Kleitophon and Encolpius: Achilleus Tatius as Hidden Author

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The intrigue in Bk. 6 of Achilleus Tatius' novel is complex. Kleitophon has learned that Leukippe is not dead, as he believed, but is living in slavery under the name of Lakaina on the rural estate of his new wife, Melite. Sosthenes, the repulsive steward of Thersander, Melite's first husband, also unexpectedly returned from the dead, has been trying to win her compliance to his master's advances and has imprisoned her in a remote hut. At daybreak Sosthenes and Thersandros arrive at the door of the hut to hear Leukippe lamenting within.[1] Even in her distress, she rises to rhetorical heights, apostrophising her absent beloved, regretting the impossibility of asking Sosthenes about him without arousing suspicion as to their relationship, and, in a miniature exercise of *mise en abyme*, repeating a purportedly earlier soliloquy also apostrophising Kleitophon in his absence. She describes her situation in theatrical terms, asking 'Shall I unmask the role-playing of the drama and narrate the truth?',[2] deciding in her last words to re-enter the performance and resume the mask of Lakaina.[3]

Not only is the plotting convoluted here, but the novel's narratology is also at its most difficult. Kleitophon, of course, is the internal narrator of his own love-story, and it is on the nature of his narrative that this paper will focus.[4] The earliest sections of the novel observe the documentary protocols

[1] 6,15,4.
[2] 6,16,4: ἆρα ἀποκαλύψασα τοῦ δράματος τὴν ὑπόκρισιν διηγήσομαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν; She implies a programmatic distinction between the truth value of theatrical performance and narrative.
[3] φέρε πάλιν ἐνδύσωμαί μου τὸ δρᾶμα· φέρε πάλιν περίθωμαι τὴν Λάκαιναν (6,16,6). περίτιθεναι is the *vox propria* for donning a theatrical mask.
[4] For discussion of the narrators and narratees of this text, and its protocols of knowledge, see Morgan 2004, and the references to earlier scholarship given there.

of internal narration fairly strictly: for the most part Kleitophon as narrator is allowed to narrate only what he would have known as a character at the time of the action, and if his narrative has to include information that does not fall into that category, it is generally provided with a provenance, such as 'as I learned later from x'. In Bk.6, however, the technique begins to run into trouble, and Kleitophon's narrative includes material for which no provenance is supplied and no plausible channel of information can be imagined, particularly relating to the thoughts and feelings of his enemy Thersandros. In the passage in question, for example, we might just about satisfy the documentary requirements by arguing that Leukippe could later, on an occasion not mentioned in his narrative (possibly after their marriage), have repeated her lament *verbatim* for Kleitophon's benefit, though the fact that in the narrative it is focalised through Thersandros and Sosthenes (in other words, it is presented as what they heard her saying rather than what she said) makes the case even harder to sustain. But there is really no way that the reactions and conversation of Thersandros and Sosthenes outside the closed door of the hut should have been known to either of the protagonists. At the eleventh hour, at the resolution of the plot, Sosthenes is made to confess his complicity:

> When he saw that he was being taken to be tortured, he confessed everything in clear detail, all Thersandros' audacity and all his own complicity. He did not even omit the private conversation they had held concerning Leukippe outside the doors of her hut. (8.15.1)[5]

The manner in which the conversation outside the door of the hut is singled out from the rest of Sosthenes' confession suggests a lingering awareness, on someone's part, of the documentary problem that had been left hanging in Bk.6. Issues of documentary provenance are implicitly foregrounded by the form of first-person narrative, and the account of the conversation outside Leukippe's hut necessarily raises the question of how Kleitophon was able to give it at all. But this belated and rather half-hearted explanation serves only to remind readers, perhaps needlessly, of the narratological riddle, at a point when their interest is more naturally focussed on the mystery of how the apparently decapitated Leukippe came to reappear as the slave-girl Lakaina (which is solved in the next chapter). Scholars have generally located this

[5] 8,15,1, quoted from the translation of Whitmarsh & Morales 2001, which I use throughout with some small modifications. Whitmarsh notes (162) the documentary function of this passage.

problem at the level of the author: Achilleus himself, they suggest, was concerned for the documentary plausibility of his narrator, and the apparent breach of protocols, patched up with a narratological sticking plaster, is a simple clumsiness of authorial technique.

