

Emotional Conflict and Platonic Psychology in the Greek Novel

IAN REPATH
Swansea University

Introduction

The Greek novels, to strip them down to their essentials, are each about a pair of lovers. The protagonists are exceptionally beautiful and inspire amorous feelings not only in each other but also in those around them. Emotions invariably run high; they are also at times contradictory. The psychological factor in the novels has not gone unnoticed,¹ but one of the ways in which the novelists describe the emotional turmoil of their characters deserves special attention. In an article which examines conflicting emotions, Fusillo concentrates on certain passages which contain lists and descriptions of different feelings, demonstrating that:

... the narrative of the Greek novels is not restricted to the mechanisms of external episodes, but shows an internal dynamic based on a view of the human psyche as a field of tensions and contradictory forces ...²

In what follows I shall take up this idea and attempt to show that the way in which some of the novelists portray the psychological states of their characters is in places influenced by philosophical, and particularly Platonic, or Platonist, theories of the soul. Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus will be, as one might expect, the main foci, but it is also worth seeing what Chariton does, since he combines an interest in psychology with arguably some knowledge, or awareness, of philosophy. Rather than conducting a comprehensive sur-

¹ See, for example, Perry 1930, 115–123, on Chariton's character-portrayal and psychological realism and depth, and Fusillo 1999.

² Fusillo 1999, 64.

vey, I shall do little more than draw attention to a phenomenon and some examples of it in the hope that it will open up new avenues of inquiry. First, however, some background is required, and a look at two other Second Sophistic authors – one, Plutarch, probably a contemporary of Chariton, the other, Lucian, of Achilles Tatius – for their discussion and use of the same device.

Platonic psychology

An interest in the soul and psychology is pervasive in the Platonic corpus, but there are three dialogues that are particularly important for the ideas concerning the structure of the soul and for the reception of those ideas in subsequent antiquity: the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus*. The *Timaeus* was arguably the most important Platonic text for later Platonism,³ but, as I hope will become clear, the first two were more influential as far as the structure of the soul was concerned, and were more influential generally for those not writing technical philosophical works. I shall therefore focus primarily on the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*.⁴

In order to discover what justice is in the *Republic*, Socrates and his interlocutors decide to consider it on a large scale before looking at it in an individual; they then create a state from scratch and divide it into three classes: the guardians, auxiliaries, and money-makers (368c ff.). From 434d on they look at the soul to see whether it contains the same number of parts which are also similar in type to the classes of the state; it is no surprise to find that it does, and these parts are: ‘the rational part’ (*to logistikon*), ‘the appetitive part’ (*to epithymētikon*), and ‘the spirited part’ (*to thymoeides*).⁵ The principle on which this division is based is the argument that

the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time.⁶

³ See, for a rough indication, the ‘Index of Platonic Passages’ in Dillon 1996, 458.

⁴ For modern material on Plato’s soul-partition, see Cooper 1984, Robinson 1995, and Miller 1998.

⁵ Pl. R. 434d2–441c7. In the process of defining these parts Plato also uses the cognate nouns: ‘reason’ (*logos* and *logismos*), ‘anger/spirit’ (*thymos*), and ‘desire/appetite’ (*epithymia*). It will become clear, I hope, that post-Plato these nouns can occasionally represent the Platonic parts of the soul, although context is clearly crucial for this.

⁶ Pl. R. 436b8–9.

Examples are produced in which each of the three parts is in conflict with each of the others, and the presence and effects of different desires and impulses in the soul are very much the focus in this section. As will become clear, this is a treatment of psychological processes which became standard for later writers, and its clarity aided its popularity.

An even more popular piece of Plato can be found in the *Phaedrus*, itself hugely influential in the Second Sophistic.⁷ In Socrates' second speech he covers a large number of what we might think of as central Platonic ideas,⁸ including the immortality and structure of the soul, the Forms, transmigration of souls, and Platonic love. Because of its combination of psychology and erotics, this speech is crucially important for later Greek writers, and there is the additional bonus that the structure of the soul is discussed in particularly memorable imagery. Socrates says: 'Let it [sc. the soul] resemble the combined power of a winged team of horses and their charioteer'.⁹ The principal distinction here seems to be between the charioteer on the one hand, and the team of horses on the other.¹⁰ However, the horses themselves are also clearly distinguished: while gods' souls are entirely constituted from good parts, those of others are mixed:

In the first place our driver has charge of a pair: secondly one of them he finds noble and good, and of similar stock, while the other is of the opposite stock, and opposite in its nature.¹¹

Socrates picks this up later in his speech: 'As in the beginning of our myth we divided each soul in three, two parts in the form of horses and the third in that of a charioteer ...'.¹² Of the horses, the good one is 'a lover of honour when joined with restraint and a sense of shame, and a companion of true opinion, needing no whip, responding to the spoken command alone',¹³ while the other is a 'companion of excess and boastfulness, shaggy around the ears, deaf, hardly yielding to whip and goad together'.¹⁴ The differences

⁷ See Trapp 1990; also De Lacy 1974, for a brief account of Plato's importance in the period.

⁸ Rowe 1986, 9–10.

⁹ Pl. *Phdr.* 246a6–7.

¹⁰ Dillon 1993, 73 suggests that what we have here is a 'virtual bipartition' which later Platonists felt obliged to reconcile with the tripartition of the *Republic*.

¹¹ Pl. *Phdr.* 246b1–3.

¹² *Ibid.* 253c7–d1.

¹³ *Ibid.* 253d6–e1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 253e3–5.

between the three parts represented by the charioteer and the two horses are made clear when the charioteer sees ‘the light of his love’,¹⁵ since the two horses react in opposite ways, and we are given a vivid description of the inner struggles caused by erotic desire: the good one restrains itself and obeys the charioteer, while the bad one springs forward and wants to mention the pleasures of sex; after a delay the other two agree, but the charioteer is so struck by the boy’s face that he recoils and pulls back the reins; the good horse obeys, whereas the bad horse, after recovering, tries to make the other approach the beloved again; it agrees to a delay, but again strains forward, making the charioteer rein it back again with even more force. This happens often until the bad horse is brought under control.¹⁶ The contrasting impulses of shame and violent, forceful desire feature strongly in this passage, and the behaviour of the charioteer and his team effectively conveys the turmoil in the lover’s soul. In this case, base desires are overcome and the good horse is closely allied to the charioteer, but there is always the danger, even in a philosophically enlightened soul, that the bad horse might get out of control. We are given only one version of events, and in a soul where the bad horse proved too strong, or the good horse for some reason did not obey the charioteer or even sided with the bad horse, the result would presumably be very different.¹⁷

Plutarch and Lucian

The changes of emphasis, purpose, and imagery in the different treatments of the division of the soul led to later Platonists, especially those of the so-called ‘Middle Platonic’ period (c. 80 B.C. – c. 250 A.D.), attempting to reconcile perceived differences in the accounts by first dividing the soul into a rational (*logistikon*) part and an irrational (*pathētikon*) part and then subdi-

¹⁵ Ibid. 253e5.

¹⁶ Ibid. 253e5–255a1.

¹⁷ Robinson 1995, 117, argues that the charioteer and the good horse are hardly distinguished, since they both act in tandem against the bad horse. However, Socrates describes a situation in which the lover and beloved either do not give in at all to the desires represented by the bad horse, or do so only infrequently (255e4–256e2), and not one in which the bad horse gets its way whenever it wishes. In the *Timaeus* it seems that Plato preferred some sort of bipartition between the immortal and mortal parts, although he does still maintain the tripartition of the *Republic*, with the spirited and appetitive parts assigned to the mortal soul. The immortal, rational part, is located in the head, the spirited part in the upper part of the torso, and the appetitive part in the lower (69c5–72d8).

viding the irrational part into the appetitive (*epithymētikon*) and spirited (*thymoeides*) parts which are found in the *Republic*. A particularly good example of this can be found in Plutarch. It is no surprise that a Platonist such as Plutarch should know about Plato's division of the soul, of course, but the extent to which he uses and discusses it gives the impression that it was an idea which was considered important and relevant among the educated elite several centuries after its conception.

In his *On Moral Virtue*, he begins with a summary of the views of the philosophers, examining different theories concerning the construction of the soul, and soon comes to Plato's views. He uses the *Timaeus* first (441e–f), to argue that the soul is not simple, before moving on to the *Republic*:

The soul of man ... is not simple nor subject to similar emotions, but has as one part the intelligent and rational (*to noeron kai logistikon*), whose natural duty it is to govern and rule the individual, and as another part the passionate and irrational and variable and disorderly (*to pathētikon kai alogon kai polyplanes kai atakton*), which has need of a director. This second part is again subdivided into two parts, one of which, by nature ever willing to consort with the body and to serve the body, is called the appetitive (*epithymētikon*); the other, which sometimes joins forces with this part and sometimes lends strength and vigour to reason (*tōi logismōi*), is called the spirited part (*thymoeides*). And he [sc. Plato] shows this differentiation chiefly by the opposition of the reasoning and wise part (*tou logizomenou kai phronountos*) to the appetitive part and the spirited part (*to epithymoun kai to thymoumenon*), since it is by the very fact that these last are different that they are frequently disobedient and quarrel with the better part (*to beltion*).¹⁸

¹⁸ 441f–442b; translations are taken and adapted, and Greek is cited, from the relevant Loeb volumes of Plutarch's works. Plu. *Fragment* 200 also contains discussion of the three parts of the soul, in relation to the afterlife and rebirth. Cf. Alcinoüs' *Didaskalikos* 24. According to Dillon 1993, 149, the bipartition with which Alcinoüs subsumes the three parts is 'basic to later Platonism' and is found as early as the first century AD in writers such as Philo of Alexandria and Aëtius the doxographer. Alcinoüs does not use the term *thymoeides*, preferring the Aristotelian term *thymikon*, but it is quite clear that we are to see no difference between the two: although it does not occur in Plato, nor in Achilles Tatius or Heliodorus, Lucian uses *thymikon* at *On the Dance* 70, where the context is unambiguously Platonic – see below.

