

Who Knows What?

The Access to Knowledge in Ancient Novels: the Strange Cases of Chariton and Apuleius¹

ROMAIN BRETHES
Université Paris IV-Sorbonne / Rennes

*I don't know just where I'm going/
But I'm gonna try.../
And I guess that I just don't know/
And I guess that I just don't know
Lou Reed, Heroin*

Knowledge in Antiquity is at the heart of theoretical conflicts, notably through the self-knowledge assumed by the Delphic maxim.² My aim in this paper is not, of course, to argue about the historical and philosophical destiny of the conception of *knowledge* through the ages but to reflect on the values of knowledge in ancient novels. When you speak about knowledge, you also speak about truth and the search for truth. The idea would be, rather than to reveal the secret truth hidden behind any novel, if there has ever been one, to delimit in some novels the relationships to knowledge that may appear through the narrative strategies which are taken up by authors, and with which characters and readers have to negotiate. According to Francis Bacon's maxim in his *Sacred Meditations*, which is also perfectly relevant to

¹ The original version of this paper was given at RICAN 3 in May 2005. I would like to thank Michael Paschalis and Stavros Frangoulidis for their invitation to the sunny and peaceful Rethymnon. I am indebted to many participants for their suggestions, and especially to Stephen Harrison for his inestimable *linguistic* help. A second version was given in February 2006 at a seminar at Brown University, where I was invited by David Konstan. I am especially grateful to him and to the participants of this seminar, particularly Pura Nieto, for the *enlightenment* they provided on some points of this paper.

² See Foucault 1984; 2001.

fiction, 'knowledge is power'. Characters, readers and sometimes narrators are indeed searching for the knowledge and truth that lie behind the events. And this access depends a lot on narrative strategies, since the first-person and the third-person narrations are offering different modalities by which to attain knowledge, truth and power. In the first case, which concerns Petronius, Apuleius and Achilles Tatius' novels, you have a world translated by a character's voice, though there are several interferences in these novelists' strategies.³ In the second one, which actually includes all the Greek novels except *Leukippe and Kleitophon*, you have an omniscient narrator, who is supposed to know and to control everything in the course of narrative events, claiming to different degrees this absolute control on narration. It will emerge from my paper that a supposed less sophistic novel⁴ has nonetheless a complex relationship with knowledge that may create a puzzling impression for the reader. I will also underline the different modalities, such as orality, vision or writing, which appear helpful, both for character and reader, in achieving an access to knowledge, mainly in the novels of Chariton and Apuleius. Indeed, though it might appear surprising to compare a novel originally introduced as the 'primitive form' of the ancient novel, that is *Callirhoe*, with one considered as a masterpiece of sophistication, that is *The Golden Ass*, I hope that this paper will show that these authors, who probably have different aims in mind, nevertheless play in a comparable way with the conceptions of truth and knowledge.

1. *Callirhoe or the battlefield for truth*

Concerning knowledge and truth, Chariton's *Callirhoe* is a kind of paradigmatic text. Indeed, the novel has been praised not only for its simplicity in style and structure, but also for its transparency and its use of dramatic irony,⁵ since its narrator and readers are deliberately made to share the same knowledge. Irony is without any doubt a key word in any study of knowledge, as it implies a superiority of a speaker over his interlocutor, that is a superiority in knowledge. Cicero, in his *De oratore*,⁶ illuminatingly chooses *dissimulatio* and *dissimulantia* as equivalents for the Greek *eironeia*. *Eiro-*

³ See especially Conte 1996 on Petronius; Winkler 1985 on Apuleius. On Achilles Tatius, see Reardon 1994.

⁴ See this distinction simply with the titles of chapters in Hägg 1983 and Holzberg 1995.

⁵ See Perry 1930, 124 n. 38.

⁶ *Dissimulatio* in *De Orat.* 2,269, 270, 272, 289; 3,203; *dissimulantia* in *De Orat.* 2,270. On the question of irony in Cicero, see Haury 1955, 7–8.

neia as play with truth is explicitly marked by Aristotle as a process used only by free men, and among free men by the great-souled man (μεγαλόψυχος). In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (4,3,1124B 28–29), he makes this statement: ‘the great-souled man must care more for the truth (μέλειν τῆς ἀληθείας) than for what people will think; and speak and act openly, since as he despises other men he is outspoken and frank, except when speaking with irony (δι’ εἰρωνείαν), as he does to common people (πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς). In the *Rhetoric* (3,18,1419B), referring to the lost part of *Poetics* on appropriate jests for gentlemen, he only indicates that ‘irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery (Ἔστι δ’ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθερωτέρον), for the first is employed on one’s own account, the second on that of another’. In other terms, to use irony is to assert an urbane superiority in knowledge. In *Callirhoe*, compared to Heliodorus’ *Aethiopica* for example,⁷ we scarcely find irony as a rhetoric trope, for Chariton prefers leaving his characters unaware of what is really going on in the story. There is no Calasiris or Sisimithres for having premonitions of any narrative *telos*. There is only one exception in the novel, when Callirhoe, defined as a proud spirit (μεγαλόφρων:1,8,1), defies the royal authority in front of the eunuch Artaxates. On this occasion, while Artaxates is convinced that Callirhoe will be happy to become the King’s lover, the young girl reacts as a *pepaideu-méné*, remembers ‘where she was, who she was, and who it was who was talking to her’,⁸ controls her anger and speaks ironically (κατειρωνεύσατο) to the eunuch (6,5,8). But it is a paradoxical irony, as Callirhoe, though powerful in speaking, belongs nonetheless as a slave to the King. The reason for such an absence of irony as a rhetorical trope used by characters is that what has been called tragic (or dramatic) irony, that is ‘the contrast between the hero’s ignorance and the audience’s knowledge’,⁹ is managed by the author-narrator and appears to be hegemonic everywhere in the novel. This can be seen like a race after knowledge and truth every character is running, from the beginning to the end of the story. Indeed, it clearly appears that the distinction between the characters does not only depend on their birth or on their *paideia*, on their racial origin or on their sex, but on the degree of knowledge they have of the events at a precise moment in the novel. One of the best examples can be found at the beginning of the novel, in a kind of *mise en abyme* displayed by the narrator. The tyrant of Acragas is presented

⁷ On the use of irony and mendacity in Heliodorus, see Winkler 1982.

⁸ On the principles which regulate the creation of a speech, see Theon, *Progymnasmata*, 115, 23–27.