In this paper I want to propose a different approach, and to explore what happens if we relocate the problem to the level of the narrator. Following Conte's model of the 'hidden author' for reading Petronius,[6] I am going to argue that Kleitophon is a far from transparent narrator, that his narration is both character-defined and character-defining, that its oddities can – and should – be read as a communication to the reader about the narrator/character from an author who is debarred by the very form of internal narration from showing himself overtly. Although, as a basic narratological principle, we should never identify even a third-person external omniscient narrator with the author of a text, it is nonetheless the case in practice that such narrators can pass comments and make judgements that readers of the text will easily accept as authoritative. When a narrative has an internal first-person narrator, who is clearly not to be identified with the author, the author has to resort to more devious strategies to guide the reader's interpretation. This is doubly so in *Leukippe and Kleitophon*, where the bulk of the narrative is addressed to a narratee within the text, who is thus clearly distinct from the reader: the enigmatic primary internal narrator of the introductory frame, who becomes the audience of Kleitophon's performance. Our text presents itself as a *verbatim* re-performance of Kleitophon's narrative by that primary narrator (who is not biographically identical with the author) to an external narratee who shares the romantic values of both narrators, and is again not identical with the reader of the novel.[7] Conte describes his 'hidden author' as a 'counter-voice that reaches us only indirectly',[8] but Achilleus is doubly distanced from the romantic narrative and even more effectively 'hidden' than Petronius.

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[6] Developed at length in Conte 1996.

[7] There are thus three acts of communication taking place simultaneously: a) that between the secondary narrator (Kleitophon) and the secondary narratee (the primary narrator); b) that between the primary narrator and the primary narratee; c) that between the hidden or implied author and the author's narratee (or reader). In this paper I do not discuss the problems raised by the failure of the primary narrator to reappear at the end of the novel to close the frame, but it would be easy enough to integrate the apparent discrepancies between the introductory sections and the end of Kleitophon's narrative into an argument that Kleitophon is not telling the whole or the true story. For full discussion see Nakatani 2003, Repath 2005.

[8] Conte 1996, 22.

The internal ego-narrator's documentary authority is weakest when he is furthest from personal participation in the action or from a direct line of information; and when his authority is weakest, the narrator's own personality and invention are most liable to manifest themselves. In other words, a scene like the one we are considering is precisely the sort of place where a careful reader might suspect that Kleitophon is presented as elaborating and spinning his narrative. There is no immediate reason to exclude the possibility that this is a deliberate part of the author's presentation of his narrating character. So in interpreting Kleitophon, and his relationship to the author, it is worth paying particular attention to this kind of episode: the words he puts in Leukippe's mouth may be intended to tell us as much about him as about her.

If we look at the scene from this perspective, two salient points require emphasis. First, the anguished rhetoric of Leukippe's soliloquy reflects Kleitophon's take on her situation: it is less a literal repetition of her words than his version of what he thinks she might have appropriately said. Second, the explicitly theatrical metaphors and references to role-playing with which he makes her conclude are in some sense self-referentially emblematic of Kleitophon's own awareness of identity as an object of performance.[9] I shall argue both that Kleitophon as a character in the story is constantly engaged in the projection of himself in performative ways, within a performative culture, and that his act of narration is itself presented, by the author, as a performance, in which Kleitophon seeks to inscribe and commemorate an approved version of himself.

The Contean approach, of course, depends on identifying an ironic distance between the narrator and the 'hidden' author, which allows us to read the novel as a whole as a critical commentary by the author on the society and culture that the narrator inhabits. Just as one has to triangulate and interpret Encolpius in order to interpret the *Satyrica*, so one has to read through, around and against Kleitophon (and the primary narrator who claims to report him) to interpret Achilleus' novel. Both are texts which subject their narrator to critical irony and laugh at him behind his back. One technique that Achilleus employs is to post signs unintended by Kleitophon himself. Our scene illustrates how the author contrives to communicate with the reader behind the back of the narrator.

[9] The theatricality of this novel has been noted by critics from Psellos onwards: Dyck 1986, 96, and most recently Morales 2004, 60–77. On the performative nature of identity in the Second Sophistic, Gleason 1995 is fundamental.