In addition to the basic point concerning the awareness of Platonic psychological theory, the terminology in this passage is also noteworthy. There is a large number of what appear to be synonyms for the three different parts: ‘the rational part’ (*to logistikon*) is also referred to as ‘the intelligent part’ (*to noeron*), ‘reason’ (*ho logismos*), ‘the reasoning part’ (*to logizomenon*), ‘the wise part’ (*to phronoun*), and ‘the better part’ (*to beltion*);¹⁹ the other two parts combined are referred to as ‘the passionate and irrational²⁰ and variable and disorderly’ part (*to pathētikon kai alogon kai polyplanes kai atakton*); ‘the spirited part’ (*to thymoeides*) is also referred to as *to thymoumenon*; and ‘the appetitive part’ (*to epithymētikon*) is also referred to as *to epithymoun*. The significance of this will become clear when we look at passages from the novelists, since we should not necessarily expect them to use only those terms found in Plato, and Plutarch’s flexibility allows us some flexibility when reading other texts which are primarily non-philosophical.

Plutarch continues his discussion by saying that Aristotle followed this tripartite division, but later ‘assigned the spirited to the appetitive part’ (*to ... thymoeides tōi epithymētikōi*), ‘on the ground that anger (*thymon*) is a sort of appetite (*epithymian tina*).²¹ He did, however, continue to treat ‘the passionate and irrational part’ (*tōi pathētikōi kai alogōi*) as distinct from the rational part (*tou logistikou*).²² After further discussion in which Aristotle is the main source, Plutarch moves on to a clear demonstration of the difference between ‘the irrational part’ (*to alogon*) and ‘the rational part’ (*to logikon*), that is ‘passion’ (*to pathos*) and ‘reason’ (*tou logou*).²³ We do not use the same part of the soul (*psychēs*) for desiring and forming judgements:

But the fact is that temperance belongs to the sphere where reason (*ho logismos*) guides (*hēniochei*) and manages the passionate part (*to pa-*

¹⁹ Cf. Pl. *Ti.* 70b8, where the immortal part is called ‘the best part’ (*to beltiston*).

²⁰ Cf. Pl. *R.* 439d7, where the appetitive part is first distinguished and called ‘the irrational and appetitive part’ (*alogiston te kai epithymētikon*).

²¹ 442b.

²² Space does not allow full consideration of Aristotelian psychology, but it is clear that he is seen, probably fairly, as very much taking Platonic ideas and adapting them. In any case Plato is a far more popular and important author in the Second Sophistic, especially for writers of fiction, so no intolerable injustice is done here by more or less leaving Aristotle out of the equation, although the syncretistic tendencies of the age (see Dillon & Long 1988) would have ensured his influence was substantial, if not necessarily felt. Nevertheless, see below on Chariton.

²³ 445a–b.

thētikon), like a gentle animal obedient to the reins (*euēnion*),²⁴ making it yielding in its desires (*tas epithymias*) and willingly receptive of moderation and propriety; but the self-controlled man, while he does indeed direct his desire (*tēn epithymian*) by the strength and mastery of reason (*tōi logismōi*), yet does so not without pain, nor by persuasion, but as it plunges sideways and resists, as though with blow and bit, he forcibly subdues it and holds it in, being the while himself full of internal struggle and turmoil.²⁵

This is clearly based on the charioteer and horses image of Plato's *Phaedrus*, as Plutarch acknowledges:

Such a conflict Plato portrays in his simile of the horses of the soul, where the worse horse struggles against his better yoke-fellow and at the same time disconcerts the charioteer (*hēniochon*), who is ever forced to hold out against him and with might and main to rein him in.²⁶

While it is not made explicit, presumably we are to see the pair of horses as constituting 'the passionate part' (*to pathētikon*) in the first of these two passages, with the better horse dominant in the case of the temperate man, and the worse in the case of the intemperate. It is worth emphasising, however, that Platonic language and imagery are deployed in discussions of the division of the soul, even if an Aristotelian bipartition seems to be the focus. Furthermore, the imagery is that of the Phaedran charioteer and horses of the soul, an image which we can see used or alluded to repeatedly in Plutarch, and in Second Sophistic literature generally.²⁷

Another example of Plutarch discussing Platonic psychology can be found in his *Platonic Question* 9, which concerns the simile at *Republic* 443d5–7 likening the order and harmony of the parts of the soul to musical notes in a scale. The entire discussion is focused on the tripartition of the soul and the passages from Plato which are the sources for this psychological theory. Rather than look at this in detail, I should like to draw attention to

²⁴ See 442d for a mention of 'reason shaking the reins' (σεισαντος ὡσπερ ἡνίας τοῦ λογισμοῦ).

²⁵ 445b–c.

²⁶ 445c.

²⁷ Cf. Plu. *Amat.* 759d and 763e–f; the extended use of this metaphor at Plu. *On the Sign of Socrates* 22 = *Moralia* 592a–c; Plu. *On the Face which Appears in the Orb of the Moon* 28 = *Moralia* 943d; Plu. *Ant.* 36,2; and Ps.-Lucian *Amores* 37. See below for examples in Achilles Tatius.

one passage of it, which is an excellent piece of evidence that the Second Sophistic reader of Plato would have regarded it as natural to equate the three parts of the soul of the *Republic* with the charioteer and horses of the *Phaedrus*:

Plato too, when he likened the structure of the soul to a composite of team and charioteer, represented, as is clear to everyone, the rational part (*to logistikon*) as charioteer and in the team of horses represented as shaggy about the ears, deaf, scarcely yielding to whip and goads (περὶ ὄτα λάσιον, κωφόν, μάστιγι μετὰ κέντρων μόγις ὑπέικον) the disobedience and utter indiscipline of the appetites (τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀπειθὲς καὶ ἀνάγωγον παντάπασι) but the spirited part (*to thymoeides*) as mostly tractable (*euēnion*) to the reason (*tōi logismōi*) and allied with it (*symmachon*).²⁸

The appetitive part is described in terms straight from the *Phaedrus*: ‘shaggy around the ears, deaf, hardly yielding to whip and goad together’,²⁹ but the description of the spirited part is a combination of elements from the *Phaedrus*, including ‘tractable’ (*euēnion*) from ‘easily controlled’/‘tractable’ (*euēnia*, *Phdr.* 247b2), where it is used of the gods’ chariots, and ‘allied with it’ (*symmachon*) from the *Republic*:

Therefore isn’t it appropriate for the rational part (*tōi ... logistikōi*) to rule, since it is wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul, and for the spirited part (*tōi ... thymoeidei*) to obey it and be its ally (*symmachōi*)?³⁰

The linking of the two Platonic passages on the division of the soul extends as far as an interweaving of vocabulary from the two sources. Moreover, this assimilation gives us greater confidence to see an engagement with Platonic psychology where authors use, whether alone or in combination, abstract nouns such as ‘reason’, parts of the soul, and metaphorical imagery. Indeed, the combination of philosophical ideas and vivid imagery is one of the factors which both made Plato so popular and makes his influence all the more manifest.

²⁸ Plu. *Quest. Plat.* 1008c.

²⁹ Pl. *Phdr.* 253e4–5: περὶ ὄτα λάσιος, κωφός, μάστιγι μετὰ κέντρων μόγις ὑπέικων.

³⁰ Pl. *R.* 441e4–6; cf. 440a8–b7.

Before looking at a final short extract from Plutarch, it is worth considering another non-novelistic passage, which is close to Plato in language if not in spirit. Lucian, an author who knows his philosophy and philosophers, but whom we might not necessarily expect to use theory to any great extent, also gives us an indication of how well-known the Platonic partition of the soul was. In his *On the Dance*, Lycinus praises dancing to the extent that he converts the previously hostile Crato. One of his arguments includes the use of philosophy and philosophers, no doubt responding to Crato's concern that in spending his time watching dancing Lycinus is oblivious of 'Plato and Chrysippus and Aristotle'.³¹ After some remarks about the purpose of dance being to impersonate and to accommodate oneself to the role one assumes,³² and about the dancer enacting different sorts of people – the sort of imitation that would presumably lead the Socrates of the *Republic* to disapprove of dancing³³ – he says that Timocrates, having seen for the only time a dancer dancing, said: 'What a treat for the eyes my reverence for philosophy has deprived me of!'.³⁴ It is clear from this, then, that any argument which deploys philosophy is going to be tongue-in-cheek at best. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note how Lucian marries the two themes of variety and philosophical theory:

If what Plato says about the soul is true, the three parts of it are excellently set forth by the dancer – the spirited part (*to thymikon*) when he exhibits a man in a rage, the appetitive part (*to epithymētikon*) when he enacts lovers, and the reasoning part (*to logistikon*) when he controls (*χαλιναγωγῆ*) each of the different passions (*tōn pathōn*); this last, to be sure, is disseminated through every portion of the dance just as touch is disseminated through the other senses.³⁵

³¹ Lucian *Salt.* 2; translations are taken and adapted, and Greek is cited, from the relevant Loeb volume of Lucian's works.

³² *Ibid.* 65.