⁹ Raphael 1961, 29.

as ‘director of the drama’ (δημιουργὸς τοῦ δράματος: 1,4,2), a phraseology typical of Chariton’s theatricalising style, which means that for a moment, at a textual level, this character will act exactly the same way as the narrator: playing with knowledge, truth and illusion but being the only one to know what is really going on behind the appearances. For a while, he acts as the real *technician* of the drama, supplying the narrator and using *technè* (τέχνη: 1,2,4; 4,1). This whole sequence can be read as a repetition in miniature of the forthcoming narrative strategy, where everyone is looking for what he does not know and is eager for knowledge, as knowledge means simultaneously truth and power. That could explain the astonishing reaction of Chaereas after having kicked his wife’s stomach. No pain, no regret, according to the narrator, but only a tremendous will to know (1.5.1–2):

Χαιρέας δὲ ἔτι τῷ θυμῷ ζέων δι’ ὅλης νυκτὸς ἀποκλείσας ἑαυτὸν ἐβασάνιζε τὰς θεραπαινίδας, πρῶτην δὲ καὶ τελευταίαν τὴν ἄβραν. ἔτι δὲ καιομένων καὶ τεμνομένων αὐτῶν ἔμαθε τὴν ἀλήθειαν. τότε ἔλεος αὐτὸν εἰσῆλθε τῆς ἀποθανούσης καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν ἑαυτὸν ἐπεθύμει...

Chaereas, whose heart was still seething, shut himself up all night, trying to extort information from the maids, especially Callirhoe’s own maid. It was while they were undergoing fire and torture that he learned the truth. At that, in an access of pity for his dead wife, he desperately wanted to kill himself...¹⁰

If the obsession for truth is patent in *Callirhoe*, as certified by the nineteen repetitions of the word *alétheia* (against thirteen in Achilles Tatius, eight in Heliodorus, and none in Xenophon of Ephesus or Longus), the novel focuses also on a particular theme, deeply linked with a permanent feature of knowledge in antiquity. Indeed, if knowledge means power and truth, it also means danger and death.¹¹ Ulysses embodies this eagerness for knowledge, a knowledge which leads him to the edge of ruin and loss. The part in the *Odyssey* with the Sirens, whose omniscient nature has been well underlined by Pucci and Segal,¹² precisely reflects a typical conflict between a desire for knowledge and the awareness that knowledge may bring death. In Chariton’s novel, the knowledge that any character has attained during the story provides him with a narratological and semiological superiority over the other

¹⁰ Translations of Chariton are taken from Reardon 1989.

¹¹ See the study of Ziolkowski 2000, centered on the figures of Adam, Prometheus and Faust who all three have committed the ‘sin of knowledge’.

¹² Pucci 1979; Segal 1983.

characters, but at the same time exposes him to danger and repression. That bivalent nature of knowledge is obviously apparent in the frequent and stunning use of torture in *Callirhoe*. This is the only Greek novel, with *Leukippe and Kleitophon*, novel of illusions and *trompe-l'oeil*,¹³ where torture appears as almost the only means to get knowledge and truth in the novel. The word βάσανος and some of its uncommon derivatives, such as βασανιστήριον and βασανιστής, are together found eleven times in the novel. The pirate Theron, master of fiction and deception, as he imitates Ulysses' Cretan tales and lies when he is found by Syracusan boats (*Callirhoe*, 3.3.17–18),¹⁴ tries to escape the anger of the Sicilian Assembly by lying, but finally has to reveal the truth (3.4.12–13):

βασανιστὰς εὐθὺς ἐκάλουν καὶ μάστιγες προσεφέροντο τῷ δυσσεβεῖ·
καίόμενος δὲ καὶ τεμνόμενος ἀντεῖχεν ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν ἐνίκησε
τὰς βασάνους. (3,4,13) ἀλλὰ μέγα τὸ συνειδὸς ἐκάστω καὶ παγκρατὴς ἡ
ἀλήθεια·

At once they called for the torturers, and the impious rogue was whipped. He had fire applied to him; his flesh was torn; but he held out for a long time and almost overcame the torture; but conscience is a strong force in every one of us, and truth is all powerful.

Actually, there was a problem with the character of Theron, as he had in his possession a superior knowledge, related to Callirhoe's abduction, which authorized him to deceive his interlocutors. He is the first to discover that the young girl is not dead and this first truth behind the appearances puts him on a superior cognitive scale. Such superiority is clearly not permitted by the general narrative strategy, aiming to put every character on the same ignorance of events and it actually costs him his life. Precisely, it would be interesting to compare the status of those who have knowledge of what really occurs in the narration with their social status, since Chariton's novel is before all a novel of and for *eugeneis* (well-born and well-to-do), where only the *eugeneis* are concerned with love and passion.¹⁵ If the latter have the actual power in the novel, be it political, social, military or financial, it seems as if knowledge would be the privilege of outsiders like Theron or of

¹³ The use of torture in Achilles Tatius is to be found especially in the last two books, in the particular context of Clitophon and Melite's trial (in book 7: 10.3; 11.1; 11.5; 12.1; 14.1; 14.6; in book 8: 8.12; 14.5; 15.1). On torture in Antiquity, see Gagarin 1996; duBois 1991. On vision as deception in Achilles Tatius, see Morales 2004.

¹⁴ See Kasprzyk 1999, 159–160.

¹⁵ See Guez 1999.

trivial people like Phocas, Dionysius's servant. Before everyone in the novel, he learns the truth (τὴν ἀλήθειαν: 3.7.1) about the boat landing not far from Miletus and its mission, that is bringing back Callirhoe to Syracuse. First, he decides to hide the truth but quickly realizes that he would be in great danger if he continued acting this way (3.9.6–8):

ὁ δὲ Φωκᾶς ἀπέκρυπτε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐ Διονύσιον δεδοικώς, γινώσκων δὲ ὅτι Καλλιρρόη καὶ αὐτὸν ἀπολεῖ καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ, πυθομένη περὶ τῶν γεγονότων. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔξαρνος ἦν ἐπιδεδημηκέναι τινάς, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὁ Διονύσιος τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπόπτευσεν βαρυτέραν ἐπιβουλήν καθ' ἑαυτοῦ συνίστασθαι. διοργισθεὶς οὖν μάστιγας ἤτει καὶ τροχὸν ἐπὶ Φωκᾶν, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς ἅπαντας συνεκάλει μοιχείαν πεπεισμένος ζητεῖν. αἰσθόμενος δὲ Φωκᾶς οἱ καθέστηκε δεινὸν καὶ λέγων καὶ σιωπῶν “σοὶ” φησί, “δέσποτα, ἐρῶ μόνῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.”

Phocas tried to hide the truth of the matter, not because he was afraid of Dionysius, but because he realized that if Callirhoe found out what happened, she would ruin him and his family, so he said that there had been no visitors. Thereupon Dionysius, not knowing why he was acting this way, began to suspect that a more serious design was being woven against himself. He grew very angry and called for whips and the wheel, to use on Phocas; and he sent for everybody else on the estate as well as him, convinced that it was a case of seduction he was investigating. Phocas saw the danger he was in whether he spoke or not. ‘Sir,’ he said, ‘I will tell you the truth – to you alone.’