When Thersandros hears Leukippe lamenting and apostrophising Kleitophon, he recognises the name as that of the young man who 'married' his wife Melite while he was lost and presumed dead, and exclaims:

> 'That adulterer gets the better of me everywhere. The brigand is a sorcerer too, methinks! Melite loves him, Leucippe loves him. O Zeus, I wish I were Kleitophon' (6.17.1).

Sosthenes' first words of reply are: 'We need no effeminacy (Ἀλλ' οὐ μαλακιστέον)'.[10] The game here is transparent: the narrating Kleitophon means Sosthenes to tell his master not to soften through despondency in his resolve to win Leukippe. Between the author and reader, however, passes the acknowledgment that to become Kleitophon is to become 'soft' in the sense of 'effeminate'; the word μαλακιστέον picks up the prominent use of its cognates in this novel, already prominently associated with the sexuality of women in the famous debate at the end of Bk.2.[11] The story has only recently forced Kleitophon to disguise himself in Melite's clothes, leading her to liken him to a painting of Achilles,[12] and we may recall that in his earliest conversation with Leukippe, Kleitophon compared himself to the transvestite Herakles enslaved to Omphale.[13] Despite his efforts to narrate himself as a masculine hero, the story exposes Kleitophon's effeminacy, which expresses itself in both his cowardice and his anti-generic interest in physical sex.[14] At 6.17.2 the author's irony at the narrator's expense both advances this trail of characterisation and confirms its existence.

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[10] 6,17,1–2.

[11] 2,37,6; 2,38,4; compare also 1,9,6.

[12] 6,1,3; presumably a painting of Achilleus in drag dodging the draft on Skyros. Morales 2004, 61 suggests that the reader will make a connection between this Achilleus ἐν γραφῇ and the author of the novel and sees it as 'a wry metaliterary moment … a textual hieroglyph of the novel itself'.

[13] 2,6,2.

[14] The painstaking analysis of De Temmerman 2006 brings these features out very clearly. We must, of course, distinguish between effeminacy and homosexuality: in ancient thought a man who liked women too much was considered effeminate. Paradoxically, from Melite's point of view, Kleitophon's failure to play the man in bed casts him as the woman (5,25,7, picked up at 8,5,3). Although the narrating Kleitophon sets Thersandros up as his anti-type, depicting himself as *sophron* and his enemy as sexually unrestrained and therefore effeminate (a theme taken up in the priest's law-court speech in Bk.8), their antithetic roles are constantly called into question. After all, Kleitophon is Phoenician and Thersandros Greek: who is the real barbarian? Can Kleitophon tell us about Thersandros' thoughts only because he attributes to him his own mentality?

Let us turn now to another passage. Towards the end of the novel (8.4ff), Kleitophon and Leukippe are reunited with her father, Sostratos, and exchange narratives of their experiences. Kleitophon presents Sostratos with an outline of the story, but when he gets to the Melite episode he admits to doctoring his account: 'I elevated (ἐξῇρον) my own behaviour, reshaping it into *sophrosyne*'.[15] A sentence or so later he says that there was only one thing he actually omitted and that was his 'shame' with Melite.[16] He then moves on to Leukippe's story and again admits to recasting it so as to increase her credit:

> when I got to the bit about Sosthenes and Thersandros I elevated (ἐξῇρον) her story even more than I had done my own, in an amorous attempt to gratify her, given that her father was my narratee.[17]

Again the crucial verb is ἐξαίρω, a rhetorical term denoting the enhancement of the dignity and esteem of both style and subject matter.[18] Kleitophon is showing himself here to be a self-serving and manipulative narrator whose account should not be taken at face value. It is significant that it is precisely with the episode with Sosthenes and Thersandros, where, as we have seen, his documentary authority is weakest, that he admits most explicitly to having spiced up his narrative to Sostratos. The hidden author issues an open invitation to the reader to project Kleitophon's tendency to recast his material back into his telling of the same episode to the primary narrator. But as a whole this little embedded narrative covers exactly the same events as the entire narrative he is telling his narratee, so that his construction here, through narrative performance, of a version of events favourable to himself and designed to ingratiate him with his narratee easily becomes a *mise en abyme* of his procedures throughout the text, a broad hint that Kleitophon is nowhere a neutral or impartial narrator. The truth value of his narrative is intensely problematised from the very start: indeed one facet of his Phoenician identity is as a teller of untruth.[19] Even if we hesitate to draw the con-

[15] 8,5,2 ἐξῇρον τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐμαυτοῦ πρὸς σωφροσύνην μεταποιῶν.