³³ *Ibid.* 66–67; see *Republic* 3 and 10. Note, however, that Lycinus does mention Socrates' keenness on dancing at 25, although, of course, he is using X. *Smp.* 2,15–19 there.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 69.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 70; cf. 'Then, too, all the rest are activities of one or the other of the two elements in man, some of them activities of the soul, some of the body; but in dancing both are combined. For there is display of mind (*διανοίας ἐπίδειξις*) in the performance as well as expression of bodily development, and the most important part of it is the wisdom (*ἡ σοφία*) that controls the action, and the fact that nothing is irrational (*τὸ μηδὲν ἕξω λόγου*)' (69).

Lycinus walks the tightrope of citing the authority of Plato while at the same time saying things antithetical to opinions about imitation and specialisation expressed in the same text. There is not space to look at this text in detail, but there are several points which come across strongly and which confirm and build on those already made: Plato's division of the soul was common and recognisable currency – Lycinus does not cite the relevant dialogues; the language of the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* is readily combined – 'controls' (χαλιναγωγῆ) shows the influence of the latter; and authors could use the partition of the soul to their own ends, whether Platonic or not.

The last piece of evidence I wish to adduce from Plutarch comes from a work which is not only thoroughly Platonic,³⁶ although not in such a technical way as the texts looked at so far, but also far more akin in subject matter and ethos to the Greek novels: the *Amatorius*.³⁷ The passage comes from an argument about the relation of gods to emotions, probing the question of personification:

'Well now,' my father asked, 'do you believe Ares to be a god or an emotion of ours?' Pemptides replied that he believed Ares to be a god who ordered the spirited and courageous part within us (*to thymoeides ... kai andrōdes*). 'What is this, Pemptides?' cried my father. 'So the warlike, inimical, and antagonistic part (*to ... machētikon ... kai polemikon kai anti-palon*) has a divinity, while the affectionate, sociable, coupling part (*to ... philētikon kai koinōnikon kai syneleustikon*) is to be left without a god?'

'The spirited part' is familiar enough, and, as was the case for the rational part discussed in *On Moral Virtue* 441f–442b (quoted above), we find several synonyms, although there is a nice twist from positive to negative in the language of the father's (Plutarch's) reply, which hints at the Platonic duality and ambiguous status of 'the spirited part'. However, what is more interesting here is the part of the soul which is implicitly contrasted with the spirited part: 'the affectionate, sociable, coupling part'. Plutarch has seemingly 'invented' a part of the soul, since this is not found in the classic tripartition, and the evidently positive attitude towards it means that it can hardly be a sub-part of the appetitive part.³⁸ At any rate, Plutarch seems to be playing

³⁶ See Trapp 1990, 157–161, Goldhill 1995, ch.3, and Rist 2001.

³⁷ It is especially similar to the debate on the merits of boys and women as sexual partners at the end of the second book of *Leucippe and Cleitophon*, 2,35–38.

³⁸ We find another example of such flexibility a little later, from a context which is particularly steeped in Plato even by the standards of this dialogue: 'But all those who by sober reason (*sōphroni logismōi*) and modesty have excluded the raging part (*to manikon*), as if

with the Platonic division of the soul, and again this is something that is significant for other writers whose concern is not necessarily or primarily to engage in philosophical debates: we should perhaps expect novelists, if they are going to take advantage of this motif, to indulge in greater variation on the Platonic texts even than Plutarch allows himself here, and to exploit the potential of the partition of the soul while still allowing us to attribute the basis of that exploitation to Platonic theory. One might expect in particular such a part of the soul as we find linked to Eros here to appeal to writers of erotic fiction with an interest in psychology, yet in fact the fundamental polarisation between reason and desire forms the basis of what the novelists do, although later exponents of the genre evidently realised the possibility of expansion.

On this point it is worth stressing that Plato himself does not rule out the possibility that the soul is not exactly as described in his dialogues; in fact he seems readily to give later writers the freedom they would have to wrench from more dogmatic philosophers. In all three texts in question we find very similar comments: in the *Republic*, after the three parts in the state have been distinguished and Socrates has raised the problem of whether the corresponding parts are to be found in the soul, he says:

... in my opinion, we shall never get a precise answer using our present methods of argument – although there is another longer and fuller road that does lead to such an answer.³⁹

Plato hopes to give only an idea of what the soul is like, and this creates freedom to play with his ideas. However, not only are the descriptions of the psychology of man in the Platonic corpus not necessarily supposed to be accurate, but they do not seem to be exhaustive, since in the *Republic* we have positive indications that the soul is more complex than described. After the tripartition of the soul the just man is defined:

[He] harmonises the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale – high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and

it were literally fire, have kept in their souls (*tēi psychēi*) only its light and radiance and warmth' (Plu. *Amat.* 765b). The raging part (*to manikon*) could be argued to be the same as 'the spirited part' but it could equally be a sub-part of that part, or even a different part. In any case, by using a term for a part of the soul not found in Plato, Plutarch opens up and reveals the possibilities.

³⁹ Pl. *R.* 435c9–d3; cf. *Phdr.* 246a4–6 and *Tim.* 72d5–8.

any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he becomes entirely one.⁴⁰

We are not, then, limited to the three parts of the soul; in fact from what Socrates says in the final book, presumably referring to the discussion at 434d2–441c7, we should perhaps imagine a far larger number: ‘... we said that our soul is full of a myriad of such oppositions at the same time’.⁴¹ Since we know that: ‘... the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time’, there must be myriad parts of the soul.⁴² We have already seen Plutarch take advantage of this possibility, and it will be interesting to see to what extent the novelists depart from the two or three basic parts of the soul, to experiment with the delineation and opposition of other, different parts.

Chariton

Chariton is generally regarded to have written his *Callirhoe* in the first century A.D.⁴³ This is consonant with the fact that, although it is not the case that philosophy has no part to play in his novel at all,⁴⁴ he does not demon-

⁴⁰ Pl. *R.* 443d5–e1.

⁴¹ Ibid. 603d5–7.

⁴² Ibid. 436b8–9; Büttner 2006, especially 76–78, discusses this clause and argues for no more than three parts of the soul; he does not, however, consider the passages from the later books in detail. Cf. the discussion at *R.* 588b10–e2, where Socrates asks Glaucon to fashion ‘an image of the soul in words’, which consists of a ‘single kind of multicoloured (ποικίλου) beast with a ring of many heads (πολυκεφάλου) that it can grow and change at will – some from gentle, some from savage animals’, ‘one other kind, that of a lion, and another of a human being.’ It is clear that these three parts should be seen as corresponding to the appetitive, spirited, and rational parts, but the multiform nature of the appetitive part both conveys the range of desires which one may feel, and also allows for further and more specific division.

⁴³ See Bowie 2002 for the arguments and further bibliography.

⁴⁴ For an argument that Chariton shows an awareness of peripatetic philosophy, see Rijksbaron 1984; cf. the comments of Reardon 1982, 21–22. Chariton has a philosopher in his cast of characters, Demetrius (8,3,10), and one of the pirates berates another for his suggestion that they return Callirhoe, and so act justly and piously, with: ‘You inopportune idiot – are you telling us to act like philosophers (*philosophēin*) now?’ (1,10,4). For arguments in favour of a relatively well-educated readership of the Greek novel, and so one which it is reasonable to suggest would have had some knowledge of philosophy and have read the principal texts, see, e.g., Wesseling 1988, Stephens 1994, Bowie 1994 and 1996, and Morgan 1995.

strate the intimate acquaintance with at least the portions of Plato that we find in the later novelists, since Platonism, and the reading of the Platonic corpus, did not come to be universally important until the second century, nor dominant until the third.⁴⁵ However, there are some points at which we can see the influence of philosophy in the way in which Chariton portrays the psychological processes of one of his characters at moments of intense emotional conflict.⁴⁶

At *Callirhoe* 2,3,5 Dionysius first sees the beautiful Callirhoe. He is still grieving for his late wife, but before long he is ‘afame with love’.⁴⁷ Dionysius shows a restraint of character which surpasses that of the protagonist, Chaereas, who had been volatile enough to kick his beloved new wife in the stomach (1,4,12), and his portrayal throughout the novel is relatively sympathetic. Nowhere does the reader feel more sympathy for him, however, than when he is trying to overcome his desire for Callirhoe, something which marks him out as almost unique among novelistic love-rivals.⁴⁸ At dinner on the day of their first meeting we see the beginning of a noble, but doomed, struggle:

Dionysius had been wounded, but tried to conceal the wound, as became an educated (*pepaideumenos*) man who made especial claim to virtue.⁴⁹

This is then amplified:

Then you could observe a struggle between reason and passion (*agōna logismou kai pathous*), for although engulfed by desire (*epithymias*), as a noble man he tried to resist, and rising above the waves, as it were, he said to himself ...⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Dillon 1996 is the standard treatment of the phenomenon of ‘middle’ Platonism.

⁴⁶ Fusillo 1999 draws attention to the following passages for the portrayal of simultaneous different emotions in *Callirhoe*: 1,9,3; 3,5,3; 3,7,6; 5,8,2; 5,8,3; 6,6,1; and 8,5,8. Similar passages in the novel of Xenophon of Ephesus are: 1,9,1; 1,11,1; 2,5,5; 3,7,1; and 5,13,3.

⁴⁷ Chariton 2,3,8: φλεγόμενος ... τῷ ἔρωτι; translations of *Callirhoe* are taken, and occasionally adapted, from Goold 1995. Greek is cited from Reardon 2004.

⁴⁸ See Kaimio 1996, 153–159, for emotional conflict in Chariton, and Balot 1998, 145–154, for Dionysius’ and Artaxerxes’ struggles with their feelings for Callirhoe. Balot is rather more condemning, especially of the former, than readers might normally be: cf. Perry, 1930, 116, and Fusillo 1999, 70–71.