Torture again appears as the only means for the well-to-do in order to gain access to a knowledge which seems to fly away far from those wishing the most to obtain it. This mechanism occurs when the three slaves of Mithridates, who have the responsibility to bring the letter from Chaereas to Callirhoe, are sent to Dionysius with treasures and gifts in order to avoid suspicions. Actually, without even realizing what is going on, those servants are nonetheless messengers of truth through the letter, as it will reveal to Dionysius that his rival is not dead. Then, once again, torture or fear of torture cause the truth to be revealed (4.5.5):

ἦκεν οὖν εἰς τὸ πανδοχεῖον ὁ στρατηγὸς καὶ διερευνώμενος εὗρε χρυσίον καὶ κόσμον πολυτελεῖ. φόρια δὲ νομίσας ἀνέκρινε τοὺς οἰκέτας τίνας εἶεν καὶ πόθεν ταῦτα. φόβῳ δὲ βασάνων κατεμήνυσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

αν ὅτι Μιθριδάτης ὁ Καρίας ὕπαρχος δῶρα πεπόμφει Διονυσίῳ, καὶ τὰς ἐπιστολὰς ἐπεδείκνυσαν.

So the chief magistrate came to their inn and made a careful search; he found gold and precious jewellery. Thinking they were stolen, he interrogated the servants asking them who they were and where these things came from. Fear of torture induced them to disclose the truth, that Mithridates, the governor of Caria, had sent them as gifts to Dionysius; and they showed him the letters as well.

Links between torture and truth are very well known and even institutionalised in Antiquity, according to theoretical discourse on production of truth, especially during trials, as it can be found in Antiphon (5,31–32) or Demosthenes. In his speech against Onetor (30,37) he declares that ‘in both private and public matters the torture is the most certain of all methods of proof, and when slaves and freemen are both available, and the truth of a matter is to be sought out, you make no use of the testimony of the free men, but seek to ascertain the truth by torturing the slave’. It is indeed well attested that lying is an ability characteristic only of freemen and that a slave’s body is a privileged space for manifestation of truth. As duBois in her book on torture notices, ‘the master possesses reason, *logos*. When giving evidence in court, he knows the difference between truth and falsehood, he can reason and produce true speech, *logos*, and he can reason about the consequences of falsehood’, which is not the case for slaves.¹⁶ This is apparent when Polycharmus, a kind of ‘sidekick boy’ for superhero Chaereas,¹⁷ is accused to have managed the escape of some slaves in a labour camp belonging to Mithridates. At the time when he is going to be crucified, he complains about Callirhoe’s responsibility in their misfortune, which makes the guards think of a female accomplice and look for the truth behind this name (4.2.10–12):

ὁ δὲ Πολύχαρμος ἔξαρνος ἦν εἰδέναι, μηδὲ γὰρ ὅλως τῆς πράξεως κεκοινωνηκέναι. μᾶστιγες ἤτοῦντο καὶ πῦρ ἐπεφέρετο καὶ βασανιστηρίων ἦν παρασκευή, καὶ τις ἤδη τοῦ σώματος ἀπτόμενος αὐτοῦ “λέγε” φησὶ “τοῦνομα τῆς γυναικός, ἦν αἰτίαν ὡμολόγησας εἶναι σοι τῶν κακῶν.” “Καλλιρόην” εἶπεν ὁ Πολύχαρμος...παίοντες οὖν τὸν Πολύχαρμον ἡρώτων τίς ἐστι καὶ πόθεν ἄγουσιν αὐτήν. ὁ δὲ ἄθλιος ἐν ἀμηχανίᾳ γενόμενος καταπεύσασθαι μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἤθελε.

¹⁶ duBois 1991, 65.

¹⁷ According to Hock (1997, 145), ‘Polycharmus is colourless but certainly not invisible’.

Polycharmus said he did not know – he had had no part in this business at all. They called for whips; fire was brought; preparations were made for torture. Now one of them laid hands on Polycharmus. ‘Tell us the name of the woman’ he said, ‘who you said was the cause of your troubles.’ ‘Callirhoe’ said Polycharmus [...] So they started hitting Polycharmus and asking him who she was and where they were to fetch her from. Poor Polycharmus was distressed, but he did not want to bring a false accusation against any woman...

Though he would be able to lie (*καταψεύσασθαι*), he decides to tell the truth following his noble nature. But the danger that truth represents does not prevent some characters from pretending not to have knowledge. The verb *προσποιεῖσθαι* (to simulate) is used eleven times in the novel, while eight in Achilles Tatius or twice in Heliodorus for example, and it is in close connection with truth and knowledge. Thanks to that process, inferior people may reverse some situations, as it is the case of the eunuch Artaxates, when he pretends not to have understood who is the girl the Great King has fallen in love with (6.3.3–5):

ἀποσιωπήσαντος δὲ εὐθὺς μὲν Ἀρταξάτης ἠπίστατο πόθεν ἐτρώθη. οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερον ἀνύποπτος ἦν, ἀλλὰ ἡσθάνετο μὲν τυφομένου τοῦ πυρός, ἔτι γε μὴν οὐδὲ ἀμφίβολον ἦν οὐδὲ ἄδηλον ὅτι Καλλιρόης παρουσίας οὐκ ἂν ἄλλου τινὸς ἠράσθη· προσεποιεῖτο δὲ ὅμως ἀγνοεῖν καὶ “ποῖον” ἔφη “κάλλος δύναται τῆς σῆς κρατῆσαι, δέσποτα, ψυχῆς, ᾧ τὰ καλὰ πάντα δουλεύει, χρυσός, ἄργυρος, ἐσθῆς, ἵπποι, πόλεις, ἔθνη; καλαὶ μὲν μυρίαί σοι γυναῖκες, ἀλλὰ καὶ Στάτειρα καλλίστη τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον, ἥς ἀπολαύεις μόνος. ἐξουσία δὲ ἔρωτα καταλύει, πλὴν εἰ μή τις ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καταβέβηκε τῶν ἄνωθεν ἢ ἐκ θαλάττης ἀναβέβηκεν ἄλλη Θέτις. πιστεύω γὰρ ὅτι καὶ θεοὶ τῆς σῆς ἐρῶσι συνουσίας.”

But despite his silence Artaxates knew at once the source of his wound. Even before this he had had his suspicions and seen the fire smouldering; besides, it was clear beyond any shadow of doubt that with Callirhoe there he would not have fallen in love with anyone else. Still he pretended not to know and said, ‘Sir, what beauty is there that can gain control of your soul, when all that is beautiful is at your command – gold and silver and clothes and horses, cities, people? You have countless beautiful women, and Statira, moreover, whom you alone enjoy, is the most beautiful under the sun. Having whatever you want puts an end to love, unless some goddess has descended from heaven above or risen

from the sea, like another Thetis: for I feel sure that even goddesses crave your company.'

As he knows that it would be extremely dangerous to show that he learned the truth, the eunuch ingenuously uses some pure rhetorical questions, where he sketches Callirhoe's portrait in comparing the mysterious beloved to the goddess Thetis, exactly as the narrator had described Callirhoe when she married Chaereas at the beginning of the book (1.1.16).