[16] 8,5,3 ἓν μόνον παρῆκα τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ δραμάτων, τὴν μετὰ ταῦτα πρὸς Μελίτην αἰδῶ· The euphemism (by which Kleitophon means, presumably, an act of which he has reason to be ashamed) recalls the self-serving arguments by which he convinced himself that he owed it to Melite to service her on the floor of his prison cell, that he was shamed into curing the sickness of her heart (5,27,1); cf. De Temmerman 2006, 339 ff.

[17] 8,5,5.

[18] LSJ sv. I.2.

[19] Morales 2004, 55–56; in particular 'At the very least, Achilleus is flirting with the possibility that Clitophon has fabricated his account' (56).

clusion that he is presented as producer of fiction, that the whole story he tells is untrue, we are being warned of the necessity to read between the lines.

Conte describes Encolpius as a 'mythomaniac' narrator: he lives his life through literature and projects grandiose theatrical constructions on to his banal, even sordid, quotidian reality:

> Great literature becomes a universe inhabited by suggestive myths, indeed it becomes the secularized mythology of a culture determined to seek out intense experiences which would otherwise be denied to it by immediate experience. … literary representations are transformed into invasive paradigms that consume every possible event like parasites … reality is impersonated by literature; but the significances required by these excessive signifiers claim a sense that they cannot find.[20]

Is Kleitophon also written as a mythomaniac narrator? Is it at all plausible to read his narrative as an imposition of elevated literary paradigms on to a much more mundane and less dignified reality? Does he, like Conte's Encolpius, end up devaluing the real world by losing sight of its real significances? I think the answer to all these questions is yes and no. We must not try to read *Leukippe and Kleitophon* as if it were a Greek *Satyrica*; it is a subtler and even more ambiguously evasive text, lacking Petronius' tragic despair about the human condition. At the same time, parallels of form, content and ethos between the two works are mutually illuminating and interpretatively suggestive.[21]

The primary narrator first encounters Kleitophon in front of a picture of Europe and the bull, which leads Kleitophon to exclaim about the powers of Eros.[22] When pressed to explain, he says that his experience is like *mythoi*.[23] This word denotes a particular place within the taxonomy of narrative developed in ancient rhetorical theory: a *mythos* is a story which is neither true nor like the truth.[24] Whitmarsh gets the sense across by making Kleitophon

[20] Conte 1996, 6.

[21] I leave open the question of whether there is any *direct* connection between these two texts. My instinct is that there is not, but the fragmentary state of the *Satyrica* makes it futile to pursue the question.

[22] There are formal resemblances here to the episode in Petronius where Encolpius encounters Eumolpus in a picture-gallery, whose exhibits prompt ekphrastic conversation (*Sat.*3 ff.).

[23] 1,2,2 τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ μύθοις ἔοικε.

[24] On this see Morgan 1993, 187–190.

say ‘my tale is like a fictional adventure’. The primary narrator sees the point and leads Kleitophon to a place planted with plane trees and watered by a clear spring, saying that it is ‘delightful and just right for erotic fiction’.[25] Note the slippage here: for Kleitophon his story is (at least ostensibly) merely *like* fiction, for his narratee it *is* fiction, and he approaches it with appropriate horizons of expectation, as a vehicle of pleasure: true experience becomes like fiction in its telling and unequivocally fiction in the reception of its telling. The setting obviously recalls that of Plato’s *Phaedrus*, the archetypal text of erotic mythology, and an intertext that would be known to any reader with half an education.[26] As both narrator and character the anonymous primary narrator is already choosing to assimilate Kleitophon’s tale to a canonical text of elevated literature. This Platonic frame appears to offer a number of interpretive keys, and at this early stage the text does not seek to foreclose on any of them. At the very least, even before Kleitophon begins to tell his story, the question of its relation to both reality and literary fiction is put on the table.