⁴⁹ Chariton 2,4,1.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 2,4,4. Cf. the eunuch Artaxates to Artaxerxes on overcoming his desire for Callirhoe: ‘Do not apply to your love the same remedy that other men use, but rather the more potent and kingly one of fighting against yourself (*ἀνταγωνιζόμενος σεαυτῷ*). For you

Although we have here the distinction between reason and passion which we saw in the (bi)partition of the soul, it might be argued that there is no particularly strong reason to think that Chariton is consciously reflecting philosophical theory. It is, after all, a natural distinction for a writer to use at this point in his narrative, but, as Scourfield puts it: ‘the language employed in describing Dionysius’ resistance to his emotions ... points to a philosophical underlay, albeit of a non-specific kind’.⁵¹ He goes on to make some interesting points around philosophical ideas of how to react to strong emotions, but I think we could argue for an influence that is a little more substantial here. The first reason for this is that Chariton himself very soon gives us cause to think that he is consciously using philosophy, since at the end of Dionysius’ speech we find:

But Love fought against these sensible thoughts, considering his self-restraint an insult, and for that reason inflamed (*ἐπυρόλει*) all the more a soul which attempted to philosophise in love (*ψυχὴν ἐν ἔρωτι φιλοσοφοῦσαν*).⁵²

The mental anguish of one of his characters, a conflict between reason and passion, is here described by Chariton as ‘philosophising’, and I think that we should take this as a signal that Chariton is aware of the philosophical pedigree of the distinction he is using. That Dionysius is *pepaideumenos* adds weight to the argument, for as such he is likely to have read his philosophical texts and to know what the ethical and social demands of his situation are.⁵³ The second reason to argue for a philosophical awareness here is that we find a passage which shows remarkable similarities in Plutarch’s *On Moral Virtue*. Against the argument of some of the Stoics that reason and passion are not essentially different, but that the former can become the latter, one point we find made is:

alone, master, can overcome even a god. So distract your soul (*τὴν σεαυτοῦ ψυχὴν*) with every pleasure’ (6,3,8–9).

⁵¹ Scourfield 2003, 170. Cf. Balot 1998, 146–147. Konstan 1994, 32–33, ignores, or vastly simplifies, the dynamics of the narrative, philosophy, and emotion which conjoin at this point, and presents a distorted and dismissive view of Dionysius, seemingly because this fits in better with his argument for ‘sexual symmetry’ and ultimate generic conformity and similarity.

⁵² Chariton 2,4,5.

⁵³ ‘Philosophy’ and ‘philosophising’ can mean very different things in Achilles Tatius, who has a far more ironic view of the relationship between theorising and desire: see Goldhill 1995, 94–100, and Morales 2004, 57–60.

For the lover who admonishes himself uses reason against his passion (ὁ γὰρ νοουθετῶν αὐτὸν ἐρῶντα χρῆται τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς τὸ πάθος), since they both exist at the same time in his soul, as it were pressing with his hand the other part, which is inflamed (φλεγμαῖνον), and clearly perceiving that there are two distinct forces and that they are at variance.⁵⁴

Not only do we have here the conflict between reason and passion, but it occurs in the soul of a lover, part of which is inflamed, just as Eros inflamed Dionysius' soul (2,4,5) when he was already 'aflame with love' (2,3,8). In spite of these similarities I do not wish to argue that one passage necessarily influenced the other; rather that Chariton's focus on, and description of, Dionysius' mental turmoil can be paralleled closely in a roughly contemporary philosophical text in a way which suggests some philosophical knowledge on the part of the novelist. Chariton may be relying on a basic, Aristotelian bipartition such as is clearly important even for a Platonist like Plutarch, but I would argue that Chariton is doing more than just subconsciously recycling platitudinous and straightforward philosophical ideas.

This same distinction is used by Chariton in the next book, after Dionysius has learned that Callirhoe wishes to marry him. At the beginning of the book he had been so disconsolate that he had decided to starve himself to death, so the news that she has decided to marry him results in a tide of emotions which he has difficulty in controlling:

His passion (*to erōtikon pathos*) now mounted and brooked no delay to the marriage: control is irksome when desire (*epithymias*) can be indulged. Though an educated (*pepaideumenos*) man, Dionysius was caught in the tempest and his heart was engulfed. Yet he forced himself to rise above the billows of his passion (καθάπερ ἐκ τρικυμίας τοῦ πάθους). And he then gave himself over to the following reflections (*logismois*) ...⁵⁵

He is desperate to consummate his love and he has now been given a green light, but Dionysius is a man of such virtue that he resolves to postpone the marriage so that by honouring his wife with a public wedding he might show her more respect and have a more watertight case should his claim to her ever be contested. Near the end of the soliloquy which follows the above

⁵⁴ Plu. *Mor.* 448b.

⁵⁵ Chariton 3,2,6.

quotation he addresses his own soul: ‘Endure a brief delay, my soul (*psychē*)’.⁵⁶ This time *logismos* gains the ascendancy, if only briefly.⁵⁷

Chariton does not, in these passages or elsewhere, use the Platonic parts of the soul, and so it is harder to claim that he is using Platonic theory in particular. However, the conflict in Dionysius’ soul between reason and desire, specifically erotic passion, is one which it is fair to conclude is drawn from philosophy, and directly so given the annotation Chariton provides in characterising what Dionysius does as ‘philosophising’. What is perhaps even more noteworthy is that Dionysius is the sole character whose emotions are analysed in this way. This is, I think, not only because he is the only man who encounters Callirhoe and makes a concerted attempt to control and restrain himself, even when he is in a position not to do so, but also because of one of the reasons he does this: he is such a cultivated man. The fact that he is educated is emphasised at both 2,4,1 and 3,2,6, and the combination of this and his ability at least to try to master his emotions is an indication of how astute and, in this case, consistent Chariton’s characterisation is. In addition to the shared language and phraseology in these passages – the imagery of being engulfed by waves and attempting to rise above them is also a common factor⁵⁸ – Dionysius and his feelings are described in ways appropriate to him and what he represents. He is the character whose education, and so philosophical knowledge, is most emphasised,⁵⁹ and so it is fitting that his experiences are portrayed in terms which he himself would both understand and use, as if Chariton’s descriptions of what Dionysius feels are so empathetic that they are focalised through the mind, and soul, of the character himself.

⁵⁶ Ibid. 3,2,9.

⁵⁷ There is this same *pathos/logismos* distinction at 4,4,2 where Mithridates, with his own gain in view, is advising Chaereas on how he ought to proceed: ‘Your present haste springs more from emotion than reason (*vñv γάρ σπεύδεις πάθει μάλλον ἢ λογισμῶ*)’.

⁵⁸ See also below on Achilles Tatius.

⁵⁹ For Dionysius’ education see: 1,12,6; 2,1,5; 2,4,1; 2,5,11; 3,2,6; 4,7,6; 5,5,1; 5,9,8; and 8,5,10; cf. 8,4,5, where Callirhoe in her letter asks Dionysius to educate ‘their’ son (it is in fact Chaereas’) in a manner worthy of his parents. Excepting 1,12,9, where Leonas claims Callirhoe is a trained nurse for a child, education is only mentioned elsewhere at 6,5,8 and 7,6,5, where Callirhoe is the focus, 7,2,5, where it is Chaereas, and 8,3,10, where it is the Egyptian philosopher Demetrius.

Achilles Tatius

Achilles Tatius has often been commended for the psychological realism in his novel *Leucippe and Cleitophon*.⁶⁰ He provides a less idealised portrayal of his protagonist, Cleitophon, than the other novelists,⁶¹ and Melite is drawn extremely sympathetically for a love rival.⁶² In fact he shows a rather marked interest in psychology, especially in the use of generalised, sententious passages; this is an interest which might not always appeal to the tastes of modern readers, but there is no doubt that there is much to be said on this as well as on the *sententiae* and ‘digressions’ of every kind in the novel.⁶³ One set of questions for which there is not space for a full treatment here concerns the levels of narration and the extent to which the reader might be supposed to think that it is Cleitophon the narrator (or, indeed, actor) who demonstrates these interests, rather than the (implied) author. However, I think Morales is absolutely right to see a separation between the author and the narrator, and this is something which I shall assume in order to see how the aspects under consideration contribute to the portrayal of Cleitophon.⁶⁴

Since *Leucippe and Cleitophon* provides such abundant material for the topic in question,⁶⁵ I shall restrict my focus to certain elements only of Achilles Tatius’ psychology, namely two ways in which he exploits Platonic ideas, and to representative examples of these which betray the influence of

⁶⁰ See Fusillo 1999, especially 73–77. This novel dates from the middle of the second century A.D. (see Bowie 2002), when Plato and Platonism were increasingly important.

⁶¹ In a note to his translation Gaselee 1969, 390–391, writes: ‘The reader, bearing in mind Clitophon’s behaviour at his previous meeting with Thersander (V.xxiii.), will by this time have come to the conclusion that the hero of the romance is a coward of the purest water’.

⁶² Fusillo 1999, 76–77.

⁶³ See Morales 2004, especially 106–130.

⁶⁴ See in particular her comments, 2004, 115–116, on what Cleitophon says about barbarians and women at 5,5,2. For other material along these lines see Whitmarsh 2003, and Morgan 1997, 179–186, 2004a, and 2007, and also Conte 1996 on Petronius, and Morgan 2004b on Longus.