I would like now to turn to the last book of *Callirhoe*. The war comes and with it disappears all this comedy of masks, playing its role of the 'accelerator of the story', to pastiche Lenin's expression. As in Greek New Comedy, and in particular in its use of the tricks of recognition,¹⁸ dramatic irony in *Callirhoe* has to disappear in favour of naked truth. But before revealing any aspect of this truth, the war puts all the characters on the same level of ignorance, as expressed by the perfectly symmetrical sentence concerning the course of the war (7.6.2):

ἀλλ' οὔτε βασιλεὺς ἐγίνωσκε τὴν ἥτταν τὴν ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ τῶν ἰδίων
οὔτε Χαιρέας τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, ἐνόμιζε δὲ ἑκάτερος κρατεῖν
ἐν ἀμφοτέροις.

But the King did not know about the defeat of his own naval forces; equally, Chaereas did not know about the Egyptian defeat on land; each thought his own side had been victorious in both elements.

This geographic repartition between sea and land works as a metaphor for the partial knowledge each character has at his disposal. But with the last book, the story again finds its balance, following the rigorous *Ringstruktur* that usually characterizes the Greek novel. There the final reunion of the *Liebespaar* occurs (8,1,8), Chaereas learns the defeat of the Egyptians on the land and makes decisions on their return to Sicily (8,2,4–5), and the Great King is told by the Queen Statira about the fall of Aradus and about the return journey of Chaereas and Callirhoe (8,5,7–8). In his turn, he informs Dionysius, who 'knew nothing of what Chaereas had done' (τῶν γὰρ περὶ Χαιρέαν ἥπιστατο οὐδέν: 8,5,10). The most significant moment pointing out the final victory over darkness of illusions and misinterpretations occurs

¹⁸ Hurst (1990, 119) notices that 'la comédie ménandreenne fait souvent coïncider la péripétie et la reconnaissance' as it can be seen in the *Périkeiroméné*. On recognitions see especially Cave 1996.

when Chaereas is asked by the Syracusan crowd to tell everything about his story (8.7.3):

ἐρωτῶμεν, ἄνωθεν ἄρξαι, πάντα ἡμῖν λέγε, μηδὲν παραλίπης.

Begin at the beginning, we beg you – tell us the whole story, don't leave anything out.

In this case, the call for orality seems to weaken the historiographical tradition, from Herodotus to Polybius, that the best means to access truth and knowledge is sight and not hearing.¹⁹ Direct speech is exposed to suspicions of manipulation, lies, or simply of incompleteness. This desire for knowledge coming from the crowd reflects the general desire any character, or even reader, is looking for in fiction. And if Chaereas honestly intends to answer this call, he is constrained by circumstances not to divulge every aspect of the story. And he has a good reason for that, since an important part of the puzzle is missing, through the problematic letter sent in secret by Callirhoe to Dionysius (8.4.5):

“Καλλιρόη Διονυσίῳ εὐεργέτῃ χαίρειν· σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὁ καὶ ληστείας καὶ δουλείας με ἀπαλλάξας. δέομαί σου, μηδὲν ὀργισθῆς· εἰμὶ γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ σοῦ διὰ τὸν κοινὸν υἱόν, ὃν παρακατατίθημί σοι ἐκτρέφειν τε καὶ παιδεύειν ἀξίως ἡμῶν... ταῦτά σοι γέγραφα τῇ ἐμῇ χειρί.

From Callirhoe: greetings to Dionysius, my benefactor – for it was you who freed me from pirates and slavery. Please do not be angry: I am with you in spirit through the son we share; I entrust him to you to bring up and educate in a way worthy of us [...] this letter is written in my own hand.

The last sentence shows the special attention paid to authenticity and truth in this final book, since a letter, as a written document, is not considered the best way to acquire knowledge.²⁰ It is indicated by the narrator that ‘this was the only thing she did apart from Chaereas (δίχα Χαιρέου); knowing his jealous nature, she was anxious to prevent him from learning it (ἐσπούδαξε λαθεῖν: 8,4,4)’. Far from being anecdotal, this revelation introduces an *aporia* in the logical and mechanical access to knowledge. As Chaereas is banned from such an access, we might think that there is now an imbalance

¹⁹ On the opposition between sight and hearing, particularly in historiography, see Hartog 2001, 395–459.

²⁰ See Létoublon 2003; Robiano forthcoming; Graverini forthcoming.

between the two rivals in love. But the letter also proposes some partial revelation through an ambiguous consolation. Indeed, Dionysius is still convinced that Callirhoe's son is his, and Callirhoe's letter does not prevent him remaining in a state of misinterpretation and false belief. So, τὸν κοινὸν υἱὸν may mean 'the son we share', but it may besides imply 'the son we share with someone else', that is Chaereas. And in the phrase 'in a way worthy of us' (ἄξιως ἡμῶν), the personal pronoun designates simultaneously Callirhoe and Dionysius, and Callirhoe and Chaereas. The final book of *Callirhoe* is meanwhile introduced by the author-narrator as the one of truth and enlightenment, thanks to Goddess Aphrodite (8.1.4):

νομίζω δὲ καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον τοῦτο σύγγραμμα τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἥδιστον γενήσεσθαι· καθάρσιον γάρ ἐστι τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις σκυθρωπῶν. οὐκέτι ληστεία καὶ δουλεία καὶ δίκη καὶ μάχη καὶ ἀποκαρτέρησις καὶ πόλεμος καὶ ἄλωσις, ἀλλὰ ἔρωτες δίκαιοι ἐν τούτῳ <καὶ> νόμιμοι γάμοι. πῶς οὖν ἡ θεὸς ἐφώτισε τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοουμένους ἔδειξεν ἀλλήλοις λέξω.

And I think that this last chapter will prove very agreeable to its reader: it cleanses away the grim events of the earlier ones. There will be no more pirates or slavery or lawsuits of fighting or suicide or wars or conquests; now there will be lawful love and sanctioned marriage. So I shall tell you how the goddess brought the truth to light and revealed the unrecognized pair to each other.

But, as a denial of what has been assumed, it is clear that access to *aletheia* is refused to the main characters, Callirhoe excepted. The passage from darkness to light, expressed by ἐφώτισε²¹ is then not as schematic and simple as previously expected, and the rigorous *Ringstruktur* of the novel may be hiding something else, more precisely some puzzling questions through the character of Callirhoe: first, what does to be with Dionysius 'in spirit' precisely mean? While the main female characters in the Greek novels are subjected to various assaults (rape attempts, wedding proposals, torture...) the classical dichotomy between soul/spirit and body shows an apparent pre-eminence of the former over the latter, with Livy's Lucretia as a paradigm:²²

²¹ The french editor of *Callirhoe* in the CUF collection has totally and unfortunately erased any reference to the light in his translation of this form: « Comment la déesse fit-elle éclater la vérité... ».

²² Xenophon Ephesius (2.4.4); Achilles Tatius (1.13.3; 13.4; 7.5.3); Heliodorus (2.25.2; 6.7.5). See the famous *sententia* by Lucretia: '*corpus est tantum uiolatum, animus in-*

the body can be constrained, the soul/spirit remains free. Without any doubt, Callirhoe crystallizes some puzzling interrogations, which are developed by the status of her son, false heir of Dionysius and so authentic bastard.²³ Moreover, the association between Aphrodite and light remains problematic,²⁴ as the goddess may incarnate the splendour of beauty but not the light of truth or knowledge. Book 8 in *Callirhoe*, while pretending that truth and knowledge will enlighten every question of previous books, proposes new riddles to the reader, all coming from Callirhoe. Undoubtedly, this is a surprise for readers accustomed to transparency and a superior knowledge shared with the author-narrator of *Callirhoe*.