This is not the last time the text plays with the idea of *mythos*. The same word is applied to the tale that Kleitophon is made to overhear in the Ephesian jailhouse about the killing of Leukippe.[27] The exchange of stories in Bk.8, which recapitulate the story of the novel, is also cast in terms of *mythos*, whose property is to provide pleasure: so the priest says to Sostratos, ‘Why not tell us your (second person plural) adventures (*mythos*)? I imagine that the twists and turns you have undergone would be a pleasure to hear. Stories (*logoi*) of that sort go particularly well with wine’, and Sostratos passes the baton to Kleitophon, saying, ‘As for the rest of it, the fantastic adventures (*mythos*) – well, speak up, Kleitophon, do not be shy … A narrative (*diegesis*) of past events provides more entertainment than grief for one whose sufferings are over’.[28] Again the words are carefully chosen for their metaliterary implications. Among the larger class of *logoi*, which can include true stories, the plot of the novel is designated as untrue *mythos.* The priest himself does not mean to cast doubt on Sostratos’ veracity, so much as

[25] 1,2,3 ἡδὺς καὶ μύθων ἄξιος ἐρωτικῶν.

[26] Trapp 1990.

[27] 7,4,1. By the time he narrates this episode, of course, Kleitophon knows that the story he overheard was untrue; the word *mythos* is precisely chosen.

[28] 8,4,2–4. Achilleus has shown himself aware of the implications of the words *logos* and *mythos* on an earlier occasion when he carefully distinguishes between them: 1,17,3 ‘The sons of the wise tell about plants, a *logos* that would be called a *mythos* if the sons of farmers did not tell it too’. The distinction, which is at root Platonic, is programmatically exploited by Longus also; see Long.2,7,1 and Morgan 2004b, 182.

to emphasise the amazing quality of the protagonists' experience, so far as he knows them. But the hidden author again hints that the story of the novel, even at the level of its secondary narrator, has a qualified truth-value. When the priest comes to explain the aetiology of the syrinx, he offers it to Kleitophon as one *mythos* in exchange for another, namely the story of his own adventures, again equating to the plot of the novel, which Kleitophon has just told in summary.[29] At the celebratory meal with the priest, accounts of the adventures of the protagonists are again termed *mythoi*, reaching a climax when Kleitophon says to Leukippe 'Please, tell us that fabulous story (*mythos*) about the bandits of Pharos and the mystery of the decapitation there, so that your father can hear it too. That is the only part of the whole plot (*drama*) that remains unheard'.[30] Here we may note also the self-referential use of the term *drama,* with its obvious overtones of theatricality, in parallel to *mythos*, both applied to the events forming Kleitophon's narrative. At all levels of narrative, then, we find narrators and narratees overtly shaping their experience to make it more like fiction.

As traced by Conte, Encolpius' mythomania amounts to a kind of lived intertextuality. Kleitophon has similar reflexes, except that whereas Encolpius seeks to elevate mundane events by accommodating them to elevated literary models, the narrating Kleitophon reaches for his mythological dictionary and *Bluffers' Guide to Culture* at moments of extraordinary personal importance, when his emotions ought to be most directly involved. When he falls in love with Leukippe at first sight, for example, he first of all compares her to a picture of Selene he had once seen,[31] and then draws on a well known simile from the *Iliad* to compare the colour of her cheeks to ivory dyed with purple by a Lydian woman.[32] At the other emotional extreme, when he narrates how he watched his beloved being pegged to the ground, apparently being disembowelled and her entrails eaten in a ritual of human sacrifice, he first compares her to an artistic representation of Marsyas tied to a tree, and then uses his experiences to validate the *mythos* of Niobe, who turned to stone in grief for the loss of her children.[33] What jars here is not, as in Petronius, the mismatch between reality and its imposed analogue, but,

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[29] 8,5,9.

[30] 8,15,4.

[31] 1,4,3. Impressive interpretive edifices have been erected on very shaky foundations hereabouts. Kleitophon's use of the word ποτε makes it clear enough that he is *not* referring to the picture of Europe before which he met the primary narrator a few minutes ago.

[32] Hom. *Il.* 4,141–142; this simile is also used by Heliodoros (10,15,2).

[33] 3,15,3–6. 'Perhaps the myth (*mythos*) of Niobe is no lie (*pseudes*)': here too the underlying assumption is that a *mythos* is untrue.

firstly, the fact that the narrating Kleitophon reaches for such analogues at all at these moments; and, secondly, that he does so in such an ostentatiously self-regarding way. He seems less interested in bringing his experiences to life for his narratee than in exploiting them in a scholastic display. The comparison of Leukippe not to Selene or Marsyas but to depictions of Selene and Marsyas is emblematic of his Encolpian disjunction from unmediated reality. To a modern sensibility these analogues seem simply intrusive; but within the novel itself they are better read as elements in a performance of the self that Kleitophon is conducting in and through his narration, signs of how he wants to construct himself and how he wants his narratee to read him.