⁶⁵ As far as relatively straightforward conflicting emotions are concerned, Fusillo 1999 discusses or mentions the following passages: 1,1,7; 1,4,5; 1,11; 2,5; 2,18,6; 2,23,4; 2,29,1; 3,8,7; 5,3,7; 5,19,1; 5,21,1; 5,24,3; 6,19; and 7,1,1. The last two will be discussed below. Although it is not a set of data whose significance should be overestimated, it is perhaps worth noting that if we compare the occurrences of ‘soul’ (*psychē*) in each Greek novel with their length (measured by pages of the translations in Reardon 1989) we find the following ratios: Achilles Tatius: 83/109; Chariton: 27/123; Xenophon of Ephesus: 22/42; Longus: 11/60; and Heliodorus: 63/235.

Plato and Platonism particularly clearly.⁶⁶ Before considering conflicts in the soul in *Leucippe and Cleitophon* which are comparable to those we have seen in Chariton, I want to look at a handful of passages where we can see a significant difference between the two. For, unlike Chariton, Achilles Tatius uses specific parts of the soul. One such instance occurs in Bk. 3. Cleitophon and Leucippe have been captured by the Egyptian herdsmen shortly after their shipwreck has brought them to land at Pelusium. During the night Cleitophon silently laments the manifold misfortunes that Leucippe has suffered because of him, among which is the fact that they have been taken prisoner by men who do not understand the Greek language. This means that they have no chance of receiving pity. As he himself says:

Speech often procures compassion; for when the tongue is mandated by a suffering soul (τῶ ... πονοῦντι τῆς ψυχῆς) to appeal for clemency it softens the raging souls of its audience (τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ψυχῆς ... τὸ θυμούμενον).⁶⁷

Achilles could simply have written ‘softens the rage (*thymon*) of its audience’, whereas a literal translation of what Cleitophon says would be: ‘softens the raging part of the soul of the listeners’.⁶⁸ There is no particular need for Platonic psychology at this point; when reading this novel, it is important to recognise unnecessary as well as appropriate allusions to Plato, since the way Cleitophon talks about his world and his experiences is fundamental to the portrayal of his character. Moreover, we find not only one of the canonical parts of the Platonic soul here, but also something that clearly derives from the same theory: a literal translation of τῶ ... πονοῦντι τῆς ψυχῆς would be ‘the suffering part of the soul’. This exploration of the psyche, where each emotion is assigned its own part, follows logically from what

⁶⁶ See Repath forthcoming for a more detailed treatment, especially of allusions to the *Phaedrus*. For knowledge and use of Plato by Achilles Tatius, see the Phaedran setting at 1,2, with Martin 2002 and Morales 2004, 50–60 and Ní Mheallaigh (this volume); the debate on love and sex at 2,35–38, with Wilhelm 1902 and Goldhill 1995, ch.2; the use of names such as Cleinias, Charmides, and Cleitophon, with Morales 2004, 56; and the repeated use of the physiology of desire from the *Phaedrus* (1,4,4; 1,9,4–5; 5,13,4), with Vilborg 1962, 26–27, Trapp 1990, 155 and 172, Garnaud 1991, 17, Bychkov 1999, 339–340, Goldhill 2001, 170, and Morales 2004, 132. All these aspects are treated in depth in my forthcoming book.

⁶⁷ Ach. Tat. 3,10,2; translations of *Leucippe and Cleitophon* are taken, and occasionally adapted, from Whitmarsh 2001. Greek is cited from Garnaud 1991.

⁶⁸ We can tell from Plu. *On Moral Virtue* 441f–442b (quoted above) that it must surely be correct to identify *tēs ... psychēs ... to thymoumenon* with *to thymoeides* of Platonism.

Plato wrote, but it is significant that we find such expositions in the mouth of a young man recounting his adventures with his girlfriend.

A little later we find that Cleitophon has been rescued from the herdsmen by the general Charmides and his soldiers, and Leucippe has been recovered after a particularly lurid *Scheintod*.⁶⁹ All seems to be going well for the couple until, inevitably, the general falls in love with Leucippe.⁷⁰ When Cleitophon learns from his friend Menelaus, whom the general is using as a confidant, that Charmides is determined to consort with Leucippe even if sex is out of the question, he gives way to despair and indulges in a characteristically ludicrous *sententia* about kisses.⁷¹ In reply Menelaus too generalises, yet at least what he says is directly and practically relevant to their predicament. He points out how dangerous a disappointed man can be:

If he also has the power to act without fear of recrimination, the part of his soul uncurbed by timidity (*tēs psychēs to mē phoboumenon*) aggravates the part impelled by acerbity (*to thymoumenon*).⁷²

To thymoumenon is already familiar, but *to mē phoboumenon* has not yet been encountered. Although one could argue that the ‘spirited’ part and the ‘non-fearing’ part are more or less identical, or that the latter should be subsumed under the former, it is the formulation of the idea that is interesting.⁷³ In Achilles Tatius psychological generalisations lead to abstract expressions such as this, and the expression here, I would argue, is also derived from the Platonic idea of the divided soul.

The examples looked at so far (including those in the notes) are generalisations made by characters/narrators – Cleitophon and Menelaus – about the feelings of others. If this were always the case in *Leucippe and Cleitophon*, it might seem to be a device to allow access, albeit indirect, into others’ minds.

⁶⁹ Ach. Tat. 3,15.

⁷⁰ Ach. Tat. 4,3 and especially 4,7,3 where Charmides says: ‘For now I shall advance to a war against the Herdsmen; but another war is being fought over the territory of my soul’.

⁷¹ Ach. Tat. 4,8,1–4.

⁷² Ach. Tat. 4,8,6. Cf. the phrasing earlier in the same speech, where the appetitive part seems to be alluded to (bearing in mind especially Plu. *On Moral Virtue* 441f–442b): ‘but if he is desperate, his appetite (*to epithymoun*) changes its focus, and he takes it on himself, using every resource he can muster, to repay whatever stands in his way with equal measures of pain’ (4,8,5).

⁷³ Cf. Cleitophon on Leucippe’s feelings at 2,29,4: ‘it checks the heart’s ardour and withers the soul’s dolour’ (τῆς καρδίας ἔπαυσε τὸ θυμούμενον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐμάρανε τὸ λυπούμενον), where the spirited part is also found, although in the heart; the soul has a ‘grieving part’. This part is found also at 2,23,4 (see n.74) 1,8,11 (see n.75).

However, it is not just other people whose emotions are described in this way. At 6,14 Cleitophon has been put in prison as an adulterer and he is visited by Cleinias and Satyrus. They are not allowed to stay with him, but before they are driven away Cleitophon tells them to return at dawn if Leucippe reappears. He describes his own mental state as follows:

My soul was poised between hope and fear: the part that hoped was fearing, the part that feared hoping (τὴν ψυχὴν εἶχον ἐπὶ τρυτάνης ἐλπίδος καὶ φόβου, καὶ ἐφοβεῖτό μου τὸ ἐλπίζον καὶ ἤλπιζε τὸ φοβούμενον).⁷⁴

Achilles Tatius/Cleitophon here indulges in another of his favourite devices, antithesis with a paradoxical twist. Of course it is philosophically, and Platonically, absurd that the ‘hoping’ part should do anything other than hope, or that the ‘fearing’ part should do anything other than fear, but, by using the possibility afforded by Platonist theory of dividing the soul into different faculties, the mental distress and confusion that the protagonist felt is effectively conveyed. That he uses this means, and that in this case we do not have a generalisation, since Cleitophon is describing how he felt on one particular occasion, creates an even stronger impression that the narrator is fond of such abstract phrasing.⁷⁵

In addition to the use of parts of the soul scattered throughout the text, there is one episode from a little later in Bk. 6 in which the psychology of one character is persistently emphasised. In this episode Thersander, who has scarcely any redeeming features, lets his feelings for Leucippe get the better of him, and the contrast with Chariton’s Dionysius will be instructive. Following the advice of his henchman Sosthenes he has decided to approach her, relying on the belief that he will be able to oust Cleitophon from her affections. Cleitophon the narrator makes a generalising comment, with the conclusion that: ‘desire (*to epithymoun*) takes what it wants as an ally (*sym-*

⁷⁴ Ach. Tat. 6,14,2. Cf. the very similar passage at 2,23,4: ‘my fear of the danger was perturbing the hopes of my soul (τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλπίδας), while my hope of success was overwhelming my fear with pleasure; thus the hopeful part of me was terrified and the anxious part ecstatic (οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐλπίζον ἐφοβεῖτό μου καὶ ἔχαιρε τὸ λυπούμενον)’. Cf. also 6,19,3, where it is Thersander’s soul which is a τρυτάνη (‘balance’), in his case of ‘desire’ (ἔρωσ) and ‘anger’ (θυμός) – see below.

⁷⁵ However, it is not obviously the case that Cleitophon is the only one, since we find even Charicles saying: ‘The exercise will lighten the pain in my soul (τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λυπούμενον)’ (1,8,11). This raises the (unanswerable) question of whether and to what extent it is the author who is fond of this phraseology, this is a world in which everyone talks like this, or it is Cleitophon the narrator who filters and characterises his narration and everything in it.

machon), and arouses hope'.⁷⁶ This sets the scene for Thersander's encounter with Leucippe in several ways: desire is his overriding feeling; the abstract formulation of 'desire' anticipates the concentration on psychology in what follows and the means by which it will be achieved; and the mention of an ally might fulfil a similar function by recalling the alliance of the rational and spirited parts at *Republic* 440–1 – for the desiring part to be taking allies is an ominous sign that Thersander's soul might be about to lose control of itself.