2. *Metamorphoses or the blinding truth*

My study about access to knowledge in Apuleius will be shorter than the one on Chariton, because it is a very well-studied question. I would like only to make some suggestions on points that have bothered me, in this comparison between Apuleius and Chariton. Although some scholars such as Mason, in a later addendum to his original article of 1978,²⁵ or Mattiacci²⁶ insist on some possible connexions between *Callirhoe* and *Metamorphoses*, they are still clearly underestimated, particularly in the matter of knowledge. The obsession with knowledge is present everywhere in the *Metamorphoses*, particularly through the celebrated pattern of *curiositas*:²⁷ the *curiositas* and desire for knowledge of Lucius in the main narration, which costs him a magic transformation, the *curiositas* of characters in inserted tales, echoing the *curiositas* of Lucius and likewise attracting punishment, like Aristomenes (1.12.8) or Psyche, affected by *temeraria curiositas* (6.20.5), and finally the *curiositas* of readers who, according to Winkler in his famous book on *The Golden Ass*, endlessly wonder what the meaning of the whole story might

sons; mors testis erit' (Liv. 1.58.7). On stoic aspects of the novels, see Perkins 1995, 77–103.

²³ Konstan (1994, 50–51; 76–79) sees only this child as a pacific link between Syracuse and Miletus, but according to Goldhill (1995, 131), his existence is an unresolved 'knot' in the story. For a similar view, see Ruiz-Montero 1994, 1015.

²⁴ Parisinou (2000) who accurately studies the association between gods and light or fire in texts and representations notices no reference concerning Aphrodite.

²⁵ Mason 1999, 236.

²⁶ Mattiacci 1993, 267.

²⁷ About *curiositas* in the *Metamorphoses*, the bibliography is huge. I would quote only Winkler 1985; Tasinato 1999; DeFilippo 1999.

be. And though there are some assertions about higher knowledge in the novel, coming from Milo (2.11), the miller's wife (9.14) or from book eleven in general, Winkler concludes in favour of an aporetic reading: '*The Golden Ass* is an evocation of religious experience bracketed in such a way that the reader must, but cannot, decide the question of its truth'.²⁸ I shall not contest such a reading here, but prefer to linger on the desire of knowledge in the novel and the role played by the last book in the satisfaction of this desire.

By chance, in a forthcoming paper, Luca Graverini proposes ideas similar to mine and I agree with most of his conclusions.²⁹ The association between Lucius and Odysseus at 9.13.4 shows the positive aspect of *curiositas*, since the ass has made Lucius 'better-informed, if less intelligent' (*etsi minus prudentem, multiscium reddidit*). Knowledge, as in the *Odyssey* and in *Callirhoe*, exposes one to danger but is also synonymous with power. In *Odyssey* 12, Circe, foretelling the encounter with the Sirens, advises Ulysses about the chance to gain knowledge while avoiding the danger of death. By reproducing six lines of the Sirens' song, Ulysses gains access to knowledge but only through *prudentia*, a knowledge which is more precious to Ulysses, *cupidus sapientiae*, than his native land, according to Cicero in *De finibus* (5.49). Being an ass and equipped with great ears (9.15.6), as Graverini rightly observes, Lucius is both a superior and inferior Ulysses, as he 'could hear everything very easily, even at considerable distance' (*cuncta longule etiam dissita facillime sentiebam*), but under the form of one of the least *prudens* animals on earth. Thus, everyone is looking for knowledge, whether Lucius (of course) or any other character in the novel. Now, as we have briefly mentioned, orality is not considered the best way to gain knowledge and truth, and every speech or tale in the *Metamorphoses* is subject to caution and suspicion. That concerns not only the inserted tale of Aristomenes, for example, but also the overall story of Lucius itself, which appeals both to the sight and to the hearing: in the phrase '*lector intende*' (1.1), '*intende aures*' and '*intende oculos*' are equally acceptable interpretations according to Graverini and other commentators. The I-narrator here is both a speaker and a writer, and addresses a listener and a reader.

But if this narrative strategy differs from Chariton's and is more open to sly and witty manipulation, the two novels share a common care in distinguishing readers and listeners.³⁰ Hunter is right to insist on the histo-

²⁸ Winkler 1985, 124.

²⁹ Graverini forthcoming.

³⁰ See Hunter 1994, 1070 ff.

riographical use of this distinction, but Robiano, in a forthcoming and original paper about the letter in *Callirhoe*, points out the theatrical dimension of orality in Chariton's novel. This theatricality, as we have seen, is to be found everywhere, particularly at the beginning of the novel, with the machinations of the tyrant of Acragas, where theatricality equals deception and trickery and works as a *mise en abyme* for the production of the whole novel. The theatricality of the novel puts an obstacle in the way of truth and revelation for the characters, but also for the reader, because he realizes that *Callirhoe* is a *theatrum mundi* and that the tacit agreement he has made with the narrator-author is not as transparent and honest as he had previously thought. In Apuleius, as Graverini says in his forthcoming publication, 'the experience of reading a novel is thus implicitly compared to that of being in a theatre, as audience or even actors in a play'. The problem is that the image of theatricality in the novel is not really engaging. Lucius, during the Festival of Laughter, endures a cruel experience of being an actor (3.10). And we cannot say that a second (threatening, but in the last moment averted) experience of Lucius, as an ass, just before the end of his adventures, appears to be more pleasant: he will be constrained to fornicate in public in the Corinthian theatre with a condemned murderess (10.23). And in Chariton, Chaereas is the main actor in the tyrant's drama, playing in a tragedy ending in the false death of his wife.

The other comparison between the two works may be established by the problematic position of the last book in both novels. As we have seen, Chariton begins the last stage of his story by the assertion that the 'goddess brought the truth to light' (ἐφώτισε τὴν ἀλήθειαν: 8.1.5). Now, rather than light, we should perhaps say *chiaroscuro*, since the characters, except Callirhoe, and to some extent the readers, are left in the same incompleteness. In Apuleius, the last book has always been a source of scholarly debates as to whether it should be read as a serious or comic conclusion. But independently from any serious or comic interpretation, we must admit at least, with Doody, that this story 'teases us with the possibility of being a religious and philosophical tale'.³¹ Moreover, one cannot deny that the eleventh book, the book of wonders, is the 'Solar Book' *par excellence*.³² There is indeed an overdetermining opposition between light and darkness in the whole book,

³¹ Doody 1998, 115.

