; to put those who are the gods' gifts to the knife would be sacrilegious. We must consider carefully what to do' (10. 39. 1).

Hydaspes' question is the same he was asking the populace concerning Charicleia: will the gods welcome the sacrifice of their gift? He himself wants to think they will not, but just as then he needed his people's approval, now he needs the priest's. This trait characterizes him as the opposite of the tragic tyrant,[72] especially Creon in *Antigone*, who listens to the voice of his people and of the seer only when it is too late. After dismissing Tiresias, Creon feels troubled by the prophecy he has heard. The chorus urges him to deliberate: 'it is necessary to make a good decision, son of Menoeceus'. But Creon is at a loss: What then ought to be done (τί δῆτα χρὴ δρᾶν;)? Show me; I will obey' (1099). The tyrant who never took counsel with others, who never experienced a dilemma, takes counsel at the wrong time, when there is nothing more he can do. His question underscores his helpless abdication of his tyrannical will, unable to make true decisions.[73] Hydaspes' words, Τί χρὴ δρᾶν, are almost identical with Creon's utterance. The echo, which quite

[71] The novel's whole plot is called a dramatic production in the very scene that includes Hydaspes' dilemma (10. 38. 3). Charicles appears 'as if from a theatrical machine', and the discovery of Theagenes' relation to Charicleia is a 'dramatic climax' (10. 39. 2).

[72] Hydaspes condemns the behavior of tyrants even in war: 9. 21. 3.

[73] See the insightful discussion in Lanza 1977, 81-82.

possibly an educated reader would recognize, brings out Hydaspes' opposite behavior: whereas Creon dismisses the priest and devolves to the people only when it is too late, Hydaspes consults with the priest after listening to the cheering of the people. Creon uses the impersonal form because he himself has no clue;[74] Hydaspes uses it to give the decision the force of an objective necessity. We can also contrast the meaning of 'what to do?' when in Hydaspes' or in Cnemon's mouth.[75] Cnemon is doing paratragedy, as it were: he is asking not for advice but for a comfortable rubberstamping of his wishes. Conversely, Hydaspes means it when he asks Sisimithres what to do. Compared to his previous dilemma, now Hydaspes aspires to an even higher level of consensus: not with the populace but with the wisest man in his kingdom, and, through him, truly with the gods (the people who told him that the gods opposed Charicleia's sacrifice did not speak from the same position of authority as Sisimithres).

Hydaspes' dilemma thus prepares for the climate of total reconciliation that reigns at the end of the novel. The scene which culminates in his question, 'What are we to do?' is marked by a harmonious synergy of movements, voices, feelings: 'there was no discordant voice as young and old, rich and poor, united in jubilation…'; 'perhaps they had been brought to a realization of the truth by the same divine force that had staged this whole drama and that now produced a perfect harmony of diametric opposites: joy and sorrow combined; tears mingled with laughter; the most hideous horror transformed to celebration; those who wept also laughed; those who grieved also rejoiced…'[76] By listening to the will of his people and of the gods, Hydaspes has succeeded at producing the perfect integration of private and public, secular and sacred, which he was seeking when he first posed his dilemma.[77]

[74] See Lanza 1977, 82.

[75] Though not impersonal, Cnemon's phrase contains the impersonal χρή: τί … με … χρὴ πράττειν; (6. 7. 5).

[76] Kytzler (2002, 77) fails to see that in this scene, contrary to what normally happens, opposite emotions, feelings, etc. live together to make a "symphonic" whole (10. 38. 4: πρὸς συμφωνίαν).

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