At 6,18,1 Thersander goes into the hut in which Leucippe is being held captive and is immediately overwhelmed by the sight of her: 'When he saw Leucippe, his soul was inflamed (*ἀνεφλέγη τὴν ψυχὴν*):⁷⁷ she seemed to have grown more beautiful on this occasion'. He nearly embraces her on the spot, 'but he controlled himself, sat down next to her, and struck up a conversation, stringing together various nonsensical themes'.⁷⁸ The control which he is able to exert is purely physical: there is no sense in which he is trying, like Dionysius, to master his desire. We now encounter a familiar sort of psychological *sententia*:

This is what lovers are like, whenever they seek to chat with their beloveds. Reason (*ton logismon*) has no authority over their language, and their entire soul is instead focused upon the beloved: they blather with the tongue alone, without reason as charioteer (*chōris hēniochou tou logismou*).⁷⁹

The mention of Thersander's soul, reason, and the charioteer is an unmistakably Platonic combination,⁸⁰ and the reader of Achilles Tatius would not have needed to think twice about whether this was an allusion. It also comes at a crucial point as we see that Thersander's desire for Leucippe is so great that reason is allowed to play no part in his dealings with her.⁸¹ It is not the bad horse in Thersander that is causing the problem, rather it is the absence of the controlling part, the charioteer. Without reason to control the horses of the soul, it is a fair bet that the bad horse will run amok and that the good

⁷⁶ Ach. Tat. 6,17,5.

⁷⁷ Cf. Dionysius at *Callirhoe* 2,3,8, quoted above.

⁷⁸ Ach. Tat. 6,18,1–2.

⁷⁹ Ach. Tat. 6,18,2–3.

⁸⁰ Plepelits 1980, 250, n.166, notes the allusion to the *Phaedrus*.

⁸¹ A little earlier in the same book Melite, Thersander's wife, makes a partially successful attempt to calm him down, saying, among other things: 'give up the anger in your heart, listen to me with pure reason (*logismon*) as a judge' (6,9,2).

horse will have little chance of restraining it.⁸² The contrast with Dionysius and the conflict in his soul between reason and passion could not be clearer.

Thersander does lose control of himself to the extent that he attempts to force his kisses on Leucippe, but she successfully resists him, both physically and verbally. However, this only increases the danger she is in, for Thersander is attacked by both anger (*thymos*) and desire (*erōs*).⁸³ The rest of the chapter consists of the description of the battles between, and alliances of, the two emotions in a manner reminiscent of the internal struggles that take place in the soul during the degeneration of the just man as described in the *Republic*.⁸⁴ Without analysing this in detail, it is clear that at war within Thersander are desire and appetite on the one side, and anger on the other, with no role for the third Platonic part of the soul: reason. We have already been told that Thersander lacks this inner control, and so anger is a largely negative impulse here, since there is no rational part with which it could be allied.⁸⁵ This, I argue, is crucial in the portrayal of Thersander as the villain of the piece, a man who is capable of nothing but base desires and anger at the frustration of those desires, and who demonstrates what happens in the soul of a man who does not, and is not able to, follow the philosophical example of restraint which Socrates describes in the *Phaedrus*. This Platonic and Phaedran influence is confirmed by what Cleitophon says next, as the allusion to the charioteer and horses of the soul is picked up:

And so when Thersander had initially hoped that his erotic ambitions (εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα) would be fulfilled, he was totally enslaved to Leucippe; but when he failed to get what he had hoped for, he abandoned the reins of his soul to anger (ἀφῆκε τῷ θυμῷ τὰς ἡνίας).⁸⁶

⁸² Achilles Tatius may have been inspired by the same myth when naming his heroine ‘Leucippe’ – ‘White Horse’. Of the two horses in the myth, the good one is white (*Phdr.* 253d5). Morales 2004, 66, briefly includes this suggestion. See the final chapter of my forthcoming book for a more detailed treatment.

⁸³ Ach. Tat. 6,19,1.

⁸⁴ See Morales (2004), 117–121, especially 120, on this passage; among other points, she draws attention, 117, to ‘Plato’s discussion of desire in *Republic* 9 586c–e’; cf. the transition from the timocratic man to the democratic, *R.* 559d7–561a4, and from the democratic to the despotic, *R.* 572d8–573b4. *Timaeus* 69c5–72d8 is also in the background to Ach. Tat. 6,19, although I wish to focus here on the general point of Platonic influence and the use of the *Phaedrus*.

⁸⁵ At 6,17,5 Thersander’s desire took hope as its ally, but now hope is replaced by anger in an intermittent alliance (6,19,3 and 6,19,7; cf. 6,19,4).

⁸⁶ Ach. Tat. 6,20,1.

Anger wins the battle against love, and there is now no prospect that the charioteer of Thersander's soul – assuming he has one – will be able to regain control, or even have a chance of fighting for it, since he has surrendered the means of doing so.⁸⁷ Such a man is clearly a danger, not least to his beloved.

In fact his anger is so great that he strikes Leucippe and unleashes a barrage of verbal abuse at her; this results in a fierce exchange, involving Sosthenes too, in which Leucippe defiantly asserts her virginity with such force that Thersander does not know how to respond:

When Thersander heard this, he went through the full spectrum of reactions (παντοδαπὸς ἦν): he was distressed, he was furious, and he plotted (ἤχθετο, ὠργίζετο, ἐβουλεύετο). He was furious because he had been insulted, he was distressed due to his failure, and he plotted since he felt passionate desire (ὡς ἐρῶν). His soul was torn apart, and without a word to Leucippe he ran out. On the surface it was an exit in fury, but in fact he was giving his soul the opportunity to dissipate the threefold wave (τρικυμίαζ) that had struck him.⁸⁸

Thersander's soul is split in three, and after the use of the Phaedran charioteer of the soul it is tempting to argue that this represents, in however debased a form, the Platonic tripartition of the soul as found in the *Republic*,

⁸⁷ See Morales 2004, 120, on the bathos here and the humour both within 6,19 and in how it relates to its context.

⁸⁸ Ach. Tat. 7,1,1. A very similar passage occurs at 2,29,1 where Leucippe's honour has been impugned by her mother Pantheia, and she reacts with indignation (rather ironically, for she was perfectly willing to lose her virginity to Cleitophon and was prevented from doing so only by the intrusion of her mother): 'Finding herself alone and overburdened with her mother's words, Leucippe felt the full range of emotions (παντοδαπή τις ἦν): she was distressed, she felt ashamed, and she was furious (ἤχθετο, ἤσχύνετο, ὠργίζετο). She was distressed at having been found out, she felt ashamed at being reproached, she was furious at being mistrusted. Shame, grief, and anger are the soul's three waves (αἰδῶς δὲ καὶ λύπη καὶ ὀργὴ τρία τῆς ψυχῆς κύματα).' The adjective παντοδαπός, the verbs ἤχθετο and ὠργίζετο, the asyndetic construction, and the metaphor of waves of the soul link these two passages. The rest of this chapter develops this metaphor into an extended *topos* of the kind found at 6,19, including the mention of parts of the soul at 2,29,4, quoted above in n. 73. Cf. 5,24,3, where Melite reacts to Cleitophon's letter to the formerly presumed-dead Leucippe, shortly after the unexpected return of her husband Thersander: 'her soul was simultaneously divided between multiple emotions (ἐμμεμέριστο πολλοῖς ἅμα τὴν ψυχὴν): shame, anger, desire, and jealousy. She felt ashamed (ἤσχύνετο) before her husband, she was furious (ὠργίζετο) at the letter, desire withered her anger, jealousy inflamed her desire, and finally desire won out.'

which Plutarch in particular assimilated to the simile of the charioteer and horses. Such a reading would take the three verbs of the quotation as representative of the three parts of the soul: ‘he was distressed’ corresponds to the appetitive part, ‘he was furious’ to the spirited part, and ‘he plotted’ to the rational part.⁸⁹ However, far from implying that Thersander is capable of rational, let alone philosophical thought, this further emphasises the strength of his lust, since his plotting is the result of his erotic feelings rather an attempt to control them. In drawing attention to a three-way division in Thersander’s soul, Achilles Tatius simultaneously alludes to the famous, Platonic partition and distances his character from it: Thersander patently does not live up to the Platonic exemplar of the just man whose soul-parts are in harmony, with reason at the helm. Nor does the fact that he leaves Leucippe go very far in exonerating him, since his next act is to attempt to persuade the jailer to have Cleitophon poisoned. There is a further, and I would argue deliberate, contrast with Chariton’s Dionysius at this point, since he too is swamped by a threefold wave (τρικυμία).⁹⁰ Dionysius, though, attempts to overcome the metaphorical wave, rather than waiting for it to dissipate, and, crucially, he uses his reason to try to cope with his feelings, rather than letting any thoughts he has be dominated by them.

In the rest of *Leucippe and Cleitophon* Thersander will be thoroughly despicable, and the portrayal of his psychology in Platonic terms at these pivotal moments is a readily understandable and clear way of establishing what kind of character he is. It is, of course, the case that he is portrayed in this way by Cleitophon, and we may like to ask to what extent the descriptions of Thersander’s mental processes are based on, and skewed by, this. And yet, despite this potential narratorial bias and the concentration of Platonic psychology at the end of Bk. 6, these passages are in keeping with the generalising, theorising, (pseudo)philosophical, and Platonic atmosphere which we find pervading Cleitophon’s narration and the novel as a whole. The phraseology, which marries abstract parts of the soul with metaphorical imagery, is a key and integral part of this and also yet another aspect of this

⁸⁹ Cf. *Tim.* 70e6–7, where the rational, immortal part is called ‘the part that takes counsel’ (τοῦ βουλευομένου).