³² The most complete study on light in Apuleius is De Smet 1987. There is also a very interesting paper on the light in the tale of Psyche by Panayotakis 2001. See also Harrison 2000, 249 n. 74.

which eventually turns into a strange association. Let us first have a look at its beginning (11.1.1):

Circa primam ferme noctis uigiliam experrectus pauore subito, uideo praemicantis lunae candore nimio completum orbem commodum marinis emergentem fluctibus. Nanctusque opacae noctis silentiosa secreta, certus etiam summam deam praecipua maiestate pollere resque prorsus humanas ipsius regi prouidentia, nec tantum pecuina et ferina, uerum inanima etiam diuino eius luminis numinisque nutu uegetari...

About the first watch of the night I awoke in sudden fright and saw, just emerging from the waves of the sea, the full circle of the moon glistening with extraordinary brilliance. Surrounded by the silent mysteries of dark night, I realised that the supreme goddess now exercised the fullness of her power; that human affairs were wholly governed by her providence; that not only flocks and wild beasts but even lifeless things were quickened by the divine favour of her light and might...³³

The openness of this book leaves no doubt about its status: it will be the enlightenment for everything that has been before, especially for Lucius who had been living until then in complete darkness, in particular because of his attraction to magic.³⁴ In terms of truth and knowledge, it may be recalled that Plutarch, a supposed relative of Lucius, opens his book on *Isis and Osiris* with the following words (*Mor.* 351C): ‘We believe that there is nothing more important for man to receive than the truth’. The idea of Isis revealing truth, especially with light, to her worshipers is well attested and Apuleius clearly exploits it in a very careful way. A little further, Lucius enumerates the various identities of Goddess Isis as Ceres, Diana Proserpina and...Venus, since Isis is the favourite goddess for syncretism, but finally recalls a feature common to every one of them (11.2.3):

Ista luce feminea conlustrans cuncta moenia et udis ignibus nutriens laeta semina et Solis ambagibus dispensans incerta lumina, quoquo nomine, quoquo ritu, quaque facie te fas est inuocare...

You who illumine every city with your womanly light, nourish the joyous seeds with your moist fires, and dispense beams of fluctuating radi-

³³ Translation of Apuleius are from Hanson 1989.

³⁴ De Smet (1987, 32) notices that before the last book there is only one reference to moonlight in 6.29.8, when Lucius is attacked by the robbers who hold Charite prisoner.

ance according to the convolutions of the Sun – by whatever name, with whatever rite, in whatever image it is meet to invoke you...

There is a very interesting point here in the association between the figure of Aphrodite/Venus and light, which can be linked with another main episode of the *Metamorphoses*. In the tale of Psyche, Cupid/Eros, son of Venus/Aphrodite, warns his bride not to view his great brightness. And when she discovers her husband in the light of a lamp, the portrait, or rather the *ekphrasis* of the god is pure enlightenment (5.22.5–6):

Videt capitis aurei genialem caesariem ambrosia temulentam [...] crinium globos decoriter impeditos [...] quorum splendore nimio fulgurante iam et ipsum lumen lucernae uacillabat; per umeros uolatilis dei pinnae roscidae micanti flore candicant [...] ceterum corpus glabellum atque luculentum et quale peperisse Venerem non paeniteret.

On his golden head she sees the glorious hair drenched with ambrosia [...] the neatly shackled ringlets of his locks; the lightning of their great brilliance made even the lamp's light flicker [...] the rest of his body was hairless and resplendent, such as to cause Venus no regrets for having borne such a child.

As C. Panayotakis indicates,³⁵ correlating this passage with book eleven, 'we as readers are invited to link the importance of the divine Cupid and the divine Isis to the fortunes of the mortals Psyche and Lucius. There is no doubt that Cupid is the only source of genuine and eternal light in the tale'. But Panayotakis also gives this precious information that if 'all things related to Cupid radiate blissful light, deprivation of light is suggested by Venus as the appropriate kind of punishment for his unruly behaviour'. We must therefore recall that in *Callirhoe*, if Aphrodite decides in the last book to 'bring the truth to light', that necessarily means she had previously darkened it, mainly because of the *hybris* of Chaereas, as noted at the opening of book eight: 'Aphrodite had given him the fairest of gifts [...] and he had repaid her kindness with arrogance' (ὕβρισεν εἰς τὴν χάριν: 8.1.3). This ambivalent nature through the association of light and dark is to be found in the description of Isis by Lucius. The portrait of the goddess who appears to Lucius in his dream functions first as a metaphor for the whole enlightenment of this book as well as corresponding to a very consistent description of Isis throughout the Imperial era (11.3.4–5):

³⁵ Panayotakis 2001, 581.

Corona multiformis uariis floribus sublimem destrinxerat uerticem, cuius media quidem super frontem plana rotunditas in modum speculi, uel immo argumentum lunae, candidum lumen emicabat [...] Tunica multicolor, bysso tenui pertexta, nunc albo candore lucida, nunc croceo flore lutea, nunc roseo rubore flammida; et quae longe longeque etiam meum confutabat optutum palla nigerrima splendescens atro nitore...

The top of her head was encircled by an intricate crown into which were woven all kinds of flowers. As its midpoint, above her forehead, a flat round disc like a mirror – or rather a symbol for the moon – glistened with white light [...] Her robe, woven of sheer linen, was of many colors, here shining with white brilliance, there yellow with saffron bloom, there flaming with rosy redness; and what most especially confounded my sight was a deep black cloak gleaming with dark sheen...

In this passage the over-determination of light should not obscure its interesting association with dark and black, as we note that the thing that ‘confounds Lucius’ sight’ is not an intense light but the intense blackness of the goddess’ cloak. Actually, goddess Isis is both light and darkness, as Plutarch says (*Mor.* 382C): ‘Isis’ power is concerned with matter which becomes everything and receives everything, light and darkness, day and night, fire and water, life and death, beginning and end’. The day after his dream, Lucius, emerging from the darkness of ignorance, sees ‘a gold Sun arising’ (*sol exurgit aureus*: 11.7.2) and the procession for Isis is nothing but ‘women gleaming with white vestments’ (*mulieres candido splendentibus amicimine*: 11.9.1), ‘shining mirrors’ (*nitentibus speculis*: 11.9.3), ‘ivory combs’ (*pectines eburnos*: 11.9.5), ‘lamps, torches, candles and other sorts of artificial light’ (*lucernis, taedis, cereis et alio genere facticii luminis*: 11.9.4). Every object carried by the crowd of initiated is gold, be it a lamp, a palm branch, a vessel, a winnowing fan or even some twigs (11.10). Once he is returned to his original condition, Lucius’ friends or household slaves hurry to see him ‘restored to the daylight from the dead’ (*diurnum reducemque ab inferis conspectum*: 11.18.2). And the acme occurs of course during the initiation of Lucius into the Isis-cult, which naturally titillates the reader’s *curiositas*. At that moment, what has become of the reader, Lucius’ faithful companion and loyal confidant during the first ten books? Before his confession, Lucius addresses his reader in this way (11.23):

Quaereas forsitan satis anxie, studiose lector, quid deinde dictum, quid factum. Dicerem si dicere liceret, cognosceres si liceret audire. Sed pa-

rem noxam contraherent et aures et lingua, ista impiae loquacitatis, illae temerariae curiositatis. Nec te tamen desiderio forsitan religioso suspensum angore diutino cruciabo. Igitur audi, sed crede, quae uera sunt. Accessi confinium mortis et, calcato Proserpinae limine, per omnia uectus elementa remeau; nocte media uidi solem candido coruscantem lumine; deos inferos et deos superos accessi coram et adoraui de proximo. Ecce tibi rettuli quae, quamuis audita, ignores tamen necesse est.