We are in the world of the *pepaideumenoi* of the Second Sophistic, a competitive and performative culture where experience was measured against and shaped by classical paradigms: the display of *paideia* was an urgent and real concern in such a ruthless intellectual environment. The interpretive issue is whether Achilleus' novel is simply written from inside the world of second sophistic *paideia*, sharing and reflecting its values and priorities, or whether it is to some degree a satirical commentary on that world, as Conte argues the *Satyrica* to be. Rather than trying to condense the subtleties of Conte's reading, let me quote from the dust-jacket of his book, which may stand as a broad statement of his position:

> The author is lurking just outside the story, inviting his readers to chuckle at the mania for self-aggrandizement of the declamatory, scholastic culture of ancient Rome. The author has hidden himself with the aim of striking at the vanity of the contemporary cultural scene, handing over the stage to his characters, who are living in various sorts of degradation, but who see themselves, in minds overactively appropriating a great literary heritage, as figures of mythic proportions. In the foreground of Petronius's work can be seen the follies and excesses of the Rome of Nero's times, the outlines of the intellectual life of the early Empire.

Is the hidden Achilleus similarly holding up his narrator for ironic criticism? Is Kleitophon's *paideia* an object of approval or mockery? I would like to suggest two ways of approaching these questions.

The first is to think about the obvious displays of learning that pepper this text as no other Greek novel.[34] They belong both to the narrating Kleitophon and to the narrated characters, including Kleitophon himself. A good

[34] Rommel 1923 devotes more than half its pages to Achilleus.

example of the cultural environment these people infest is provided by a peculiar episode when Kleitophon is narrating (again with a documentary authority weak enough to suggest that there might be a certain amount of self-projection in his account) the circumstances leading up to the Byzantine embassy to Tyre in the course of which the wastrel Kallisthenes intended to kidnap Leukippe.[35] The Byzantines have received an oracle, which Sostratos expounds sophistically, drawing on his knowledge of Tyre, where an olive tree is nourished by fire. In response the joint commander Chairephon chips in with some totally irrelevant paradoxography about water, ranging from a Sicilian spring to a Spanish river, to a Libyan lake from which gold may be extracted with a pole smeared with pitch.[36] This competitive exchange of extraneous learning takes place in a popular assembly and is greeted with public approval. Another good example occurs when the general Charmides, displaying himself peacock-like to attract a female, gives an ekphrastic description of the hippopotamus, follows it up with an account of the elephant, in particular the sweetness of its breath, and thence moves on a tangent to the black rose of India.[37]

Kleitophon is very much at home in this environment: his propensity to 'go off on one' at the slightest provocation is remarkable. The large majority of his sententious discourses concern love, its physiology and its psychology, and this interest reflects both his own character and the profile of his narratee, who describes himself as *erotikos*.[38] However, none of these discourses is grounded in narrated incident, and Kleitophon claims on at least one occasion to be a novice in love and to have experienced sex only with prostitutes,[39] though this seems to be belied by the well informed tone of his contribution to the debate at the end of Bk.2 on whether sex is better with women or boys. Some at least of these passages are either undermined by the narrative in which they are framed or are mutually contradictory.[40] Let me take just one example. At 7,4,4–6 Kleitophon expounds a complex physiology of tears, explaining that just as a deep wound does not always bleed at

[35] 2,14.
[36] We are intended to see that he derives this detail from Herodotos (4,195). The historian expresses some scepticism, but clearly to the active sophist self-display is a more pressing imperative than factual judiciousness.
[37] 4,4–5.
[38] 1,2,1.
[39] 2,37,5.
[40] Acutely analysed by De Temmerman 2006, 322–332 (on Kleitophon's narrator text) and 381–386 (on his character text); see also Morales 2004, 106–130 (reworking Morales 2000).

once, so when words cause deep grief (in this case it is news that his beloved has been murdered), there can be a delay before tears spring to the eyes:

> Just as, when one's body is lashed, the weal[41] does not spring up at once and the skin does not bloom under the lash straightaway, but it swells up after a short while; and just as when someone is gored by a boar's tusk he seeks the wound immediately and cannot find it, because it is still sunk deep and concealed (it forms the scar at its leisure, then afterwards the white trace dawns suddenly, the advance party announcing the arrival of the blood, which comes a while later in a copious stream); just so, when the soul has been struck by the arrow of grief loosed by language, it is wounded and pierced at once, but because of the speed of the blow the wound does not yet gape, and tears are driven far from the eyes (for tears are the blood of the wounded soul). As the tusk of grief gradually gnaws away the heart, the soul's wound is torn apart, the gateway of the tears is opened in the eyes, and the tears surge forth a short time after the opening. So it was with me: the first shocks of hearing these words struck my soul like arrows, silencing me and stopping up the well of tears; but afterwards, when my soul had had some respite from the barrage of misfortunes, the tears flowed freely.

This, however, is directly at variance with an earlier disquisition on tears occasioned by the capture of the protagonists by Egyptian bandits:

> I was unable to cry, a peculiarity of eyes in times of major crisis. In moderate disasters the tears run in abundance, appealing for clemency to persecutors on behalf of their victims and phlebotomizing sufferers' pain like a pustular sore; but amid extreme suffering even tears desert one, forsaking the eyes. For when the tears well up, grief confronts them and halts them when they are at their peak, then heads them off and escorts them down with it. The tears, diverted from the journey to the eyes, flood down to the soul and exacerbate its wound.[42]

This diagnosis is borne out a few chapters later when Kleitophon watches Leukippe apparently being eviscerated and is simply dumbstruck. But he

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[41] The unusual word used of an unbleeding wound (*smodix*) turns out not to be medical but Homeric, cohering with the archetypal Odyssean motif of the boar's tusk wound, a telltale sign of the register and status of Kleitophon's science.

[42] 3,11,1–2.

cannot have it both ways; two incompatible propositions cannot both be universally true. The inconsistency of these prominent digressions, pinned to some of the plot's most memorable moments, suggests that Kleitophon's generalisations have no application beyond their immediate context: they are not the product of real thought or intelligence but vehicles of decorative and sophistic display. This is confirmed by a third discourse on tears, when Thersandros is moved to tears by the sight of Leukippe weeping.[43] After dwelling on the attractiveness of eyes when they are full of tears, Kleitophon tells his narratee that the lover keeps tears in his eyes, hoping that his beloved will see them. Thersandros' tears are, according to Kleitophon, an *epideixis*, a performance, designed to manipulate the woman on whom he has designs. How does Kleitophon know Thersandros' innermost emotions and motives? He can be so cynically frank about the theatricality of love because he is talking of his enemy, but he can surmise Thersandros' interiorities only by analogy with himself: he is projecting on to his adversary the performative nature of his own amatory behaviour, and so unwittingly telling us more about himself than about Thersandros. Kleitophon is a role-playing lover, and the hidden author silently exposes the artificiality and exhibitionism of that role.

So in various ways, the hidden author allows us to glimpse the 'real' Kleitophon: an ordinary sort of guy, not very brave, realistically interested in sex with his girl friend, and even tempted into adultery with Melite. Kleitophon, however, is not content to be or to represent himself as an ordinary sort of guy. If he sees his experience as close to fiction, this is partly because, as Kleinias tells him, he knows all about women from *dramata* on the stage.[44] But to a greater extent the *mythos* to which he consciously assimilates his life, and as which his narratee enjoys it, is none other than the canonical form of the Greek romance. We are not told what the book is that he is pretending to read as he ambles around the house to get a sight of Leukippe, but it is a pleasant conceit to imagine it as a novel.[45]

Romances, however, have two protagonists. By projecting himself as the romantic hero and performing the role of lover, Kleitophon conscripts Leukippe willy-nilly into the role of romantic heroine. The final section of this paper will briefly discuss the way in which he constructs this role and imposes it on her, and the way in which the hidden author hints that she is not always as Kleitophon professes to see her. One consequence of the

[43] 6,7,1–7.
[44] 1,8,4–7.
[45] 1,6,6. Discussion of the passage's metafictional sense in Morales 2004, 78–82.

novel's ego-narration is that (with one striking exception to which we shall return) we are never allowed an authorised or direct view of her thoughts and feelings, only Kleitophon's reading of them. The reading of Leukippe, however, is an even more complicated business, because, it seems to me, we are led to see that Kleitophon projects two quite different roles on to her, each the product of his desires and neither of them her real self. Firstly, as a young man sexually attracted to a young woman, he wilfully misreads her behaviour as reciprocating his own desires; but secondly as a narrator shaping realistic experience into ideal romance, he also has to make her conform to the literary stereotype of the romantic heroine.