⁹⁰ See Chariton 3,2,6, quoted above. Τρικυμία, a rather rare word, occurs only once in Chariton, twice in Achilles Tatius (the other is at 3,2,5), and once in Heliodorus (5,27,2); in these last two occurrences it has its literal meaning. The likelihood of this being an allusion is increased by the fact that it is not normally used metaphorically, although it is at its only two occurrences in Plato: *Euthd.* 293a3 and *R.* 472a4, where, however, the metaphors are to do with the arguments, not emotion.

novel which demonstrates and demands a high level of literary and intellectual sophistication.

Heliodoros

Heliodoros does not display the intense focus on psychology that we find in Cleitophon's narration, but he does use the division of the soul at moments of heightened emotion, and it is worth considering the handful of passages in his *Aethiopica* where this philosophical influence is noticeable.⁹¹

At 2,15,1 Theagenes, Charicleia, and Cnemon suddenly take stock of their situation. They are alone, lost in a foreign land, without food, and caught up in a fight between two groups of brigands. They try to come up with a plan, but are overwhelmed by their predicament:

They seemed to want to form a plan, but the number of their past woes, the hopelessness of their present predicament, and the uncertainty of the future, clouded their intellects (*tēs psychēs to logizomenon*).⁹²

No one says anything, they ease their pain (*to pathos*) with a sigh, they recline, and they try to remain awake since they want (*epithymountes*) to devise a plan; eventually, however, and against their will they give in to nature and fall asleep:

Thus it is that sometimes the conscious mind (*to noeron tēs psychēs*) consents to accede to bodily pain (*sōmatos pathei*).⁹³

It does not seem that the reader is to distinguish between *tēs psychēs to logizomenon* and *to noeron tēs psychēs*; rather the two are to be regarded as

⁹¹ Fusillo 1999 discusses the following passages: 4,9,1; 4,11,1; 7,7,3; 10,13,1; and 10,38,4. For Heliodoros' relation to, and use of, philosophy, especially Platonism, see Sandy 1982, Morgan 1989a, Bowie 1995, Dowden 1996, and Jones 2005 and 2006.

⁹² Translations of *Aethiopica* are taken, and occasionally adapted, from Morgan 1989b. Greek is cited from Rattenbury and Lumb 1935–1943.

⁹³ A passage which is thematically and verbally very similar to these occurs at 6,9,1, where Charicleia has just witnessed the betrothal of Cnemon and Nausicleia and has retired to her chamber to escape the celebrations and lament her own situation: 'her sorrow grew past bearing, and a swirling mist stole over her, plunging her conscious mind (*to noeron tēs psychēs*) into darkness and causing her to slip, despite herself, into a slumber ...'

synonymous and equivalent to *to logistikon*.⁹⁴ The use of the supreme part of the Platonic soul division here emphasises the plight of the protagonists, for in one stroke we are given the impression that rational thought is normally the dominant part within them and that even their desires (*epithymountes*) are rational, but that in this extreme case they succumb to their worries and their need for rest. There is a comparison to be made with Chariton's Dionysius, in whom there was also this opposition between reason and *pathos*, but the difference here is that this is a momentary lapse which in fact enables the protagonists to fare better, not the beginning of an all-consuming and doomed passion. The other difference is the phraseology employed: Heliodorus uses parts of the soul at this point rather than abstract nouns, and so betrays the influence of Platonism.

Another character whose soul is generally well ordered, as it were, is Calasiris.⁹⁵ At 2,25,4 he has begun his narration of his story to Cnemon and he tells him how he tried to escape the temptation of a woman named Rhodopis. In spite of being forewarned of trouble and so able to temper the prospect of it by reason (*tōi logismōi*, 2,24,7), the sight of Rhodopis is too much for him:

For a long time I pitted the eyes of my soul against the eyes of my flesh (τοῖς σώματος ὀφθαλμοῖς τοὺς ψυχῆς), but in the end I had to admit defeat and sank beneath the weight of carnal passion (*pathos erōtikon*).⁹⁶

The eyes of the soul and of the flesh represent the conflict of reason and desire, and eventually Calasiris had no option but to exile himself in order not to disgrace his priesthood and defile the gods' temples and precincts:

... referring my case to the court of reason (*ton logismon*), I punished my desire (*epithymian*) with flight ...

This conjunction of reason, the soul, passion, and desire points effectively, and in philosophically loaded terms, to the intense internal conflict that Calasiris felt. The comparison with Dionysius is even more direct this time, since erotic desire is the root of the problem, but Calasiris is able to avoid

⁹⁴ Cf. Plu. *On Moral Virtue* 441f–442b.

⁹⁵ See Jones 2005, 81–82, with bibliography, on Calasiris as a representation or embodiment of Pythagorean/Platonic philosophy. 'Philosopher' (*philosophos*) occurs only once (its cognates do not feature at all) in the *Aethiopica*, at 2,27,2, where Calasiris is describing his stay in Delphi.

⁹⁶ Hld.2,27,2.

giving into his desire by fleeing from its cause.⁹⁷ On the other hand, although this act is made to seem less passive than it might be by the way Calasiris claims that he ‘punished’ his desire, there is a contrast with the protagonists, and especially the resolutely virginal Charicleia, in that he did not feel able to overcome his desire by will power alone.

Perhaps the clearest example of the divided soul being used for emotional effect by Heliodorus comes at 10,16,2, where Hydaspes finally comes to recognise that the female sacrificial victim who had been part of the first spoils of the war against the Persians is none other than his daughter:

His soul was buffeted by waves of fatherly love and manly resolve that fought for possession of his will, which was pulled in two directions by their opposing tide races (τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῷ πατρικῷ τῷ πάθει καὶ ἀνδρείῳ τῷ λήματι κυματουμένης καὶ τῆς γνώμης ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων στασιαζομένης καὶ πρὸς ἑκατέρου καθάπερ ὑπὸ σάλου μετασπωμένης). But finally he bowed to all-conquering nature: not only was he convinced that he was a father, but he also betrayed a father’s feelings.⁹⁸

This passage forms part of the extended climax of the novel and so all the stops are pulled out, including the metaphor of the soul being buffeted by waves of emotion which we have seen used by both Chariton (2,4,4; 3,2,6) and Achilles Tatius (7,1,1). These emotions (‘fatherly *pathos*’ and ‘manly resolve’) could be said to spring from the appetitive and spirited parts respectively, but they are not negative in this context, since each represents a conflicting duty between which Hydaspes is torn and has to decide. He decides, of course, not to kill his daughter, but the division of the soul conveys the strength of Hydaspes’ emotions and their contrary effects and creates suspense in the reader by suggesting that the king might have made a different decision.

Heliodorus, like Achilles Tatius before him, also moves beyond the ‘standard’ parts of the soul. In the course of the bizarre intrigue in which Calasiris dupes Charicles about the nature of his supposed daughter’s illness,

⁹⁷ Cf. the lack of self-control at 3,3,8, where Theagenes appears at the climax of the procession at Delphi. The vision of his beauty so stuns the crowd that: ‘all those women of the lower orders who were incapable of controlling and concealing their emotions (*to tēs psychēs pathos*) pelted him with apples and flowers in the hope of attracting his good will’. See Jones 2005, 87 on this. The crowd forms a direct contrast with Charicleia, who is able to master her desire for Theagenes, even aggressively at times: see, for instance, 1,25,4–5.

⁹⁸ On this passage, see also Jones (this volume).

he approaches the girl and asks her to reveal to him what is evidently troubling her, despite the fact that he already knows that she is deeply in love. She asks for one day's grace and Calasiris gives it to her, telling his narratee Cnemon that:

I rose and left without a word, allowing the girl an interval in which to come to terms with (*diaitēsai*) her sense of shame (*tēs psychēs to ai-doumenon*).⁹⁹

As in Achilles Tatius, the phraseology is interesting here: Heliodorus writes 'the part of her soul feeling shame' rather than 'her shame' or even 'the shame of her soul'. The philosophically familiar term employed is influenced by the Platonic method of dividing the soul to account for psychological phenomena, specifically contradictory emotions. Charicleia's shame is here couched in such a way as to emphasise simultaneously how love-stricken she is and that she is a woman of such virtue that she aims to overcome her feelings.

Another example can be found at 7,28,1, where Achaemenes wants to see Charicleia, to whom he believes he is betrothed, and with whom he is besotted. He is upset at the preferential treatment shown to Theagenes by Arsace, and is seeking some sort of consolation, thinking that he will find it in the form of Charicleia:

But at the moment, Mother, I should like to see my betrothed, my dearest darling Charicleia, in the hope that in the sight of her I can find a cure (*diaitēsai*) for the hurt that has stung my soul (*to dedēgmenon tēs psychēs*).

The passive nature of his affliction and his proposed method of dealing with it contrast with the positive emotion of Charicleia and her attempt to subdue her feelings in the passage quoted above. The verb *diaitēsai* ('come to terms with'/'cure') links these two passages, as does the use of parts of the soul to describe strong psychological impulses. Achaemenes is such an epithymetic character that he is unable even to express his feelings in terms of anything other than pain, and there is certainly no attempt to control his desire.

As should be clear from these passages, Heliodorus reserves the device of dividing the soul for moments of emotional conflict, mental distress, or to emphasise the psychology of a particular character. The *Aethiopica*, like

⁹⁹ Hld. 4,6,1.