Perhaps, my zealous reader, you are eager to learn what was said and done next. I would tell if it were permitted to tell; you would learn if it were permitted to hear. But both ears and tongues would incur equal guilt, the latter from its unholy talkativeness, the former from their unbridled curiosity. Since your suspense, however, is perhaps a matter of religious longing, I will not continue to torture you and keep you in anguish. Therefore listen, but believe: these things are true. I came to the boundaries of death and, having trodden the threshold of Proserpina, I travelled through all the elements and returned. In the middle of the night I saw the sun flashing with bright light. I came face to face with the gods below and the gods above and paid reverence to them from close at hand. Behold, I have told you things which perforce you may not know, although you have heard them.

While we can note the famous expression ‘in the middle of the night I saw the sun flashing with bright light’, which is perfectly relevant to our point, I would like to turn to the new contract and relationship established between Lucius and his reader. Indeed Lucius, who now calls the latter *studiosus lector* (‘zealous reader’: 11.23), seems to be embarrassed by his presence, precisely because he wants to know and to continue sharing Lucius’ knowledge, as Tasinato, in her book about *curiositas* in Apuleius and Augustine, rightly points out.³⁶ The original contract with the reader must now end. However, just like the narrator in *Callirhoe*, Lucius promises him the truth: ‘Listen and believe, because this is truth’ (*audi, sed crede, quae uera sunt*: 11.23). This appeal to listen to the truth is clear, but even in listening, knowledge is nevertheless refused, as Lucius under-informs his reader: ‘things which perforce you may not know, although you have heard them’ (*ea quamuis audita ignores tamen necesse est*). This is a wonderful formula, which concerns not only Lucius’ initiation but also the whole story. Though the reader has heard everything, even the truth, all along this story, that is the eleven books, he does not know the truth, since he has not *seen* it with his

³⁶ Tasinato 1999, 100.

own eyes. Finally, the access to truth is denied, exactly as the true meaning of this last book remains deeply uncertain. But in our case, this closure is the only one where the narrator claims so strongly that he is telling the truth, by bringing enlightenment to the reader. If there is too much light, it is hard to look truth in the eye. That is also the final lesson of the allegory of the cave in Plato's *Republic* (518A): 'a sensible man will remember that the eyes may be confused in two ways – by a change from light to darkness or from darkness to light.'

The philosophical-religious meaning of the book eleven has often been attached to Platonic or neo-Platonic readings of the book,³⁷ a reading which seems not to be appropriate for Chariton.³⁸ But, if we read carefully, the hypothesis of the last book of *Callirhoe* being read as a kind of special initiation might not appear as absurd as previously estimated. Indeed, the Latin equivalent of the verb φωτίζειν used by Chariton in the opening of his last book, with θεός as subject, is *illuminare* or *illustrare*. We find *inlustrare*, with the sense of *initiate*, twice in *Metamorphoses* 11, first at 11.27.2 ('I had not yet been enlightened by the mysteries of Osiris the unconquered'),³⁹ then at 11.28.5 ('I was illuminated by the nocturnal mysteries of the foremost god'),⁴⁰ with the paradoxical association between light and darkness. The notion of φώς as referring to a process of initiation can be found in an inscription from Keios: Isis is there defined as φώς πᾶσι βροτοῖσι, 'a light for every man'.⁴¹ In the *Metamorphoses*, as has been rightly suggested,⁴² proper names play an important part in Apuleius' narrative strategy and there are several references to the semantic field of light: there is of course the name of the main character, Lucius, with its *lux* root, but also the servant Photis, whose name can be related to the Greek φώς.⁴³ De Smet has given an interesting interpretation of these linguistic points: 'Le lecteur fait d'abord la connotation évidente avec φώς qui est la lumière en tant que beauté, puis

³⁷ On this issue, see Harrison 2000, 136–209. A very full bibliography is given by Panayotakis 2001, 576 n. 1. On the Platonic theory of Eros in Apuleius, see Thibau 1965.

³⁸ It is interesting to note that Merkelbach (1962; 1988), who in several studies argued that Greek novels are *Mysterienromane* readable at some higher level by initiates, remains almost entirely silent on the case of Chariton: 'Dieser Autor hatte ein allgemeines Empfinden für den religiösen Wert des Romans, aber der mystische Sinn (!) der einzelnen Episoden war ihm nicht bekannt' (1962, 159).

³⁹ 11.27.2: *inuicti Osiris necdum sacris inlustratum*. At 11.5.6, *inlustrari* is used in the sense of 'being lighted (by the sun)'.

⁴⁰ 11.28.5: *principalis dei nocturnis orgiis inlustratus*.

⁴¹ Vidman 1969, n°325 vs. 8, quoted by De Smet 1987, 39.

⁴² See Hijmans 1978.

⁴³ See Hijmans 1978, 110–111.

après, lorsque le lien avec la magie est établi, il la complète avec φωτίζεσθαι parce que Lucius la considère comme un moyen à l'initiation dans les (faux) mystères',⁴⁴ that is the mysteries of love, and not the Isis-mysteries, the real initiation. If there is no direct reference to mysteries in *Callirhoe*, the remarkable association of the love-goddess, Aphrodite, with φωτίζειν and ἀλήθεια, a triple reference to love, light and truth, clearly implies that the author-narrator gives a Platonic and *mystic* coloration to his last book.⁴⁵

I have tried to show how *Callirhoe* and the *Metamorphoses*, even with different narrative strategies and probably with different aims, play with the idea of access to knowledge thanks to a very comparable procedure. Claiming that knowledge will eventually be offered, in particular through the enlightening action of Aphrodite and Isis, the last book of each novel nevertheless ends with the reader's epistemic frustration. The theme of light's association with knowledge has a prominent place in philosophy and religion, from Plato to Augustine, and if the part played by Apuleius in this history of revelation and mystery is well attested, the opening of book eight in *Callirhoe* is another riddle, if we consider that Chariton proposes an aporetic ending to his novel. This ironical contrast is developed by the superiority of both narrators over the reader, one explicit in the case of Lucius, and one disguised and insidious in the case of *Callirhoe*'s narrator. They both could certainly borrow from the poet Arthur Rimbaud the conclusion of his poem *Parade*: 'J'ai seul la clef de cette parade sauvage'.

Bibliography

- Cave, T. 1996. *Recognitions. A Study in Poetics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 Conte, G.B. 1996. *The Hidden Author. An Interpretation of Petronius' Satyricon*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
 DeFilippo, J. 1999. 'Curiositas and the Platonism of Apuleius' *Golden Ass*', in: S. J. Harrison (ed.), *Oxford Readings in the Roman Novel*, Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 269–289.
 Des Places, E. 1981. 'Platon et la langue des mystères', in: id. (ed.), *Études Platoniciennes 1929–1979*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 83–98.