Let me take just one example of the first. At the beginning of their courtship Kleitophon finds himself unexpectedly alone in Leukippe's company, and greets her as his mistress (*despoina*):

> She smiled sweetly, indicating through her smile that she had understood why I had said 'Greetings, mistress'.

It is clear enough that he is reading her smile to signify what he wants it to signify, but her words tell a very different and less compliant story: 'I, your mistress? Don't say that.' There then ensues a little charade when he pretends to have been stung on the lips by a bee and gets her to whisper a charm, brushing his lips with hers as she does so. When he grabs her and kisses her openly, she again recoils: and again Kleitophon interprets her behaviour in a way that suits himself, even though in the same sentence he admits that he had no idea what her feelings were on this occasion:

> She acquiesced with a show of resistance. Then we saw her servant approaching in the distance and we separated, I unwilling and suffering and she – well, I do not know what her emotions were.[46]

Kleitophon's own narrative contains enough clues to hint that his reading of the amatory situation in which he finds himself is a partial and self-serving one. He does not say so, but the reader can see that in fact Kleitophon is remembering and projecting on to Leukippe the advice given him earlier by his cousin Kleinias that when women say 'no' they really mean 'yes'.[47] Eventually, of course, Kleitophon finds his way into Leukippe's bedroom;

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[46] 2,8,1.

[47] 1,10,4–6. De Temmerman 2006, 396–402 gives a detailed analysis of this and similar passages.

but he merely tells us that he had persuaded her to receive him there.[48] A sceptical reading of his account of the episode will leave the reader in doubt that she really was expecting him that night, and the reason she gives for eloping with Kleitophon is not that she cannot live without him, but that her mother's attentions are intolerable.[49]

Despite this, Kleitophon, especially in the later sections of his narrative, comes to dwell on her virginity as her defining characteristic.[50] This is heavily ironic when, on his own reading, she was earlier up for sex and had preserved her virginity only by accident; but it is the clearest indication that he is assimilating her to the conventional romantic heroine. The 'real' Leukippe remains inscrutable; but on one occasion we are allowed unmediated access to her voice. This is when she has become a slave and adopted the name Lakaina, and sends Kleitophon a letter, trenchantly blaming her misfortunes on him, and asking him to arrange her return to her home and family.[51] For a brief paragraph she pops out of the categories into which Kleitophon has boxed her; this is the voice neither of willing sex-object nor of generically demure virgin.

So, like Encolpius, Kleitophon is represented as imposing literature on life, and, like Petronius, Achilleus makes him reveal just enough of the 'truth' for the reader to see what he is doing. It is often said that Achilleus is parodying the conventions of the romantic genre,[52] but perhaps we should reverse this idea: it is precisely the divergences of his protagonists' actions and experiences from the standard generic moves and ethos that enable him, as hidden author, to show us Kleitophon rewriting those experiences as if they were a standard novel. As with the *Satyrica* the point is that the novel has two stories: the artificially literary one the narrator tells, and the realistic one the hidden author allows us to glimpse.[53]

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[48] 2,19,2.

[49] 2,30,1.

[50] De Temmerman 2006, 346–348 gathers the references.

[51] 5,18,2–6.

[52] Chew 2000 surveys the question and the use of the term *parody*. Durham 1938 acutely identifies parodic features in Achilleus, but draws a conclusion (that he was directly parodying Heliodoros) which is untenable in the light of papyrus finds which securely date Achilleus earlier than Heliodoros.

[53] I am grateful to members of the KYKNOS research group in Swansea for discussing with me the approach to Achilleus Tatius adumbrated in this paper: in particular to Koen De Temmerman, Meriel Jones, Saiichiro Nakatani, and Maria Oikonomou. They will all recognise how much I owe to our discussions. De Temmerman 2006, 306–410 develops the idea that Kleitophon is characterised by his manner of narration in a very detailed

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analysis. Jones 2007, in her final chapter, proposes a more radical approach to the problematic nature of Kleitophon as narrator.

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