Leucippe and Cleitophon, has what one might loosely call a philosophical atmosphere in that wisdom and knowledge are crucial factors,¹⁰⁰ and the use of soul-partition fits into this. However, the way Heliodorus uses it is rather more akin to Chariton's deployment of the conflict between reason and desire, that is for the purposes of characterisation, whereas Achilles Tatius/Cleitophon is at least as concerned with general theorising as with describing individuals and their feelings at any one point. The result may be that the effect in Heliodorus is rather more subtle and unobtrusive, but then an obtrusive and bombastic narrator seems to be precisely what Achilles Tatius is aiming at.

Conclusion

The narratives of the Greek novels virtually necessitate conflicting emotions and desires, and each of the novelists discussed shows a fascination with the dramatic tensions and paradoxical possibilities available in conveying these feelings.¹⁰¹ Philosophy and philosophical concerns are also common to all three, albeit in varying degrees, and the soul, as the site in which emotions and desires dwell and conflict, is often explicitly the focus of attention. Starting from the fundamental opposition of reason and desire in Chariton, later novelists constructed a more elaborate and flexible psychology to account for the full range of emotions. The increasing influence of Plato during the period in which the novelists were writing, and the contemporary interest in all things Platonic, including the division of the soul, enabled the use of this device to convey psychological turmoil in an effective and powerful way, and nowhere more clearly or pervasively than in *Leucippe and Cleitophon*. Finally, the presence of psychology allied with philosophy, the use of Platonic soul-partition, and a willingness to adapt it according to context, all show that the authors under consideration were to a certain extent philosophically literate and writing for a readership which shared that knowledge and appreciated its meaning and impact.

¹⁰⁰ See especially Jones 2005.

¹⁰¹ This is also true for Xenophon of Ephesus. Longus, as often, is the exception, and the reasons in this case include the significant difference in his narrative, the characters involved, and the register, although not content, of his novel.

Bibliography

- Balot, R.K. 1998. 'Foucault, Chariton, and the masculine self', *Helios* 25, 139–162.
- Bowie, E.L. 1994. 'The readership of Greek novels in the ancient world', in: J. Tatum (ed.), *The Search for the Ancient Novel*, Baltimore-London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 435–459.
- Bowie, E.L. 1995. 'Names and a gem: aspects of allusion in Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*', in: D. Innes, H. Hine, & C. Pelling (eds.), *Ethics and Rhetoric, Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday*, Oxford: University Press, 269–280.
- Bowie, E.L. 1996. 'The ancient readers of the Greek novels', in: G. Schmeling (ed.), *The Novel in the Ancient World*, Leiden: Brill, 87–106.
- Bowie, E.L. 2002. 'The chronology of the earlier Greek novels since B.E. Perry: revisions and precisions', *AN* 2, 47–63.
- Büttner, S. 2006. 'The tripartition of the soul in Plato's *Republic*', in: F.-G. Herrmann (ed.), *New Essays on Plato*, Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 75–93.
- Bychkov, O. 1999. 'ἡ τοῦ κάλλους ἀποροπή: a note on Achilles Tatius 1.9.4–5, 5.13.4', *CQ* 49, 339–341.
- Conte, G.B. 1996. *The Hidden Author: An Interpretation of Petronius' Satyricon*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cooper, J.M. 1984. 'Plato's theory of human motivation', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 1, 3–21.
- De Lacy, P. 1974. 'Plato and the intellectual life of the second century AD', in: G.W. Bowersock (ed.), *Approaches to the Second Sophistic*, University Park, PA: American Philological Association, 4–10.
- Dillon, J.M. 1993. *Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism*, Oxford: University Press.
- Dillon, J.M. 1996. *The Middle Platonists* (2nd edition), London: Duckworth.
- Dillon, J.M. & Long, A.A. (eds.). 1988. *The Question of 'Eclecticism': Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dowden, K. 1996. 'Heliodoros: serious intentions', *CQ* 46, 267–285.
- Fusillo, M. 1999. 'The conflict of emotions: a *topos* in the Greek erotic novel', in: S. Swain (ed.), *Oxford Readings in the Greek Novel*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 60–82 (translated from 1990. 'Les conflits des émotions: un topos du roman grec érotique', *MH* 47, 201–221).
- Garnaud, J.-P. 1991. *Achille Tatiüs: Le Roman de Leucippé et Clitophon*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Gaselee, S. 1969. *Achilles Tatiüs* (2nd edition), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Goldhill, S. 1995. *Foucault's Virginity*, Cambridge: University Press.
- Goldhill, S. 2001. 'The erotic eye: visual stimulation and cultural conflict', in: S. Goldhill (ed.), *Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 154–194.
- Goold, G.P. 1995. *Chariton*: Callirhoe, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jones, M. 2005. 'The wisdom of Egypt: base and heavenly magic in Heliodoros' *Aithiopia*', *AN* 4, 79–98.
- Jones, M. 2006. 'Heavenly and pandemic names in Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*', *CQ* 56, 548–562.
- Kaimio, J. 1996. 'How to enjoy a Greek novel: Chariton guiding his audience', *Arctos* 30, 49–73.
- Konstan, D. 1994. *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Martin, P.M. 2002. 'A good place to talk: discourse and topos in Achilles Tatius and Philostratus', in: M. Paschalis & S. Frangoulidis (eds.), *Space in the Ancient Novel, Ancient Narrative Supplementum 1*, Groningen: Barkhuis, 143–160.
- Miller, F.D. 1998. 'Plato on the parts of the soul', in: N.D. Smith (ed.), *Plato: Critical Assessments III*, London: Routledge, 48–65.
- Morales, H.L. 2004. *Vision and Narrative in Achilles Tatius' Leucippe and Clitophon*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morgan, J.R. 1989a. 'The story of Knemon in Heliodorus' *Aithiopika*', *JHS* 109, 99–113 (reprinted in S. Swain (ed.), *Oxford Readings in the Greek Novel*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 259–285).
- Morgan, J.R. 1989b. 'Heliodorus', in: Reardon 1989, 349–588.
- Morgan, J.R. 1995. 'The Greek novel: towards a sociology of production and reception', in: A. Powell (ed.), *The Greek World*, London: Routledge, 130–152.
- Morgan, J.R. 1997. '*Erotika mathemata*: Greek romance as sentimental education', in: A.H. Sommerstein & C. Atherton (eds.), *Education in Greek Fiction*, Bari: Levante, 163–189.
- Morgan, J.R. 2004a. 'Achilles Tatius', in: I.J.F. De Jong, R. Nünlist, & A. Bowie (eds.), *Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature*, Leiden: Brill, 493–506.
- Morgan, J.R. 2004b. *Longus: Daphnis and Chloe*, Oxford: Aris and Phillips.
- Morgan, J.R. 2007. 'Kleitophon and Encolpius: Achilleus Tatius as hidden author', in: M. Paschalis, S. Frangoulidis, S. Harrison, & M. Zimmerman (eds.), *The Greek and the Roman Novel: Parallel Readings, Ancient Narrative Supplementum 8*, Groningen: Barkhuis, 105–120.
- Perry, B.E. 1930. 'Chariton and his romance from a literary-historical point of view', *AJPh* 51, 93–134.
- Plepelits, K. 1980. *Achilleus Tatios. Leukippe und Kleitophon*, Stuttgart: Hiersemann.
- Rattenbury, R.M. & Lumb, T.W. 1935–1943. *Héliodore: Les Éthiopiennes*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Reardon, B.P. 1982. 'Theme, structure and narrative in Chariton', *YCS* 27, 1–27 (reprinted in: S. Swain (ed.), *Oxford Readings in the Greek Novel*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 163–188).
- Reardon, B.P. (ed.). 1989. *Collected Ancient Greek Novels*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Reardon, B.P. 2004. *Chariton: De Callirhoe Narrationes Amatoriae*, Munich: Teubner.
- Repath, I.D. Forthcoming. *Playing with Plato: Platonic Allusion in Achilles Tatius' Leucippe and Cleitophon*.
- Rijksbaron, A. 1984. 'Chariton 8, 1, 4 und Arist. *Poet.* 1449b 28', *Philologus* 128, 306–307.
- Rist, J.M. 2001. 'Plutarch's *Amatorius*: a commentary on Plato's theories of love?', *CQ* 51, 557–575.
- Robinson, T.M. 1995. *Plato's Psychology²*, Toronto: University Press.
- Rowe, C.J. 1986. *Plato: Phaedrus*, Warminster: Aris and Phillips.
- Sandy, G.N. 1982. 'Characterization and philosophical decor in Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*', *TAPA* 112, 141–167.
- Scourfield, J.H.D. 2003. 'Anger and gender in Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe*', in: S. Braund & G.W. Most (eds.), *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, *YCS* 32, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 163–184.
- Stephens, S.A. 1994. 'Who read ancient novels?', in: J. Tatum (ed.), *The Search for the Ancient Novel*, Baltimore–London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 405–418.

- Trapp, M.B. 1990. 'Plato's *Phaedrus* in second-century Greek literature', in: D.A. Russell (ed.), *Antonine Literature*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 141–173.
- Vilborg, E. 1962. *Achilles Tatius: Leucippe and Clitophon. A Commentary*, Göteborg: University Press.
- Wesseling, B. 1988. 'The audience of the ancient novels', *GCNI*, 67–79.
- Whitmarsh, T. 2003. 'Reading for pleasure: narrative, irony, and eroticism in Achilles Tatius', in: S. Panayotakis, M. Zimmerman, & W. Keulen (eds.), *The Ancient Novel and Beyond*, Leiden: Brill, 191–205.
- Whitmarsh, T. & Morales, H. 2001. *Achilles Tatius: Leucippe and Clitophon*, Oxford: University Press.
- Wilhelm, F. 1902. 'Zu Achilles Tatius', *RhM* 57, 55–75.