⁴⁴ De Smet 1987, 40.

⁴⁵ On the relationships between Plato and Greek mysteries, see Des Places 1981. See for example the famous passage in *Phaedrus* 250B–C, with a reference to 'pure light' (φῶς καθαρὸς).

- De Smet, R. 1987. 'La notion de *lumière* et ses fonctions dans les *Métamorphoses* d'Apulée', in: *Studia varia Bruxellensia ad orbem Graeco-Latinum pertinentia* 1, Leuven: Peeters, 29–41.
- Doody, M. A. 1998. *The True Story of the Novel*, London: Fontana Press.
- duBois, P. 1991. *Torture and Truth*, London: Routledge.
- Foucault, M. 1984. *Histoire de la Sexualité. III. Le souci de soi*, Paris: Gallimard.
- 2001. *L'herméneutique du sujet*, Paris: Gallimard-Seuil.
- Gagarin, M. 1996. 'La torture des esclaves dans le droit athénien', in: *Le IV^e siècle av. J.-C. Approches historiographiques*, textes réunis par P. Carlier, Paris: de Boccard, 273–279.
- Goldhill, S. 1995. *Foucault's Virginité: Ancient Erotic Fiction and the History of Sexuality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Graverini, L. forthcoming. 'The Ass' Ears and the Novel's Voice. Orality and the Involvement of the Reader in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*' in: V. Rimell (ed.), *Orality and Representation in the Ancient Novel, Ancient Narrative*, Supplementum 7, Groningen: Barkhuis & Groningen University Library.
- Guez, J.-P. 1999. 'Pourquoi Théron n'est-il pas amoureux ?', in: B. Pouderon (ed.), avec la collaboration de C. Hunzinger et D. Kasprzyk, *Les personnages du roman grec*, Lyon: Maison de l'Orient méditerranéen, 101–110.
- Hägg, T. 1983. *The Novel in Antiquity*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hanson, J.A.. 1989. *Apuleius: Metamorphoses* [2 vols.]. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Harrison, S.J. 2000. *Apuleius: a Latin Sophist*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hartog, F. 2001. *Le miroir d'Hérodote: essai sur la représentation de l'autre*, Paris: Gallimard.
- Haury, A. 1955. *L'ironie et l'humour chez Cicéron*, Leiden – New York – Köln: Brill.
- Hock, R. F. 1997. 'An Extraordinary Friend in Chariton's *Callirhoe*: The Importance of Friendship in the Greek Romances', in: J.T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship*, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 145–162.
- Holzberg, N. 1995. *The Ancient Novel. An Introduction*, London: Routledge.
- Hunter, R. 1994. 'History and Historicity in Chariton', *ANRW* II. 34. 2, 1055–1086.
- Hurst, A. 1990. 'Ménandre et la tragédie', in: E. Handley, A. Hurst (eds.), *Relire Ménandre*, Genève: Droz, 93–122.
- Hijmans, B.L. 1978. 'Significant Names and Their Function in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*', in: B.L. Hijmans jr., R.Th. van der Paardt (eds.), *Aspects of Apuleius' Golden Ass*, Groningen: Bouma's Boekhuis, 107–122.
- Kasprzyk, D. 1999. 'Théron, pirate, conteur et narrateur dans le roman de Chariton, *Chairéas et Callirhoé*', in: B. Pouderon (ed.), avec la collaboration de C. Hunzinger et D. Kasprzyk, *Les personnages du roman grec*, Lyon: Maison de l'Orient méditerranéen, 149–164.
- Konstan, D. 1994. *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Létoublon, F. 2003. 'La lettre dans le roman grec ou les liaisons dangereuses', in: S. Panayotakis, M. Zimmerman, W.H. Keulen (eds.), *The Ancient Novel and Beyond*, Leiden – Boston: Brill, 271–288.
- Mason, H.J. 1999. 'Fabula graecanica: Apuleius and his Greek Sources', in: S.J. Harrison (ed.), *Oxford Readings in the Roman Novel*, Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 217–236.

- Mattiacci, S. 1993. 'La *lecti invocatio* di Aristomene: pluralità di modelli e parodia in Apul. *Met. I 16*', *Maia* 45, 257–267.
- Merkelbach, R. 1962. *Roman und Mysterium in der Antike*, Munich: Beck.
- 1988. *Die Hirten des Dionysos: Die Dionysos-Mysterien der römischen Kaiserzeit und der bukolische Roman des Longus*, Stuttgart: Teubner.
- Morales, H. 2004. *Vision and Narrative in Achilles Tatius*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Panayotakis, C. 2001. 'Vision and Light in Apuleius' Tale of Psyche and her Mysterious Husband', *CQ* 51, 576–583.
- Parisinou, E. 2000. *The Light of the Gods: the Role of Light in Archaic and Classical Greek Cult*. London: Duckworth.
- Perkins, J. 1995. *The Suffering Self. Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era*, London: Routledge.
- Perry, B.E. 1930. 'Chariton and his Romance from a Literary-Historical Point of View', *AJP* 51, 93–134.
- Pucci, P. 1979. 'The Songs of the Sirens', *Arethusa* 12, 121–132.
- Raphael, D. D. 1961. *The Paradox of Tragedy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Reardon, B.P. 1989. 'Chariton: Chaereas and Callirhoe', 17–124 in id. (ed.), *Collected Ancient Greek Novels*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 1994. 'Achilles Tatius and Ego-Narrative', in: J.R. Morgan, R. Stoneman (eds.), *Greek Fiction: the Greek Novel in Context*, London: Routledge, 80–96.
- Robiano, P. forthcoming. 'La voix et la main: la lettre intime dans *Chéréas et Callirhoé*', in: V. Rimell (ed.), *Orality and Representation in the Ancient Novel, Ancient Narrative*, Supplementum 7, Groningen: Barkhuis & Groningen University Library.
- Ruiz-Montero, C. 1994. 'Chariton von Aphrodisias: Ein Überblick', *ANRW II*. 34. 2, 1006–1054.
- Segal, C. 1983. 'Kleos and its ironies in the *Odyssey*', *AC* 52, 22–47.
- Tasinato, M. 1999. *La curiosité: Apulée et Augustin*, Lagrasse: Verdier.
- Thibau, R. 1965. 'Les Métamorphoses d'Apulée et la théorie platonicienne de l'Eros', *Studia Philosophica Gandensia* 3, 89–144.
- Vidman, L. 1969. *Sylloge inscriptionum religionis Isiacae et Sarapicae*, Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten XXVIII, Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Winkler, J.J. 1982. 'The Mendacity of Kalasiris and the Narrative Strategy of Heliodoros', *YCS* 27, 93–158.
- 1985. *Auctor and Actor: a Narratological Reading of Apuleius's Golden Ass*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ziolkowski, T. 2000. *The Sin of Knowledge. Ancient Themes and Modern Variations*, Princeton – Oxford: Princeton University Press.